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1. The plaintiff's appeal is dismissed.
2. The costs of appeal shall be borne by the Plaintiff.
The purport of the claim and appeal is the purport of the appeal.
Reasons
1. The grounds for appeal by the plaintiff citing the judgment of the court of first instance are not significantly different from the allegations in the court of first instance, and the fact-finding and judgment of the court of first instance are recognized as legitimate even if the evidence presented by the plaintiff was presented to the court of first instance.
Therefore, the reasoning for this court's explanation is as follows, and this court's reasoning is the same as the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance, except for supplementing the judgment that is identical to that of paragraph (2) as the ground for appeal in this court, and thus, this court's reasoning is cited as it is in accordance with Article 8 (2) of the Administrative Litigation Act and the main sentence of
[Supplementary part] The second part of the judgment of the court of first instance [based on recognition] shall be subject to the second part "this court" as "the first part."
The 11th judgment of the first instance court, "the plaintiff" of the 6th, 12th, 2, 4, 5, and 10th, shall be raised in all as "the deceased".
2. Supplementary determination on the Plaintiff’s assertion in this Court
A. The summary of the argument 1) The first instance court denied the causal relationship between the deceased’s official duties and the death on the ground that the deceased had been under continuous medical treatment with high blood pressure for a long time. However, the deceased did not have any risk factors of cerebral tension except for high blood pressure. As risk factors of the above clinical disease, stress, romatic, and lavers, etc. were found, and it should be deemed that cerebral ties and stress, which were borne by the deceased in the line of duty, caused cerebral dystrophism and probathum transfusion by combined action with high blood pressure of the deceased, which is the low-tension disease of the deceased. 2) Since the electronic computer system used by the deceased for additional hours of work, which was used by the deceased, did not properly reflect the actual excess working hours, it should be additionally recognized as excess working hours prior to the death of the deceased based on the written statement, etc. of the teachers submitted by the Plaintiff.
B. Determination 1: (a) between the state of peace and health of the deceased and the death.