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1. All appeals filed by the plaintiffs are dismissed.
2. The costs of appeal are assessed against the Plaintiffs.
The purport of the claim and appeal is the purport of the appeal.
Reasons
1. The reasons for the court’s explanation concerning this case are as stated in the part of the judgment of the first instance except for the corresponding part of the judgment of the first instance as stated in the following paragraph (2). Thus, this is citing it as it is in accordance with the main sentence of Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act.
2. As to the part of the judgment of the court of first instance, “a person who has raised an objection to a distribution” in Section 12 of the judgment of the court of first instance was used as “a person who has raised an objection to a distribution by the members of the instant company”, and as to the same part of Section 13 of the said judgment, “a person who has filed a lawsuit claiming a cancellation of registration of the registration of the establishment of a neighboring mortgage prior to the foregoing registration of the establishment of a new mortgage and
A. Under the 13th judgment of the first instance court, the “common facilities of sports facilities business” shall be “common essential facilities of sports facilities business”.
A. On the 15th judgment of the first instance court, the 3rd judgment “a facility essential for the skiing ground business” is “a facility essential for the skiing ground business in accordance with the facility standards for the skiing ground business.”
A. According to the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance, Article 30(2) of the former Sports Facilities Act (amended by Act No. 6907, May 29, 2003; August 30, 2005) provides that “The acquisition of ownership of the instant facilities cannot be assessed only by acquiring the ownership of the instant facilities.” In addition, the acquisition of essential facilities according to the facility standards for the skiing ground business prescribed by the former Sports Facilities Act and the Enforcement Rule cannot be assessed as having acquired the ownership of the instant facilities, and at that time, Article 27(2) of the former Sports Facilities Act (amended by Act No. 6907, May 29, 2003; the effective date was August 30, 2005) refers to Article 30(2) of the former Sports Facilities Act (amended by Act No. 30(2) of the Sports Facilities Act) which does not allow the retroactive application of Article 30(2) of the former Sports Facilities Act. Accordingly, Defendant A does not have any legal basis for the acquisition of ownership of the instant facilities.