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(영문) 대법원 2012. 5. 24. 선고 2012도2763 판결
[아동·청소년의성보호에관한법률위반(음란물제작·배포등)[예비적죄명:성폭력범죄의처벌등에관한특례법위반(카메라등이용촬영)]·아동·청소년의성보호에관한법률위반(강간등)(예비적죄명:강요)][공2012하,1198]
Main Issues

[1] The significance and legal nature of the disclosure order and notification order system under the Act on the Protection of Children and Juveniles against Sexual Abuse (=the security disposition of a kind)

[2] The base point of time for determining “where a defendant is a child or juvenile” as an exception to disclosure orders or notification orders under the proviso to Article 38(1) and the proviso to Article 38-2(1) of the Act on the Protection of Children and Juveniles against Sexual Abuse (=the time when a judgment in fact is rendered)

Summary of Judgment

[1] The disclosure order procedure under the Act on the Protection of Children and Juveniles against Sexual Abuse (hereinafter “Child and Juvenile Protection Act”) is a system that allows anyone who has undergone necessary procedures by taking measures to disclose personal information of sex offenders against children and juveniles through an information and communications network for a certain period of time to allow anyone to peruse the disclosed information of persons subject to the disclosure order via the Internet. Furthermore, the disclosure order procedure under the aforementioned Act is a kind of security measure aimed at effectively preventing sexual crimes against children and juveniles and protecting children and juveniles from such crimes, and its purpose, character, contents and purport of the Act on the Protection of Children and Juveniles against Sexual Abuse, etc. is distinguishable from the ex post facto punishment that imposes liability on a person who has committed the crime, etc.

[2] The proviso to Article 38(1) and the proviso to Article 38-2(1) of the Act on the Protection of Children and Juveniles against Sexual Abuse provides that "where a fine is imposed on a sex offense case against a child or juvenile, or a defendant is a child or juvenile, or any other special circumstance that may not disclose personal information exists, the disclosure order or notification order shall be deemed an exception to the disclosure order. In light of the nature and nature of the disclosure order and notification order, the content and purport of the relevant Act, etc., whether the above "where the defendant is a child or juvenile," which is provided as an exception to the disclosure order, should be determined at the time of

[Reference Provisions]

[1] Articles 38 and 38-2 of the Act on the Protection of Children and Juveniles against Sexual Abuse / [2] Articles 2 subparag. 1, 38(1), and 38-2(1) of the Act on the Protection of Children and Juveniles against Sexual Abuse

Reference Cases

[1] Supreme Court Decision 2010Do14393, 2010Do120 Decided March 24, 201

Escopics

Defendant

upper and high-ranking persons

Defendant

Defense Counsel

Attorney Na Sung-tae

Judgment of the lower court

Seoul High Court Decision 2011No3355 decided February 2, 2012

Text

The appeal is dismissed.

Reasons

The grounds of appeal are examined.

The disclosure order procedure prescribed by the Act on the Protection of Children and Juveniles against Sexual Abuse (hereinafter “Child and Juvenile Protection Act”) is a system that allows anyone who has undergone necessary procedures by taking measures to disclose personal information of sex offenders against children and juveniles through information and communications networks for a certain period of time so that anyone may peruse such information via the Internet. In addition, the disclosure order procedure under the aforementioned Act is a kind of security measure aimed at effectively preventing sexual crimes against children and juveniles and protecting children and juveniles from such crimes, and its purpose, character, content and purport, etc. are distinguishable from the ex post facto punishment, which is to pursue liability for the purpose of providing information to persons who have committed the crime (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 201Do3134, Apr. 14, 201; 201Do301, Apr. 14, 2014).

Meanwhile, the proviso of Article 38(1) and the proviso of Article 38-2(1) of the Child and Juvenile Sex Protection Act provide that "where a fine is imposed on a sex offense case against a child or juvenile, or where a defendant is a child or juvenile, or where it is deemed that any other special circumstance exists that no personal information shall be disclosed, the disclosure order or notification order shall be given." Thus, in light of the nature and nature of the disclosure order and the nature of the disclosure order and the content and purport of the relevant Act, etc., whether the above "where a defendant is a child or juvenile," which is an exception to the disclosure order, should be determined at the time of

According to the reasoning of the judgment of the court below, the court below reversed the judgment of the court of first instance that found the defendant guilty of the facts charged regarding sexual assault crimes against children and juveniles and sentenced the disclosure order and notification order, and issued the disclosure order and notification order for each three years to the defendant ex officio, on the ground that the defendant was not subject to the disclosure order and notification order as "children and juveniles" under the Child and Juveniles Protection Act at the time of the judgment of the court of first instance, but was excluded from "children and juveniles" after the lapse of January 1 of the year in which he reached the age of 19.

Examining the records in light of the above legal principles, the above measures of the court below are just and acceptable, and contrary to the allegations in the grounds of appeal, there were no errors in the misapprehension of legal principles as to an order of disclosure or notification under the Child and Juvenile Protection Act.

In addition, in this case where the defendant was sentenced to a punishment of less than 10 years of imprisonment, the reason that the amount of punishment is unreasonable is not a legitimate ground for appeal.

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Park Poe-dae (Presiding Justice)

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