Cases
2017Da271971 Action for Claim for Damages
Plaintiff Appellant
A
Since it is a minor, the legal representative B and C
Law Firm International Law Firm
Attorney Lee In-bok, Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant
Defendant Appellee
Ulsan Metropolitan City School Safety Mutual Aid Association
The judgment below
Busan High Court Decision 2016Na52555 Decided September 20, 2017
Imposition of Judgment
July 11, 2018
Text
The judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded to Busan High Court.
Reasons
The grounds of appeal are examined.
1. As to the grounds of appeal Nos. 1 and 2
A. Article 38(1) of the Act on the Prevention of and Compensation for Accidents at School (hereinafter “School Safety Act”) provides that “The nursing benefits shall be paid to the beneficiary or his/her guardian, etc. who actually receives the medical care benefits under the provisions of Article 36 where the medical care benefits under the provisions of Article 36 are medically needed to attend the school on a regular or occasional basis after receiving the medical care.” Article 17(2) of the Enforcement Decree of the School Safety Act provides that “The payment of the nursing benefits shall be paid on a monthly basis for the day on which the medical care is actually provided.” Thus, the nursing benefits may be paid as nursing benefits under the School Safety Act only for the day when the medical care is actually provided during the period after receiving the medical care.” In this context, the term “after receiving the medical care” can no longer expect the effect of treatment, and after the symptoms are fixed (see Supreme Court Decision 2013Da78976, Aug. 20, 2014).
Meanwhile, Article 17(2) of the Enforcement Decree of the School Safety Act provides that the subject of the payment of nursing benefits and the criteria for payment thereof shall be governed by attached Table 4. Thus, the subject of the payment falling under each subparagraph of attached Table 4 ought to be considered as cases where nursing care is required medically or occasionally. In order to claim nursing expenses until the closing of argument in the court below, even if the subject of the payment of nursing benefits was actually received the opening of the nursing and paid the expenses or did not actually spent the opening of the nursing expenses, it is required that at least the victim’s parents or spouse, etc. actually received the opening of the nursing (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 86Meu266, Jan. 19, 198; 91Da8081, May 14, 1991).
B. In light of the aforementioned legal principles and records, with respect to the claim for nursing expenses from September 6, 2012, which was caused by the instant accident to August 14, 2051, the date of occurrence of the accident, from September 6, 2012, the date of occurrence of the accident, to August 14, 2051, the court below should have examined whether the effect of medical treatment is no longer expected and the symptoms thereof are fixed, and then, it should have deliberated whether the Plaintiff was actually under nursing at all or from time after the date of the closing of argument in the court below.
C. However, according to the reasoning of the lower judgment and the first instance judgment partially accepted by the lower court, the lower court rejected the Plaintiff’s claim for the above nursing benefits on the ground that the Plaintiff’s claim for the nursing benefits of this case was unable to pay nursing benefits for the period for which the Plaintiff received hospitalized treatment, and the nursing expenses paid to nursing workers were paid during the period for which the Plaintiff received hospitalized treatment, and thus, the said claim cannot be deemed as a nursing expense claim for days on which the nursing was actually provided during the period after receiving hospitalized treatment
In so doing, the lower court erred by misapprehending the legal doctrine on nursing benefits under the School Safety Act, thereby adversely affecting the conclusion of the judgment without exhausting any necessary deliberation. Therefore, the allegation in the grounds of appeal assigning this error is with merit.
2. Conclusion
Therefore, the lower judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the lower court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.
Judges
Justices Lee Dong-won
Justices Kim In-bok, Counsel for defendant
Justices Park Sang-ok
Justices Park Il-san