[1] The validity of the terms of exemption from driving without a license in a life insurance contract (limited invalidation)

[2] The case holding that the insurer may not refuse the payment of insurance money on the ground of a non-licensed driving exemption clause in case where the insured under a life insurance contract had driven a car during the suspension period of a driver's license and caused the death due to his mistake in driving

[1] Under Articles 732-2 and 739 of the Commercial Act, an insurer of a life insurance contract which covers death or bodily injury as an insured event shall pay insurance proceeds even if the insured event was caused by gross negligence, and Article 663 of the same Act shall not put any disadvantage to the policyholder, the insured, or the beneficiary by a special contract between the parties. Thus, if the terms and conditions of a life insurance contract which covers death or bodily injury stipulate that the insured shall be exempted not only from liability due to intentional or intentional act, but also from liability due to negligent act, including gross negligence, as a whole, if the terms and conditions of the life insurance contract which covers death or bodily injury stipulate that the insured shall be exempted from liability due to an act which is assessed by negligence (including gross negligence) rather than intentional or intentional act of the insured, it is invalid against Articles 732-2, 739 and 663 of the same Act.

[2] The case holding that in a case where the insured under a life insurance contract died due to an error in his driving while driving a car during the suspension period of driver's license, the insurer cannot refuse payment of insurance money on the ground of the exemption clause on driving only because the accident was in a state ofless driving, unless it was caused by the insured's intentional or intentional act.

[1] Articles 63, 732-2, 739, and 739 of the Commercial Act / [2] Articles 663, 732-2, and 739 of the Commercial Act

[1] [1]

[Plaintiff-Appellant-Appellee] Plaintiff 1 and 1 other (Law Firm Gyeong, Attorneys Park Jong-soo et al., Counsel for plaintiff-appellant-appellant-appellee)

[Plaintiff-Appellant] Plaintiff 1 and 1 other (Law Firm Gyeong, Attorneys Park Jae-soo et al., Counsel for plaintiff-appellant)

[Plaintiff-Appellant] Plaintiff 1 and 1 other (Law Firm Gyeong, Attorneys Park Jong-soo et al., Counsel for plaintiff-appellant)

Plaintiff 1 and one other (Attorney Kim Young-soo, Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Samsung Fire Insurance Co., Ltd. (Attorney Han-hee et al., Counsel for the defendant-appellant)

Seoul High Court Decision 95Na32978 delivered on December 21, 1995

[Plaintiff-Appellant] Plaintiff 1 and 1 other (Law Firm Gyeong, Attorneys Park Jong-soo et al., Counsel for plaintiff-appellant)

1. The defendant shall pay to the plaintiffs 50 million won with 5% per annum from February 11, 1995 to August 3, 1995, 25% per annum from the next day to the date of full payment, and 5% per annum to the date of full payment.

2. The plaintiffs' remaining claims are dismissed.

3. The costs of lawsuit shall be borne by the defendant.

4. Paragraph 1 can be provisionally executed.

The defendant shall pay to the plaintiffs 50 million won with 55% per annum from January 17, 1994 to the sentencing date of this case, 25% per annum from the next day to the full payment date, and 25% per annum with each interest rate. This is as set forth in the order.

1. Basic facts

The following facts are not disputed between the parties, or can be acknowledged by taking into account the whole purport of the pleadings in each entry of Gap evidence Nos. 1 through 9-8.

A. On September 30, 1994, the deceased Nonparty entered into a new age comprehensive insurance contract (hereinafter “instant insurance contract”) with the content that the Defendant Company, the insured, the beneficiary, the beneficiary, the legal inheritor, the insurance amount of KRW 100,000,000, the insurance amount of KRW 198,610, the insurance amount of KRW 198,610, the insurance amount of KRW 1610, September 30, 1994 for the insurance period from September 16, 1994:0 to September 30, 200, when the insured is on board a transport instrument during the insurance period, and as a result, when the insured is on board a transport instrument during the period of insurance period due to sudden and remote accidents and dies within 180 days from the date of direct damage, with the content that the insured would pay KRW 100,000,000 for the death benefit to the beneficiary.

B. On November 16, 1994, the Nonparty: (a) operated a EXV car owned by it on a 30th day; (b) was killed on the following day during the process of the construction of the road near the site of the road expansion works in the Hancheon-gun, Chungcheongnam-gun; (c) while the road was in the vicinity of the site of the road expansion works in the same military area, the Nonparty was trying to avoid a stone left alone on the road due to the said construction works; (d) was laid down on the 18th day above the road, and was receiving treatment by suffering from the fluenc fever, and the Plaintiffs were the parents of the Nonparty.

C. However, among the insurance clauses of the insurance contract of this case, Article 3(1) of the insurance contract provides that "the company shall not compensate for any damage caused by the following causes, not directly or indirectly," and subparagraph 4 of Article 3 provides that "the insured shall not drive without any license." The above non-party obtained a Class-I driver's license on October 27, 1989, but was subject to a disposition suspending the driver's license for 107 days from October 18, 1994 by the Chief of the relevant Police Station on October 18, 1994, and was returned to the relevant Police Station on the 18th of the same month.

2. The assertion and judgment

A. The plaintiff and the defendant's assertion

The plaintiff is an accident that occurred while driving without a license, since the accident itself occurs due to negligence. Thus, the non-license exemption clause of the insurance contract of this case, which uniformly states the accident caused by driving without a license, can result in the insurer's exemption from liability. Thus, the accident caused by negligence may result in the insurer's exemption from liability. Therefore, in violation of Article 663 of the Commercial Act, which provides for the prohibition against disadvantageous change of the policyholder, etc., the defendant asserts that the plaintiff, the beneficiary

On the other hand, this case's non-licensed exemption clause provides that the insurer's non-licensed exemption clause is not limited to a non-licensed driving on the ground that the cause of the accident is not a non-licensed driving, but to exclude it from the insurer's compensation. Thus, it is valid as it does not violate Article 663 of the Commercial Act, and the above traffic accident occurred under the state of non-licensed driving. Thus, the defendant does not have the obligation to pay insurance money

Therefore, the following should be examined as to whether the defendant is liable to pay the above insurance proceeds to the plaintiffs.

(b) Markets:

(1) Article 732-2 of the Commercial Act provides that an insurance contract of which death is an insured accident shall not be exempt from liability to pay the insured amount even in cases where the accident occurred due to gross negligence of the policyholder, the insured, or the beneficiary, and Article 739 of the Commercial Act provides that an accident insurance contract shall apply mutatis mutandis pursuant to Article 739 of the Commercial Act. Article 663 of the Commercial Act provides that a special agreement between the parties shall not make any disadvantageous changes to the policyholder, the insured, or the beneficiary. Since the insurance contract of this case constitutes an insurance contract which constitutes an insured accident for which the injury is an insured accident, the above provision shall apply. Thus,

However, in the case of unlicensed driving, the possibility of occurrence of an insurance accident is high compared to the case of a person who does not drive or drive a licensed person. However, the possibility of such occurrence is not to harm the homogeneity between the members in the insurance, but to the extent that the possibility is not to harm the homogeneity of risks. In addition, in the case ofless driving, the intentional criminal act is subject to criminal punishment, but in the case ofless driving, the intention is not related to theless driving itself, and it is not directly related to the death or injury, and the degree is not against the good faith and ethics of the parties in the insurance contract with compensation for

Therefore, in light of the provisions of the above Commercial Code, if the above non-licensed exemption clause includes not only the case of an insurance accident caused by an intentional act, but also the case caused by an act which is assessed by negligence (including negligence), it shall be null and void as to an accident caused by negligence.

Thus, even though the above non-party is considered to have caused an accident while driving a car during the driver's license suspension period, it cannot be deemed to have caused an intentional or intentional act corresponding to the above non-party. Thus, the defendant is liable to pay insurance money to the plaintiffs who are beneficiary.

(2) In regard to this, the defendant, under Article 659 (2) of the former Commercial Act (amended by Act No. 4470 of Dec. 31, 1991), provides that "any insurance contract involving death or bodily injury as an insured accident shall not be relieved of the liability to pay the insured amount even if the accident occurred due to gross negligence of the policyholder, the insured, or the beneficiary. However, this shall not apply in the case of death due to the execution of death penalty." However, the above provision was deleted by the above amendment, and Article 659 (1) of the same Act provides that "if the insurance accident occurred due to intentional or gross negligence of the policyholder, the insured, or the beneficiary, the insurer shall not be liable to pay the insurance amount." Thus, the purport of Articles 659 (1) and 663 of the Commercial Act is that the insurer shall not extend the insurer's exemption from liability in accordance with the terms and conditions, and therefore, the non-license exemption clause in the insurance contract of this case shall not extend the insurer's exemption from liability.

Therefore, Article 659(2) of the former Commercial Act is applicable only to cases where only the original death or injury is an insured accident, and it has been deleted from the general provisions through the amendment of the Commercial Act, but it has been newly established as Article 732-2 and applied mutatis mutandis to accident insurance pursuant to Article 739. Thus, if the insurance accident is not caused intentionally, the defendant shall pay the insurance money even if it is caused by gross negligence, and as stated in the above (1), the non-licensed indemnity clause of the insurance contract of this case is also exempted from the accident caused by negligence not caused by the non-party's intentional or intentional act, and thus, it is null and void against Article 732-2 and Article 739 of the Commercial Act and Article 663 of the Commercial Act (Articles 732-2 and 739 of the Commercial Act are applicable only to the insurance contract which is a death or injury insured accident, and Article 739 of the Commercial Act provides that the insurer shall not be liable for damages to a third party, which is a breach of Article 269(2) of the Commercial Act.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, according to the plaintiffs' shares in inheritance, the defendant is obligated to pay the plaintiffs 50,000,000 won per annum from February 11, 1995, which is served on the defendant by the plaintiff's complaint seeking the payment of the above insurance money (1,00,000 won x 1/2) and damages for delay from February 17, 1994, which is the day following the occurrence of the above traffic accident, to the defendant's claim for the payment of the above insurance money (the plaintiff is liable for delay from December 17, 1994, but the above claim is rejected). The defendant is not liable for delay when the plaintiff's claim for insurance money is made at the time of the judgment on August 3, 1995, which is the sentencing day of this case, 5% per annum under the Civil Act, 25% per annum under the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Promotion of Legal Proceedings, etc. from the next day to the full payment day. Thus, the plaintiffs' claim in this case is justified within the above scope of recognition, and the remainder is dismissed.

Judges Kim Hwang-sik (Presiding Judge) and Kim Jong-soo