(영문) 인천지방법원 2016.1.8.선고 2015구합51235 판결

On April 8, 2015, the Defendant’s entrustment of electronic publication (digital publishing) training courses to the Plaintiffs on April 8, 2015, the entrustment of one-year course and restriction on recognition, the cancellation of publication editing design (personal design, e-Bok) training courses, and the disposition of restriction on entrustment of and recognition for one-year course is revoked.

Reasons

1. Details of the disposition;

A. The plaintiffs are operating ‘D Driving Schools' in Bupyeong-gu Incheon Metropolitan Government C (In Bupyeong-dong, 4th floor) (hereinafter “the instant private teaching institute”).

B. According to Article 16(1) of the Act on the Development of Workplace Skills of Workers (hereinafter referred to as the "Act"), the plaintiffs were entrusted with four training courses, including "electronic publication (digital publishing)" as the national key and strategic occupational categories (hereinafter referred to as "period and strategic occupational categories"), and 14 training courses, such as "publication editors (personal design, e-Ok)", were approved pursuant to Article 19(1) of the Act; the plaintiffs were entrusted with 20 training courses (hereinafter referred to as "electronic publication (digital publishing) and the 5th anniversary of the recognition of the above training courses; the plaintiffs were entrusted with the above training courses for 15th anniversary of the recognition of the 6th anniversary of the Act's integrated review of workplace skill development training course; the plaintiffs were entrusted with the foregoing training courses (hereinafter referred to as "education courses of this case"); the employees of private teaching institutes in charge of the administrative affairs of this case; and the 1th anniversary of the foregoing training courses for the reasons that they were entrusted with the training courses of this case."

[Reasons for Recognition] Facts without dispute, Gap evidence Nos. 1 through 3, Gap evidence Nos. 1 to 5 and 12 (including each number), the purport of the whole pleadings

2. Whether the disposition is lawful;

A. The plaintiff's assertion

1) The above E entered F into a training course with the consent of F by telephone upon seeking the conclusion and recognition of the consignment contract for the instant training course through HRD-Net, and thereafter, on January 19, 2015, the training course was conducted through a modified lecturer upon filing an application for change of the training instructor with the Defendant on January 19, 2015. As such, the Plaintiffs cannot be deemed to have been entrusted with or recognized with the training course by “any falsity or any other unlawful means” under Articles 16(2)1 and 19(2)1 of the Act.

2) Furthermore, considering the fact that even if not F, it was sufficiently able to secure instructors to be registered as training instructors, the training courses were conducted through the changed instructor with the approval of the change of training instructors, the fact that the instant private teaching institute has provided continuous and strict education to the employees of the private teaching institute, and the fact that the personal records of the training instructor in the entrustment or recognition of the training course are relatively minor requirements compared to other application requirements in the form of a formal matter, it cannot be deemed that there was intentional or gross negligence of the plaintiffs, and the degree of the violation is minor and minor, and the disposition of this case without mitigation may be mitigated by up to 1/2 of the administrative disposition criteria set forth in Article 6 [Attachment Table 1-2] and Article 6-3 [Attachment Table 1-2] of the Enforcement Rule of the Act.

B. Relevant statutes

The entries in the attached Table-related statutes are as follows.

C. Determination

1) Whether there is a ground for disposition

Pursuant to Articles 16 (1) and 19 (1) of the Act, the State or a local government which intends to conduct training for the development of vocational skills for a fixed and strategic occupation may conduct training by entering into an entrustment contract with a person prescribed by Presidential Decree, and any person who intends to operate an account-based joint training course shall obtain recognition from the Minister of Employment and Labor. According to Articles 16 (2) 1 and 19 (2) 1 of the Act, where a person entrusted with workplace skill development training and a person recognized as an account-based joint training course has been entrusted or recognized by fraud or other improper means, the entrustment contract shall be terminated or revoked.

Article 13(1) and (3) of the Enforcement Decree of the Act provides that the State and local governments shall enter into an entrustment contract containing matters concerning training courses and training contents, training subjects and the management of trainees, termination of entrustment contracts, etc. When entrusting vocational ability development training. The standards for entrustment of vocational ability development training shall be determined by the Minister of Employment and Labor in consideration of the occupational categories of training, training experience, education and training experience, facilities and equipment, teachers and instructors, evaluation results under Article 53 of the Act. Article 17(1) and (2) of the Enforcement Decree of the Act provides that the Minister of Employment and Labor may recognize training courses that meet the requirements determined by the Minister of Employment and Labor, such as training period and time, teachers and instructors, training contents, training course name and training contents, training period and time, training method, training place, training facilities, equipment, teachers, instructors, and training expenses.

Therefore, since occupational ability development training or the requirements for the conclusion or recognition of an entrustment contract for the training course, "a teacher or an instructor" constitutes a false entry of matters concerning teachers and instructors in a false manner, and entered them into or obtained recognition of an entrustment contract accordingly.If such entry is made by fraud or other improper means, it is necessary to terminate or revoke an entrustment contract in accordance with Articles 16 (2) 1 and 19 (2) 1 of the Act as it falls under the case where an entrustment contract is concluded or recognized by fraud or other improper means.

With respect to the instant case, it is insufficient to recognize that E, as claimed by the Plaintiffs, has entered F as a training instructor upon obtaining F’s consent in entering into an entrustment contract and recognition of the instant training course. There is no other evidence to acknowledge it. Rather, considering the following: (a) although F was not determined to teach the instant training course by taking account of the personal information and documentary evidence of F secured by other private teaching institutes; and (b) although E was determined to teach the instant training course, it is recognized that E entered F as a training instructor without F’s consent and obtained the conclusion and recognition of an entrustment contract for the instant training course; (c) it is deemed that E entered one of the requirements for entering into an entrustment contract and recognition as a training instructor without permission; and (d) entered into an entrustment contract or other unlawful method after entering into an entrustment contract with respect to one of the teachers and instructors, which is an unlawful training instructor; and (e) the same applies to the case where E entered into an entrustment contract with respect to the instant training course by false or unlawful means as prescribed by Article 16(2)1 and (2)1)19 of the Act.

Therefore, this part of the plaintiffs' assertion cannot be accepted.

2) Whether the discretion is deviates or abused

Whether a punitive administrative disposition deviates from or abused the scope of discretionary power under the social norms shall be determined by comparing and comparing the degree of infringement on public interest and the disadvantages suffered by an individual due to the disposition, by objectively examining the content of the offense committed as the ground for the disposition, the public interest purpose to be achieved by the relevant disposition, and all the relevant circumstances (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 9Du5207, Mar. 9, 2001).

The following circumstances revealed in the records and arguments of this case: ① Vocational skills development training is conducted with limited financial resources, such as budget and the Employment Insurance Fund under the Employment Insurance Act; ② The public interest is to promote the stabilization of workers’ employment, the enhancement of social and economic status, and the improvement of corporate productivity; ② In order to achieve the purpose of the workplace skill development training course, an entrustment contract should be concluded and recognized with an appropriate agency in accordance with the requirements prescribed by the relevant Acts and subordinate statutes; ③ The instant disposition is in accordance with the individual criteria for administrative disposition prescribed in Article 6 [Attachment Table 1] and Article 6-3 [Attachment Table 1-2] of the Enforcement Rule of the Act.

In light of the fact that the part related to the teachers and instructors who are in charge of training during the workplace skill development training constitutes an important element in achieving the training performance of workers' acquisition and improvement of their ability to perform their duties, and therefore, it cannot be deemed that the commission contract is concluded and recognized by falsely stating the training instructor and it is a minor negligence or a minor violation. In comparison with the public interest to be achieved by the disposition of this case, it is difficult to deem that the Plaintiff has abused and abused its discretionary power because it is excessively harsh to the Plaintiff.

Therefore, this part of the plaintiffs' assertion cannot be accepted.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, the plaintiffs' claim of this case is dismissed as it is without merit, and it is so decided as per Disposition.