Plaintiff

The Administrator of the Korea National Labor Agency;

August 18, 2009

Suwon District Court Decision 2008Guhap8216 Decided December 15, 2008

1. The plaintiff's appeal is dismissed.

2. The costs of appeal shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

The judgment of the first instance is revoked. The defendant's disposition of early re-employment allowance against the plaintiff on January 31, 2008 is revoked.

1. Quotation of the reasons for the judgment of the first instance;

The reasoning for the court’s explanation concerning this case is as follows, except for the change of “2.(c)(3)” in the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance as follows, and therefore, it is identical to each corresponding part of the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance. Thus, it is acceptable in accordance with Article 8(2) of the Administrative Litigation Act and Article 420 of the

2. Parts changed;

“(3) Determination as to the allegation that the instant disposition was unlawful on the grounds of force majeure

Article 49(2) of the Employment Insurance Act provides that the grace period for job-seeking benefits following high-amount receipt of money and other valuables shall be calculated by adding three months to the benefit period of an eligible recipient under Article 48 of the same Act, if the necessity of stabilizing job-seeking benefits and promoting job-seeking activities is relatively weak compared to that of a regular retirement worker, and the job-seeking benefits remain as a unemployed worker after the expiration of such period, thereby promoting substantial allocation of job-seeking benefits under the Employment Insurance Act. However, Article 59(2) of the Employment Insurance Act provides that where the grace period for job-seeking benefits expires, the eligible recipient's waiting period under Article 49 of the same Act (seven days after the date of filing of the unemployment), the benefit period for which job-seeking benefits are postponed shall be determined on the basis that the recipient's period of early re-employment benefits is calculated by adding three months to the benefit period of the eligible recipient under Article 48 of the same Act, and Article 48 of the Enforcement Decree of the Employment Insurance Act does not provide for re-employment benefits corresponding to three months.

Therefore, as to whether the Plaintiff satisfies the payment requirements under Article 84(1)2 of the Enforcement Decree of the Employment Insurance Act, the above provision was revised to the purport that the Plaintiff shall pay early re-employment allowance to a worker under Article 61(1) of the Enforcement Decree of the Employment Insurance Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 18165, Dec. 18, 2003; Presidential Decree No. 18165, Dec. 18, 2003; and that even if the Plaintiff is employed as a self-employed person, representative of the company, or officer of the company, etc., in order to increase employment benefit, he shall be paid early re-employment allowance. The Plaintiff did not report the fact that the Plaintiff did not pay early re-employment allowance to the Defendant for the pertinent self-employed person, etc., whose name was changed from the "employment allowance" to the "re-employment allowance", and that the Plaintiff did not receive early re-employment allowance without reporting the fact that the Plaintiff did not meet the payment requirements for early re-employment allowance.

However, in cases where an eligible recipient who has been recognized as having an intention to find a job as an employee under Article 84(1)1 of the Enforcement Decree of the Employment Insurance Act, is physically unable to re-employment report pursuant to the requirements of subparagraph 2, and thus is unable to receive early re-employment allowances because he/she becomes unable to receive early re-employment allowances pursuant to the above subparagraph 2, but this is merely a cause attributable to an eligible recipient who fails to report re-employment activities in accordance with the requirements of subparagraph 2. However, it is not impossible to report in advance the preparation activities for self-employment as a re-employment activity on the ground of such case.

Therefore, since the disposition of this case cannot be deemed to have been made on the ground of force majeure, the plaintiff's assertion is groundless.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, the judgment of the first instance court is just in its conclusion, and the plaintiff's appeal is dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition.

Judges Ahn Young-chul (Presiding Judge)