[1] Whether the application for payment order is also included in the “judicial claim” under Article 170(1) of the Civil Act (affirmative)

[2] In a case where Gap filed a complaint against Eul on suspicion of rape, etc., but the prosecutor, who became aware of the complaint, was indicted and convicted in the first instance court on charges of non-Rape, and the judgment of innocence was rendered final and conclusive at the appellate court and the final appeal, and thereafter Gap filed a claim for damages against Eul, and thereafter filed a claim for damages within six months from the claimant, the case holding that the extinctive prescription of the claim for damages for the part of the act that became the object of a criminal trial among the act of seeking damages by Eul, which is recognized as rape, was interrupted at the time when Gap filed a claim for payment order under Article 170(2) of the Civil Act

[1] “A judicial claim” under Article 170(1) of the Civil Act is not limited to “instigation of a lawsuit to receive a final judgment,” and an application for a payment order shall be deemed to include the case in which a right holder exercises his/her right and seeks a public legal judgment from a judicial institution. If it is interpreted that an application for a payment order is not included in “judicial claim” under Article 170(1) of the Civil Act, the application for a payment order may lose the effect of the interruption of prescription without express provision in the case where the application for a payment order which is effective under Article 168 of the Civil Act is rejected, and is unfair. In addition, if the effect of the interruption of prescription is interpreted to be lost pursuant to Article 170(1) of the Civil Act in the event the application for a payment order is rejected, the exclusion of the case in which the application for a payment order is rejected from among “the case of the preceding paragraph” under Article 170(2) of the Civil Act shall be considered to be invalid, barring special circumstances.

[2] In a case where Gap filed a complaint for rape, etc. on the grounds that he/she had been raped several occasions, but the prosecutor who became aware of such rape was prosecuted and convicted in the first instance court after having been acquitted at the appellate court and the final appeal, and subsequently Gap filed a claim for damages against Eul for payment of compensation for rape, etc., and thereafter, Gap filed a claim for damages within six months from each other, the case holding that in a case where Gap filed a claim for damages, the extinctive prescription has expired three years from the time when the act was committed, and the part which was not subject to criminal trial among rape, etc. of Eul who sought compensation for damages was final and conclusive, and the extinctive prescription of the part which was recognized as the act subject to criminal trial was run from the time when the judgment of innocence was final and conclusive, but rejected a claim for payment order three years prior to the expiration of the extinctive prescription period, and then filed a lawsuit again within six months therefrom, the claim for damages against the rape portion was interrupted at the time of applying for the payment order under Article 170(2) of the Civil Act.

[1] Articles 168 and 170 of the Civil Act / [2] Articles 166(1), 168, 170, and 766(1) of the Civil Act

Plaintiff (Law Firm Min & Lee, Attorneys Park Jae-soo, Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Defendant (Law Firm Rate, Attorneys Park Jae-chul et al., Counsel for the defendant-appellant)

Seoul Central District Court Decision 2009Kahap125825 Decided July 22, 2010

April 20, 2011

1. Of the judgment of the court of first instance, the part against the plaintiff falling under the following order for payment shall be revoked. The defendant shall pay to the plaintiff 15 million won with 5% interest per annum from March 1, 200 to June 1, 201, and 20% interest per annum from the next day to the date of full payment.

2. The plaintiff's remaining appeal is dismissed.

3. Of the total litigation costs, 90% is borne by the Plaintiff, and the remainder is borne by the Defendant.

4. The part concerning the payment of money under paragraph (1) may be provisionally executed.

The judgment of the first instance is revoked. The defendant shall pay to the plaintiff 150,000 won and 135,000,000 won among them, with the amount of 12,50,000 won from March 1, 200, 12,500 won from January 9, 2004, 2,500 won from October 5, 2001 to the delivery date of each complaint of this case, 5% per annum from October 5, 2001 to the delivery date of each complaint of this case and 20% per annum from the next day to the day of full payment.

1. Basic facts

A. Nonparty 1 (the Plaintiff and the Seoul Family Court were married on January 15, 1975 but divorced on August 24, 2001) leased from the Defendant the underground floor part of the ○○ Building located in the Gangnam-gu Seoul Newdong (hereinafter omitted), Gangnam-gu, Seoul (hereinafter omitted) and operated the “△△△△△△ Folk Folk Folk” with the Plaintiff around November 23, 1993.

B. On May 20, 200, the Plaintiff filed a complaint against the Defendant on charges of rape, etc. on February 21, 2000. The prosecutor in charge determined that the Defendant was guilty of the above rape on August 28, 200, and the Defendant’s violation of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act against the Plaintiff on November 6, 1999 was prosecuted with summary charge of KRW 1 million.

C. On December 4, 200, the Plaintiff filed a charge of rape, etc. again on the charge of rape, and the prosecutor in charge became aware of the Plaintiff’s charge in relation to each of the above complaints regarding rape, and investigated on February 26, 2001, and prosecuted the Plaintiff on March 6, 2001 (Seoul Central District Court 2001 High Court 2001 High Court 2068). The summary of the charges is as follows.

The term "the plaintiff shall be a person who has been married with the non-party 1 on January 15, 1975, and the defendant and the non-party 1 were living in the middle of August 1997 through the defendant. The defendant and the non-party 1 once sexual intercourse in the middle of June 1998, and the defendant and the non-party 1 sexual intercourse from the beginning of the beginning of the year 1998 to April 199, the defendant and the non-party 1 sexual intercourse in the village of the Gyeonggi-gun-gun-gun, the Domini-ri (hereinafter referred to as "2 omitted) located in the middle of the middle of February 21, 199, and the non-party 1 sexual intercourse in the non-party 1's non-party 1's non-party 1's non-party 1's non-party 1's non-party 1's non-party 2's non-party 1 sexual intercourse in the middle of the Gyeonggi-gu.

2) The facts are as follows: (a) around 199:30 on November 6, 199, the Defendant’s 19: (b) sought words from the Plaintiff on the second floor in the Gyeonggi-gun cafeteria located in Gwangju-gun, that she had engaged in 2 weeks bodily harm to the Plaintiff; (c) the Plaintiff did not commit rape or rape against the Plaintiff; (d) the Plaintiff was discovered to her husband; and (e) around 2000, the Defendant would be subject to criminal punishment; (e) around May 20, 200, at the first and second office located in Seocho-gu, Seoul Metropolitan Government 2, 1997, the Defendant did not request the Plaintiff to engage in rape on several occasions from around 197 to February 1, 200; and (e) the Plaintiff did not request the Plaintiff to make a false statement to the public prosecutor’s office located in Seoul, stating that she would have been rape to the Plaintiff on the ground that she would have received a false statement from the Seoul 20th police station.

D. On August 9, 2001, the first instance court rendered a judgment of conviction (Seoul Central District Court 2001Sang2068) against the above facts charged. Of the above facts charged on October 10, 2002, the appellate court rendered a judgment of conviction against the police officers in the middle of June 1998 and the police officers in the middle of February 1999, the appellate court rendered a judgment of conviction against the non-guilty facts for the reasons unspecified in the facts charged, and the appellate court rendered a judgment of acquittal against the defendant's will on the ground that there is no possibility that the defendant's act of accusation against the defendant's sexual intercourse or intimidation was committed against the defendant's will on the ground that there is no possibility that the defendant's act of dismissal against the defendant's will on May 20, 2004 and the defendant's criminal trial against the defendant's free will on the ground that there was no possibility that the defendant's act of dismissal against the defendant's free will on February 21, 2004.

[Reasons for Recognition] Facts without dispute, Gap evidence 1-2, Gap evidence 5, 8, Gap evidence 11-1, 2, and Gap evidence 13-1, 2, and 3-1, 2, and the purport of the whole pleadings

2. The parties' assertion

A. Summary of the plaintiff's assertion

1) On August 21, 1997, the Defendant raped the Plaintiff in the middle of June 1998 and in the middle of February 1999, the Defendant attempted to rape the Plaintiff from around August 21, 1999 to the open room located in the Gyeong-gun located in the Gyeonggi-si, which was located in the second floor, by taking advantage of the position of building owner and lessor, and by assaulting and threatening the Plaintiff to prevent the entrance of the folklore shop operated by the Plaintiff, who is a lessee, and to drive away from the above building. Since the raped the Plaintiff, the Defendant attempted to rape the Plaintiff from around February 21, 200 to the open room located in the Gyeonggi-si located in the Gyeonggi-gu, Gyeonggi-do, and the Plaintiff from around February 1, 1999, and the Defendant attempted to rape the Plaintiff from around February 21, 200 to the point of view of Nonparty 1, 199 and Nonparty 1, 199.

2) In addition, the plaintiff filed a complaint against the defendant on May 20, 200 and December 4, 200 on the charge of rape, etc., the defendant deceivings an investigative agency with a false statement, thereby leading the plaintiff to be detained on the ground of a false statement, and ordered the first instance court to be convicted of a conviction.

3) The Plaintiff, as above, did not have any family which was separated due to the Defendant’s tort, was divorced from Nonparty 1, who is the husband, did not engage in his occupation and received treatment for a long time due to the crime of false accusation. The Defendant is obligated to pay 150,00,000 won in total, including consolation money of KRW 135,00,000, and attorney’s fee of KRW 12,500,500, and medical expenses of KRW 2,500,000, and damages for delay incurred by the Plaintiff to defend the case prosecuted without the above accusation.

B. Summary of the defendant's assertion

In addition, the defendant did not commit any illegal act, such as rape or attempted rape, and even if such illegal act was committed, the right to claim damages arising therefrom has expired due to extinctive prescription. Therefore, the plaintiff's assertion is without merit.

3. Existence of a claim for damages due to a tort;

A. The existence of a claim for damages arising from rape, attempted rape, injury, intimidation, etc., not subject to a previous criminal trial

1) From among the tort of rape, attempted rape, injury, intimidation, etc. asserted by the Plaintiff, whether extinctive prescription has expired due to the tort, such as rape, attempted rape, injury, intimidation, etc., except for patrolmen on June 1998 and the remaining rapes on February 21, 199 and February 21, 200.

2) Article 766(1) of the Civil Act provides, “The right to claim compensation for damages caused by a tort shall expire by prescription if the injured party or his legal representative does not exercise it for three years from the date on which the injured party or the perpetrator becomes aware of the damages and the perpetrator.” Each of the above tort is committed prior to March 1999. The injured party, as the injured party, shall be deemed to have been aware of the occurrence of damages caused by the tort, the existence of the illegal harmful act, the proximate causal relation between the harmful act and the occurrence of the damages, and the fact that there was a substantial and specific causal relation between the harmful act and the perpetrator at the time of the above tort. Since the injured party filed the lawsuit in this case on March 18, 2008, the right to claim compensation for damages caused by the above tort shall be deemed

3) On this ground, the Plaintiff asserted to the effect that the starting point of the statute of limitations for the claim for damages due to each of the above illegal acts ought to be seen as September 24, 2004, which became final and conclusive by the judgment of partial innocence in the previous criminal trial. However, since each of the above illegal acts is not subject to the previous criminal trial, it is deemed that the statute of limitations runs from the time of such illegal

B. The existence of the right to claim damages due to rape in the previous criminal trial

1) Whether a tort has been constituted

A) First of all, as to sexual intercourse between the Plaintiff and the Defendant, which had been closed in the middle of June 1998 among the acts subject to the previous criminal trial, and on February 2, 1999, among the acts committed in the middle of the middle of June 199, as well as the sexual intercourse between the Plaintiff and the Defendant located in the open room in the cafeteria-gun of Gyeonggi-gun, the Plaintiff alleged that each of the above acts was rape committed against the Plaintiff’s will through assault or intimidation by the Defendant. However, it is insufficient to recognize that the descriptions of the evidence No. 9, No. 22, No. 23-1, No. 23-2, and No. 24 were insufficient, and there is no other evidence to acknowledge it. Rather, according to each of the statements set forth in the evidence No. 5, No. 8, and No. 13-3, the facts that each of the above acts was recognized as the Plaintiff’s

B) Next, we examine whether the sexual intercourse of February 21, 200 was rape.

(1) According to the above evidence: (a) around 28, 199, the Defendant appeared at the above-mentioned office 10th of May, 200, and then asked the Plaintiff to take a monthly rent of 100,000; (b) the Defendant, who was on the 1st of May 19, 200, did not appear in the above-mentioned office 6th of that time; (c) the Plaintiff was forced to take advantage of his 1st of May 19, 200, to take advantage of his 1st of May 19; (d) the Defendant’s 9th of May 10, 200, 200 to 1st of May 19, 200; and (e) the Defendant did not appear in the above-mentioned office 9th of that time; and (e) the Plaintiff did not comply with the Defendant’s request for a 9th of May 2nd of that time, 201.

In full view of the circumstances revealed by the above facts, namely, the relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant from May 199 to February 21, 2000, the attitude that the plaintiff had taken against the defendant, the plaintiff's mental and physical health condition at that time, the circumstances in which the plaintiff found the defendant, the lack of credibility of the defendant's assertion, etc., it is reasonable to deem that the defendant rapeed against the plaintiff's will by assault or intimidation rather than by assault or intimidation, under the agreement with the plaintiff on February 21, 2000.

2) Judgment on the defendant's defense for the expiration of extinctive prescription

The defendant asserts that even if the right to claim compensation for damages is established due to rape on February 21, 2000, since the lawsuit in this case was filed after the lapse of three years thereafter, the statute of limitations has expired. Accordingly, the plaintiff asserts that the starting point of starting the statute of limitations should be seen as September 24, 2004, which became final and conclusive in the previous criminal trial.

A claim for damages due to an illegal act is extinguished by prescription if it is not exercised within three years from the date the injured party or his/her legal representative becomes aware of the damage or the perpetrator (Article 766(1) of the Civil Act). Meanwhile, the "date when the injured party becomes aware of the damage and the perpetrator", which is the starting point of the statute of limitations for the claim for damages, is insufficient simply to recognize the occurrence of the damage and the perpetrator, and it is also when the harmful act becomes aware that it can be claimed as a tort (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 95Da3450, Aug. 23, 1996; 2010Da71592, Dec. 9, 2010).

However, as seen above, the plaintiff filed a complaint against the defendant on February 21, 200 on the charge of rape, etc., but the prosecutor made a disposition against the defendant without suspicion, and instead prosecuted the plaintiff on March 6, 2001 on the charge of non-componing and intercomponing, and the plaintiff was sentenced to the judgment of conviction in the first instance court on August 9, 2001. On October 10, 2002, the appellate court rendered a judgment of innocence on the charge of intercomponing on February 21, 200 and the charge of non-componing on September 24, 2004. The judgment became final and conclusive as the judgment of the Supreme Court on September 24, 2004.

In light of these facts in light of the above legal principles, in case where the plaintiff is found guilty of the crime of adultery or false accusation against the defendant on February 21, 200 as the prosecutor's or the defendant's assertion, it is difficult for the plaintiff to claim damages against the defendant even if it is found that the plaintiff is guilty of the crime of adultery or accusation against the defendant, and rather, it would be difficult for the plaintiff to claim damages from rape on February 21, 2000. Accordingly, it is in fact impossible for the plaintiff to claim damages from rape on February 21, 200. Accordingly, the plaintiff's claim for damages in this case should be deemed practically possible only after the judgment of innocence against the crime of adultery or false accusation becomes final and conclusive, and as a result, the plaintiff's right to claim damages from rape on February 21, 200 shall expire from September 24, 2004 (see Supreme Court Decision 2010Da71592, Dec. 9, 2010).

However, even if following this, it is clear that the lawsuit of this case was filed on March 18, 2008 after three years from the lawsuit of this case, and therefore, the respondent's defense is justified.

3) Determination on the Plaintiff’s second defense against the interruption of extinctive prescription

A) The gist of the plaintiff's second defense and the issues of the case

On September 21, 2007, which was within three years from September 24, 2004, the starting point of the extinctive prescription as above, the Plaintiff filed an application for a payment order (Seoul Western District Court 2007Guj134555) seeking the payment of the instant damages, and the Plaintiff again filed the instant lawsuit on March 18, 2008, which was within six months from the rejection of the application, and the extinctive prescription was interrupted on September 21, 2007, which was the time when the application for the payment order was filed pursuant to Article 170(2) of the Civil Act.

Therefore, this paper examines whether the extinctive prescription can be deemed interrupted when the first application for payment order was made in accordance with Article 170(2) of the Civil Act in cases where the extinctive prescription was interrupted due to the application for payment order, but the interruption of prescription became void due to the rejection of the application.

B) Relevant provisions

Article 168 of the Civil Act provides that “A claim, seizure, provisional seizure, provisional disposition, or approval for the cause of interruption of prescription shall be deemed to have no effect of interrupting prescription in the case of dismissal, dismissal, or withdrawal of a lawsuit.” Article 170(1) of the Civil Act provides that “In the case of the preceding paragraph, if a judicial claim, intervention in bankruptcy proceedings, seizure, provisional seizure, or provisional disposition is made within six months, the period of prescription shall be deemed to have been interrupted due to the first judicial claim.”

On the other hand, with respect to a claim aimed at paying a certain amount of money or other substituted goods or securities, the payment order is to be made at the request of a creditor (Article 462 of the Civil Procedure Act), by a court (Article 462 of the Civil Procedure Act), so that a creditor may acquire an executive title easily and rapidly. The procedure is simple and the payment order, unlike ordinary final and conclusive judgment, is not res judicata, and even if there is executory power, is distinguishable from a claim between the parties in that the court seeks an order of performance on the premise of the existence

C) Literacy interpretation perspective

The “request” under Article 168 of the Civil Act refers to both a judicial claim and a non-judicial claim. Among them, the term “judicial claim” refers to a final judgment on the merits, i.e., a final judgment on the final judgment on the case, which is to narrowly resolve the case, but refers to an expression of public-private legal judgment or intention conducted by a broad judicial institution, and such meaning of a judgment may be divided into a judgment, decision, and order in accordance with the form by which the subject and establishment procedures are followed.

Meanwhile, the grounds for the interruption of extinctive prescription under Article 168 of the Civil Act can be divided into those arising from an act on the part of the claimant, such as a claim, seizure or provisional seizure, and provisional disposition under subparagraphs 1 and 2, and approval under subparagraph 3. In the case of the former, the grounds for interruption of prescription are recognized in that the exercise of rights by the right holder is interrupted in that the exercise of rights by the right holder is interrupted. However, given that the payment order is essentially a claim by the right holder for the existence of rights and the realization thereof, there is sufficient reason to recognize the grounds for interruption of extinctive prescription as the same as

Therefore, the phrase “judicial claim” stipulated in Article 170(1) of the Civil Act is not limited to “instigation of a lawsuit” to receive a final judgment, but it should be deemed that the application for payment order is also included in that the holder of a right seeks a judgment of public authority by exercising his/her right.

If it is interpreted that an application for a payment order is not included in the “judicial claim” under Article 170(1) of the Civil Act, it would result in the forfeiture of the validity of the interruption of prescription without any express provision in the case where the application for a payment order becomes effective under Article 168 of the Civil Act. In addition, in a case where the application for a payment order is rejected, it shall be deemed that the application for a payment order is included in a judicial claim, and if it is interpreted that the interruption of prescription is invalidated under Article 170(1) of the Civil Act, the exclusion of the “case” under Article 170(2) of the Civil Act from the case where the application for a payment order is rejected is different from the case where the application for a payment order is rejected in front and rear, and it shall be deemed unfair unless there

D) Systematic interpretation point of legal advice

The foregoing conclusion does not change from Article 172 of the Civil Act as the title “payment order and interruption of prescription.” As to the interruption of extinctive prescription, Articles 168 through 178 of the Civil Act provide for the general provisions concerning the cause of interruption of prescription. Articles 168 and 169 of the Civil Act provide for the effect of interruption, and Articles 170 through 177 of the Civil Act provide for individual cause of interruption. In other words, the cause of interruption of extinctive prescription is generally prescribed by Article 168 of the Civil Act, and is not the form of the Civil Act, since Article 170 through 177 of the Civil Act provides for separate provisions concerning individual cause of interruption, the effect of a provisional execution as the cause of interruption of extinctive prescription cannot be independently provided by Article 172 of the Civil Act. In addition, Article 172 of the Civil Act provides for the effect of the interruption of extinctive prescription as the cause of interruption of a provisional execution without any substantive effect of an obligee within the statutory period of interruption of prescription.

E) Legal perspective

Article 170 (2) of the Civil Procedure Act provides that "If a right holder has filed a new lawsuit within six months, the interruption of prescription shall not be deemed to have occurred due to an action," and Article 212 (1) of the German Civil Procedure Act provides that "if the right holder has filed a new lawsuit within six months, the period of extinctive prescription shall be deemed to have been interrupted by the first action," and Article 691 of the German Civil Procedure Act provides that "if the period of service of the payment order is observed or the prescription is interrupted, the effect of the application is only one month after the delivery of the application, and the application for the payment order is not submitted or filed by the German court for the interruption of prescription."

F) Conclusion in the instant case

In full view of the purport of the argument in this case, the plaintiff applied for a payment order for the compensation of the damage of this case on September 21, 2007 as Seoul Western District Court 2007Guj13455 on September 21, 2007. However, the original copy of the payment order is not served on the defendant, and the application for the payment order is dismissed on November 13, 2007 because the plaintiff did not comply with the order for correction of address, and the payment order of the plaintiff is written as "Seongnam-gu Seoul Metropolitan City Spadong (hereinafter 4 omitted)." The written decision for the above dismissal is written as "the defendant's address is stated as "Seongnam-gu Seoul Metropolitan City Spadong (hereinafter 5 omitted)." However, since it is evident that the plaintiff filed the lawsuit of this case on March 18, 208, which was six months after it was revoked under Article 170 (2) of the Civil Act, the period of prescription for the first rape order against the defendant 201.

Therefore, the plaintiff's second defense that the prescription has been interrupted due to the application for the payment order of this case is reasonable, and the defendant's defense for the completion of extinctive prescription is not justified.

C. The existence of the right to claim damages due to the defense of the case, such as an accusation

In the criminal procedure of a complaint case, including murder, rape, etc., the defendant, who is a suspect, is guaranteed the procedure to deny and actively defend the defendant's suspicion. Thus, such defense act cannot be deemed a tort against the plaintiff. In addition, the investigation and criminal trial against the plaintiff was conducted not by the defendant's accusation but by the prosecutor's without accusation within the criminal procedure that the plaintiff filed a complaint, and there is no evidence to acknowledge special circumstances such as the defendant's refusal of suspicion of rape, etc., and the defendant's act of defense in the above criminal procedure, investigation and trial on suspicion of non-rape, etc., and thus, there is no proximate causal relation between the defendant's injury and the plaintiff's injury due to the defendant's investigation and trial (the plaintiff was placed under pre-trial detention for 164 days from February 27, 201 through August 9, 201, and some of the defendant was found not guilty, and the Seoul Central District Court rendered compensation 201.26.26.16

Therefore, this part of the plaintiff's assertion that the defendant's act of defense in criminal procedure constitutes a tort against the plaintiff, which is based on the premise that the plaintiff suffered losses, such as being detained and convicted by the court of first instance, is without merit.

D. Sub-committee

Therefore, since the defendant committed a tort that rapes the plaintiff on February 21, 2000, the defendant is responsible for compensating the plaintiff for the damages suffered by the plaintiff.

4. Scope of liability for damages

The plaintiff and the non-party 1 were divorced from the plaintiff due to the above rape of the defendant as to the amount of damages that the defendant should compensate for to the plaintiff due to the above tort. The plaintiff and the non-party 1 were married due to the above rape, and it is clear in light of the empirical rule that the plaintiff suffered severe mental suffering. Thus, the defendant has a duty to compensate the plaintiff for the above mental suffering. In light of all the circumstances revealed in the arguments of this case, such as the circumstances leading to rape and the relation between the plaintiff and the defendant, the marriage period between the plaintiff and the non-party 1, and the plaintiff's age and economic situation, it is reasonable to 15,00,000 won.

Furthermore, the plaintiff asserted that the defendant did not live a normal life due to the above rape and received treatment for a considerable period of time, and that the medical expenses would have been paid a total of KRW 2,500,000,000. Thus, there are evidence evidence Nos. 7-1 through 3, but it is not sufficient to recognize that each of the above evidence alone is damage caused by the crime of rape since it is a medical expense receipt related to high blood pressure that had been committed before rape on February 21, 200. There is no other evidence to prove otherwise.

Therefore, as damages for the above tort, the defendant is obligated to pay damages for delay calculated by the rate of 5% per annum as stipulated in the Civil Act from March 1, 2000 to June 1, 201, which is the date of the judgment of the court below, and 20% per annum as stipulated in the Act on Special Cases concerning the Promotion, etc. of Legal Proceedings from the next day to the date of full payment, as damages for delay, to the plaintiff, as damages for delay calculated by the plaintiff from March 1, 200 to June 1, 201.

5. Conclusion

Therefore, the plaintiff's claim of this case shall be accepted within the scope of the above recognition, and the remaining claims shall be dismissed as without merit. Since the part against the plaintiff falling under the part against which payment of the above money is ordered is unfair with different conclusion, the plaintiff's appeal is partially accepted, and the defendant shall be ordered to pay the above money, and the remaining appeal of the plaintiff shall be dismissed as it is without merit. It is so decided as per Disposition.

Judges Kim Jong-soo (Presiding Judge)