A. In a case of application for challenge, whether the opinion of a judge against whom a motion for challenge has been filed under Article 41(2) of the Civil Procedure Act is not determined, and whether the decision is incomplete without going through the procedure for stating the opinion of the same judge under the proviso of Article 42(2) of the same Act

B. The meaning of “when there is any circumstance in which it is difficult to expect a fair trial” under Article 39(1) of the Civil Procedure Act, and whether it constitutes a replacement of an attorney due to a change of the presiding judge (negative)

A. In a case of application for challenge, the submission of a written opinion submitted by a judge to whom the challenge has been challenged under Article 41(2) of the Civil Procedure Act is not determined, but the failure to undergo the procedure for stating the opinion of the judge who has been challenged under the proviso of Article 42(2) of the same Act is not illegal

B. Article 39(1) of the Civil Procedure Act provides that “When there is a circumstance in which it is difficult to expect the fairness of a trial” refers to the case where there is a subjective circumstance that the party would be aware of whether it will be an unfair trial, but it refers to the case where there is an objective circumstance that is deemed reasonable to have the suspicion that it would be an unfair trial in view of the relationship with a judge as a matter of ordinary person’s judgment. Thus, even if one of the parties to a lawsuit replaces the attorney following the change of a presiding judge, such reason cannot be said to constitute an objective circumstance where it is difficult to expect the fairness of a trial

A. Articles 41(2), 42(2), and 183 of the Civil Procedure Act; Article 39(1) of the Civil Procedure Act

B. Supreme Court Order 64Ma830 Dated Apr. 4, 1966, 67Ma830 Dated Mar. 28, 1967 (No. 15) 67Ma89 Dated Oct. 21, 1987 (Gong1987,1802) 87Du10 Dated Oct. 21, 1987

Re-appellant

Gwangju High Court Order 92Ra8 dated July 31, 1992

The reappeal is dismissed.

The grounds of reappeal are examined.

The reasoning of the judgment of the court below is based on the reasoning of the court below, and the court below judged that the presiding judge of the case in the merits as stated in the judgment cannot recognize that he did not have a coercive and insulting attitude only to the plaintiff-appellant. In light of the records, the above fact-finding of the court below is justified and there is no error of law in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the submission of vindication

The decision of party members cited by the theory of the lawsuit is a different issue and it cannot be compared to the opinion of the case.

The court below did not judge the written opinion submitted by the judge to whom an application for challenge was filed pursuant to Article 41(2) of the Civil Procedure Act, but did not go through the procedure for stating the opinion of the judge who was challenged pursuant to the proviso of Article 42(2) of the same Act, and it cannot be deemed unlawful in

The court below held that even if the presiding judge of the case on the merits in the judgment of the court below did not know about the re-appellant as evidence, "A person who raised an objection at the time of the past time of the party's application for examination as evidence," such circumstance alone does not make it difficult to expect the fairness of the trial. However, according to the reasoning of the court below, it is clear that the presiding judge does not recognize the fact that he made a statement like the theory, and even if the presiding judge made such statement to the re-appellant, it cannot be viewed as a case where there are objective circumstances that make it difficult to expect the fairness of the trial, barring any special circumstances, and thus, the argument cannot be accepted.

In light of the records, it is proper that the court below's decision that the protocol of witness examination against the non-party 1 and non-party 2 in the first instance court of the merits case in the judgment of the court below was prepared falsely, and the presiding judge of the appellate court did not intentionally adopt the witness who requested the re-appellant to maintain the judgment of the court of first instance that dismissed the claim of the re-appellant, and the presiding judge of the appellate court decided that the witness questioning or intervention in order to intentionally induce the Re-Appellant to give testimony unfavorable to the re-appellant, restricted the testimony favorable to the re-appellant, or led the re-appellant to prepare the witness examination protocol as disadvantageous to the re-appellant

The court may freely decide whether to accept the evidence, unless it is the only evidence for the facts alleged by the parties, and the Re-Appellant applied for the witness examination by the judge in charge of the first instance court, the taking of the taking of the taking of the taking of the taking of the taking of the witness examination against the non-party 1 and the non-party 2 for the purpose of proof by asserting that the protocol of the taking of the witness examination against the non-party 1 and the non-party 2 was prepared falsely as determined by the court below, but the presiding judge did not adopt the above protocol on the ground that it is nothing more than the facts of the initial case, and thus it cannot be deemed an unfair litigation direction. The

According to Article 298 of the Civil Procedure Act, in the examination of witness, the other party's cross-examination, supplementary examination, and intervention by the presiding judge in addition to the main examination of the witness. As determined by the court below, when the presiding judge of this case examines non-party 3 of the witness, he testified to the Re-Appellant's main examination of the Re-Appellant's main examination of the Re-Appellant's main examination of the Re-Appellant to the effect that the reputation or reputation of mountain among the inherited property at the time of the Re-Appellant's death of the re-Appellant's predecessor is satisfied. The presiding judge did not give clear answer as to whether the pre-examination of the aforementioned witness's main examination of the inherited property at the time of the death of the defendant, because the aforementioned witness did not know that the inherited property at the time of the aforementioned witness's death was a large number of answers, and thus, the court below's decision that the aforementioned witness's witness's cross-examination of the defendant's legal representative did not know what the above legal guarantee under the Act was used, but that the witness's name was used, and that the witness's ability to read.

When there is a circumstance in which it is difficult to expect the fairness of a trial under Article 39 (1) of the Civil Procedure Act does not refer to the time when there is a subjective reason that the parties might be the unfair judgment, but it refers to the time when there is an objective reason that it is reasonable to have the suspicion that the parties will make an unfair judgment in view of the relationship with a judge as a matter of ordinary person's judgment. Thus, even if the defendant of the case on the merits replaces the attorney according to the change of presiding judge, such reason cannot be deemed to constitute an objective reason that makes it difficult to expect the fairness of a trial, and the judgment of the court below to the same purport is correct, and there is no error of law in the incomplete hearing. All arguments are without merit.

Therefore, the reappeal is dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.