In determining whether or not a disposition to revoke a driver's license due to a drunk driving is deviation or abuse of discretionary power, whether the general preventive aspect that should prevent traffic accidents caused by a drunk driving than the disadvantage of the party to whom the revocation of a driver's license will be suffered should be emphasized (affirmative)

In light of the fact that a motor vehicle is a mass means of transportation and accordingly, the need to strictly observe traffic regulations is greater as the traffic situation is congested on the day, and the traffic accidents caused by drunk driving are frequently and the result thereof is harsh, so it is necessary to strictly control driving in order to protect the majority of drivers and pedestrians, the necessity for public interest in preventing traffic accidents caused by drunk driving should be more emphasized, and the revocation of a driver's license should be more emphasized than the disadvantage suffered by the parties due to its revocation, unlike the cancellation of the general beneficial administrative act.

Article 93 (1) 1 of the Road Traffic Act, Article 27 of the Administrative Litigation Act

Supreme Court Decision 99Du9681 Decided December 10, 1999 (Gong2018Sang, 650) Supreme Court Decision 2017Du67476 Decided February 28, 2018

Plaintiff (Attorney Park Young-chul et al., Counsel for plaintiff-appellant)

The Commissioner of Gangwon-do Police Agency

Seoul High Court (Chuncheon) Decision 2016Nu1009 decided August 30, 2017

The judgment below is reversed and the case is remanded to Seoul High Court.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. citing the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance, the lower court acknowledged the fact that the Plaintiff driven under the influence of alcohol on January 15, 2016 at around 03:49: (a) and accepted the Plaintiff’s claim seeking revocation on the ground that the instant disposition for revocation of driver’s license was in violation of the law of deviation from the scope of discretion or abuse of discretion, on the following grounds:

A. On January 14, 2016, the Plaintiff was found to have been driving at around 03:49 on the following day after drinking alcohol from January 14, 201 to around 22:00.

B. After obtaining the first-class driver's license and the first-class driver's license, the Plaintiff did not have any record of driving under the influence of alcohol before regulating the instant drinking driving, and the distance of driving at the time did not change.

C. The Plaintiff worked as a local driving assistant of the ○○○○○ Office of Education and received ex officio dismissal on March 22, 2016 due to the instant driver’s license revocation disposition. The Plaintiff seems to have suffered excessively harsh treatment to the Plaintiff who supported his family while living as a public official with good faith by receiving two exemplary public officials commendation.

2. However, the lower court’s determination is difficult to accept for the following reasons.

A. In light of the fact that a motor vehicle is a mass means of transportation and accordingly, the need to strictly observe traffic regulations is greater as the traffic situation is congested on the day, and the traffic accidents caused by drunk driving are frequent and there are many cases where the results are harsh, so it is necessary to strictly control driving to protect the majority of drivers and pedestrians, the need for public interest in preventing traffic accidents caused by drunk driving should be more serious, and the revocation of a driver's license should be more emphasized than the disadvantage suffered by the parties due to the revocation of the revocation, unlike the cancellation of the ordinary beneficial administrative act (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 9Du9681, Dec. 10, 199; 2017Du67476, Feb. 28, 2018).

B. In the same purport, the Supreme Court has taken a strict attitude on the lower court’s judgment that it was unlawful on the grounds that the driver’s license was revoked due to the deviation or abuse of discretion on driving a motor vehicle. (See Supreme Court Decision 9Du9681, supra) In other words, the Supreme Court held that the revocation of the driver’s license was justifiable on the ground that the driver who stopped a motor vehicle to the extent of 8 km by taking about 5 hours after drinking alcohol up to 70 hours (see Supreme Court Decision 9Du9681, Feb. 9, 200; Supreme Court Decision 207Du7067, Feb. 9, 207; Supreme Court Decision 207Du7167, Feb. 27, 2007).

C. According to the records, the blood alcohol level measured at the time of the Plaintiff’s drinking more than five hours exceeds the individual criteria for revocation under the Enforcement Rule of the Road Traffic Act as 0.129%, and the police dispatched after receiving a report that the Plaintiff was able to cause a traffic accident while driving under the influence of alcohol and the other party driver and vagabonds. In light of the above legal principles, the above circumstance cited by the court below cannot be deemed as an illegal disposition that deviates from or abused the limits of discretion.

D. Nevertheless, the lower court determined that the revocation disposition of the instant driver’s license was unlawful by deviating from or abusing the bounds of discretion. In so doing, it erred by misapprehending the legal doctrine on deviation and abuse of discretionary power, thereby adversely affecting the conclusion of the judgment. The allegation contained in the grounds of appeal

3. Therefore, the lower judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the lower court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Jo Hee-de (Presiding Justice)