Plaintiff 1 and one other (Law Firm Han, Attorney Choi Woo-soo, Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

SMV Investment Co., Ltd. and four others (Attorneys Kim Heung-jin et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Eston Hocc Corca (Attorney Kim Hung-hoon, Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

August 25, 2016

Seoul Central District Court Decision 2012Gahap80182-1 Decided October 29, 2015

1. The judgment of the court of first instance is modified as follows.

A. The plaintiffs' lawsuits against Defendant Aju Capital Co., Ltd. and lawsuits against the remaining Defendants, added in the trial, are dismissed, respectively.

B. The plaintiffs' primary claims and preliminary claims against the remaining defendants except the defendant Aju Capital Co., Ltd. are dismissed, respectively.

2. The costs of the lawsuit, including the part arising from the supplementary participation, are borne by the Plaintiffs.

The judgment of the first instance shall be revoked.

primary, primary, 1, 2, and 3;

1. The plaintiff 1;

A. Between Defendant SM Investment Co., Ltd. (hereinafter “Defendant SM”), Sungdo Water Industry Co., Ltd. (hereinafter “Defendant Sungdo Water Industry”), and Defendant 3, the Korea Broadcasting System (hereinafter “KBS”) deposited on December 9, 2010 by the Seoul Central District Court No. 24956, Dec. 9, 2010, KRW 171,000,000, out of KRW 565,100,000 deposited on December 9, 2010;

B. The right to claim a deposit of KRW 319,270,000 deposited by Defendant SMM, Sungdok, Defendant 3, and Korea, and the Cultural Broadcasting Co., Ltd. (hereinafter “MBC”) on March 8, 2011 by the Seoul Central District Court No. 4479 on March 8, 201;

C. Among the Defendants, the right to claim the payment of the deposit amount of KRW 118,80,000 deposited by SBS Co., Ltd. (hereinafter “SBS”) on September 16, 201 by the Seoul Central District Court No. 17941 on September 16, 2011

I confirm that there is each plaintiff 1.

2. Plaintiff 2

A. The right to claim a deposit of KRW 55,00,000, out of the total amount of KRW 565,100,000 deposited by the Seoul Central District Court No. 24956 on December 9, 2010, between Defendant SM, Sungdo Products, and Defendant 3;

B. Among the Defendants, the right to claim payment of KRW 41,780,000 deposited by the Seoul Central District Court No. 22634 on November 15, 201, as between the Defendants

I confirm that there is each plaintiff 2.

1. Basic facts

A. Exclusive contract between the plaintiffs and the planning company

On March 2005, the Plaintiffs entered into an exclusive agreement with Patom Co., Ltd., an entertainment planning company, with the following content: (a) Patom Satom Co., Ltd., Ltd. (the former trade name before the change is Datom, Datom, and Datom, etc.; hereinafter “Satom” without distinction before and after the mutual change.

The purpose of this Agreement is to provide for all kinds of rights and obligations necessary for the negotiation and conclusion of contracts (hereinafter referred to as “ entertainment activities”) to Gap and Eul (the plaintiff 1 or 2) to whom Gap’s exclusive entertainment proceeds are distributed at the rate of 0.0 billion won, and to which Gap’s exclusive entertainment proceeds are assigned, for all kinds of subsequent public performances, events, broadcasting, internet advertising, books, records, characters, etc. The purpose of this Agreement is to provide for the rights and obligations of Gap (the term of exclusive entertainment), Gap’s exclusive entertainment proceeds, and to which Eul’s exclusive entertainment proceeds are assigned, for five years from March 1, 206 to February 28, 201, and to which Gap’s exclusive entertainment proceeds are assigned (the term of this Agreement). It is to provide for all kinds of rights and obligations related to Gap’s entertainment activities (the exclusive entertainment rights, etc.) to Gap to whom Gap’s exclusive entertainment proceeds are assigned, and to which Gap’s exclusive entertainment rights are assigned.

B. Contribution to the plaintiffs' TV program

The Plaintiffs contributed to each of the following programs (hereinafter referred to as “each of the instant programs”) produced by KBS, MBC, and SBS (hereinafter referred to as “each of the instant programs”), which led to the occurrence of the contribution fee claims (hereinafter referred to as “the contribution fee claims”) as listed below (hereinafter referred to as “the instant program”).

From June 3, 2010 to October 7, 2010, the details of contributions to the Plaintiff’s broadcast company’s program 1 KBS program (won) contained in the main text are “(name 1 omitted) program” 19 times as contributions from May 201 to October 2010 (name 2 omitted). From May 201, to October 2010, “(name 3 omitted)” 319,270,003 SBS 3, 11 to September 26, 2010 to “(name 4 omitted) program’s name, 118,80,000, 200 KBS 20 to 200, 2010 to 10, 250, 2010 to 5, 10, 2010 to 5, 205, 5, 2010 to 5, 5, 2010.

(c) Transfer, etc. of contribution fee claims;

1) On June 24, 2010, Patom transferred to Defendant SM all claims against each broadcasting company, including each contribution fee claim, and each broadcasting company notified the transfer to each broadcasting company by content-certified mail with a fixed date, and the notice reached each broadcasting company on July 7, 2010.

2) As indicated below, the Defendant Sungdo Industries, Defendant 3, and the Amap Capital Co., Ltd. (hereinafter “Defendant Amap Capital”) received each of the above contribution fee claims against the broadcasting companies of Som’s respective broadcasting companies, and each of the above decisions reached each broadcasting company, and the Defendant Republic of Korea seized each of the contribution charges claim against Som’s respective broadcasting companies based on the national tax claim against Som’s respective national tax claim against Som’s respective broadcasting companies, and the notification of seizure reached each broadcasting company.

Defendant Sungdo water Seoul Central District Court 2010TBS 561,163,000 on June 17, 2010, 2010, MBC 1,300,000 SBS 2,000,000,000 on June 24, 2010, on the date of service of the date of the third debtor's claim amount (source 2010,300,000,000 on the provisional seizure of claim No. 2010Kadan4312, Seoul Central District Court 30,189,40,200 on July 29, 2010, 2000, 3BS 1,182,400 on the provisional seizure of claim No. 3010,30,000 on the claims of the Defendant Sungdo water Seoul Central District Court 203BS SBS 392,207,39,207

1) A collection order

Note 2) 1,189,082,40

D. Plaintiffs’ request for the payment of contributions

1) On October 6, 2010, Plaintiff 1 requested each broadcasting company to pay the 1 through 3 contributions to the company, not the Satom, by giving notice of the termination of the exclusive contract with Patom.

2) On October 2010, Plaintiff 2 also sought to KBS, SBS, from SBS, the amount of the contribution unpaid to SbS, and requested the payment of each of the 4 and 5 contributions claim against KBS and SBS.

(e) Deposit by each broadcasting company;

Each broadcasting company between December 9, 2010 and November 15, 2011, claimed the right to each of the contribution claim by the plaintiffs (celetains funded to the program), stomer, defendant KSM, and many other than the other Defendants (e.g., seizure and collection creditors, provisional seizure creditors, etc.). Each broadcasting company as a broadcasting company claims the right to each of the contribution claim. It is unclear who is true creditor because the validity of exclusive contract, the validity of the assignment of claim is unknown, and the validity of the assignment of claim is not known, and there is a competition of seizure and provisional seizure against each of the contribution claim. Pursuant to Article 487 of the Civil Act and Article 248(1) of the Civil Execution Act, each of the payment of each of the contribution claim was deposited in combination, as stated in each of the claims in the Seoul Central District Court.

[Reasons for Recognition] 1 through 6, 9 through 11, 13 through 15, 38 through 40, Eul 5, 25, 26, Eul 3, 6, 8, 9, 12, Byung 1 and 2, each statement, the whole purport of pleadings, and the whole purport of arguments

2. Judgment on the main defense of this case

A. Determination on the main defense of the Defendant Sungdosan

Defendant Sungdosan, in a lawsuit between Defendant SM and Defendant Sungdo Industries (Seoul High Court 2012Na4503), represented for Defendant Sungdosan in the past, and the supplementary intervenor against Defendant Sungdo Industries (Seoul Central District Court 201Gahap65827), was represented by the supplementary intervenor of Defendant Sungdo Industries in the lawsuit (Seoul Central District Court 201Gahap65827). However, it is alleged that the representation of the plaintiffs in this case violated the delegation restriction provision of Article 31 Section 3 of the Attorney-at-law Act. Since it is invalid in the case where the other party raises an objection to the court against the litigation by an attorney violating Article 31 of the Attorney-at-law Act (see Supreme Court Decision 2003Da15556, May 30, 2003). The aforementioned plaintiffs' assertion to the effect that the instant lawsuit is unlawful.

Article 31 (1) 1 and 2 of the Attorney-at-Law Act applies to cases where an attorney-at-law (law firm also has accepted cases from the other party to the previous case. Even according to the above argument of the defendant Sungdosan, the plaintiffs of this case were not the other party to each of the parties represented by the plaintiffs' attorney in Seoul High Court 2012Na44503 cases, Seoul Central District Court 201Gahap65827 cases. Accordingly, since there is no room to apply the above provision to cases where the plaintiffs' attorney delegated the case from the plaintiffs and performs the lawsuit, the above defense is without merit.

B. Determination as to the legitimacy of the plaintiffs' action against the defendant Ig Capital

The benefit of confirmation in a lawsuit for confirmation is recognized in cases where there is a dispute between the parties as to the legal relationship subject to confirmation, and thereby, it is recognized as the most effective and appropriate means to determine as the judgment in order to eliminate the Plaintiff’s legal status’s apprehension and danger (see Supreme Court Decision 2009Da93299, Feb. 25, 2010, etc.).

The plaintiffs asserted that each claim for withdrawal of deposit money as stated in the purport of the claim is against the plaintiffs, and seek confirmation thereon respectively. However, according to the records, the defendant Skin Capital may recognize the fact that the defendant's claim is expressed directly or indirectly by the court of Seoul Central District Court 2010TTT-33928 on September 15, 2010 that the defendant's claim for cancellation of execution of provisional seizure and collection order was decided on October 25, 2012, and that the defendant's Alkin Capital expressed its intention not to dispute the plaintiffs' claim until the court of first instance.

Therefore, it cannot be said that there is a dispute over the right to deposit capital worth KRW 47,000,000 deposited by SBS between the plaintiffs and the defendant I Capital. Thus, the plaintiffs' lawsuit against the defendant I Capital is unlawful as there is no benefit of confirmation ( Accordingly, in paragraphs 3 through 6 below, only the lawsuit or claim against the remaining defendants except for the defendant I Capital).

3. Summary of the plaintiffs' assertion

For the following reasons, Plaintiff 1’s claim for payment of deposit money against Plaintiff 1’s claim for payment of deposit money against Plaintiff 1’s claim for payment of deposit money is against Plaintiff 1, and Plaintiff 2’s claim for payment of deposit money against Plaintiff 4 and 5’s claim for payment of deposit money is against Plaintiff 2, and the Plaintiffs seek confirmation thereof in order to claim payment of deposit money (the Plaintiff added Plaintiff’s claim for payment of deposit money to Plaintiff 2 and 3 preliminary claim as described in Plaintiff 1’s claim for payment of deposit money in

(a) The primary claim

The Plaintiffs are the parties who entered into a contribution contract with each broadcasting company for each of the instant programs (hereinafter “each of the instant agreements”). Accordingly, the 1 through 3 contribution claims shall belong to Plaintiff 1, Plaintiff 4, and Plaintiff 2 respectively, and even if Patom received the contribution fees from each broadcasting company, it is merely a fact that the Plaintiffs’ agent or custodian received the payment of the contributions from each broadcasting company.

(b) Initial Claim

Even if the Plaintiffs are not the parties to each of the instant contribution contracts, the broadcasting company’s broadcast contribution agreement is a kind of contract, and the employer, Som, the principal contractor, and the subcontractor. The Plaintiffs did not receive more than twice the contribution fee to be paid by Pom, the principal contractor, and the subcontractor. As such, each broadcasting company should pay the Plaintiffs the contribution fee in accordance with Article 14(1)3 of the Fair Transactions in Subcontracting Act (hereinafter “subcontract”).

(c) 2 preliminary claims;

If the Plaintiffs cannot be seen as a party to each of the instant contribution contracts, and if each of the instant broadcast contribution agreements cannot be seen as a kind of contract, the Plaintiffs are in the position of workers in the relationship with Patom, and thus, the Plaintiffs have wage claims in an amount equivalent to 80% of the contribution fee, and the total amount of wage and damages for delay is equal to deposit money. This is a preferential payment claim under the Labor Standards Act, and the Plaintiffs are entitled to receive full deposit in preference to the Defendants.

(d) Third preliminary claims;

Even if all of the above claims are without merit, the plaintiffs have a damage claim amounting to 1 billion won as a result of the plaintiffs' failure to execute the contract with the Patom with an agreement amounting to 80% of the contribution fee in accordance with the exclusive agreement concluded with the Patom. Meanwhile, the acquisition of the claim by the defendant SM is not effective, and there is no claim and collection order by the defendant SatM, and the provisional seizure by the defendant 3 does not exist.

4. Judgment on the main claim

A. Consumed legal doctrine

A party to a contract is a matter of interpretation of the intent of the party involved in the contract. Of them, as to whom one party to the contract is the party to the contract, if the intent of the actor and the other party is identical, the party to the contract shall be determined according to the same intent. If the intent of the actor and the other party is not in accord, the other party shall be determined by determining who is the party to the contract in accordance with the specific circumstances before and after the conclusion of the contract, including the nature, purpose, and details of the contract, if the other party is reasonable, based on the various circumstances before and after the conclusion of the contract (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 20

B. Determination

In light of the following circumstances as seen earlier, it is insufficient to recognize the facts as seen earlier and the evidence Nos. 23, 24, B, or 25 through 27, and 30 as being recognized or inferred by the overall purport of each of the statements and arguments as well as the evidence Nos. 7, 8, 12, 22, 23, 24, 30 through 34, and evidence Nos. 41 through 46, and the testimony of Non-Party No. 1 of the first instance trial by Non-Party No. 1 as a party to each of the instant contribution contracts, and there is no other evidence to prove otherwise. The Plaintiffs’ above assertion is rejected.

1) The absence, etc. of disposal documents

First of all, regarding each of the instant programs subject to deposit as described in Paragraph 1-b, a disposition document, such as a broadcast contribution agreement concluded between each broadcasting company and the Plaintiffs, was not submitted to the instant lawsuit. Nonparty 1, the lower court, as the manager of Plaintiff 1, testified to the effect that he did not know this point at the first instance court.

As to this, the Plaintiffs, like evidence Nos. 22 and 23 (Plaintiff 2), and evidence Nos. 24 (Plaintiff 1), were directly concluded with each broadcasting company, or the Plaintiffs submitted an exclusive contribution contract concluded with each broadcasting company with each broadcasting company. However, in the case of Plaintiff 2, evidence Nos. 22 and 23 was a contract concluded between the KBS, not SBS, which broadcast the program subject to deposit, and Plaintiff 2. According to the evidence Nos. 27, Plaintiff 2 consented to the receipt of the contribution fee to the KBS as of June 11, 2010. In the case of Plaintiff 1, it is difficult to recognize that the Plaintiffs were either the parties to the exclusive agreement or the deposit contract (Evidence No. 24-4), respectively, at the time of this case’s ratification of the deposit agreement with each of the parties to the deposit agreement (Evidence No. 24 of this case’s evidence).

2) Terms, etc. of the exclusive agreement

As seen earlier, each exclusive contract entered into between the plaintiffs and Som states that ① Pom has exclusive rights to act on behalf of the plaintiffs, and exercise all rights to negotiate, conclude, maintain, and terminate all the contributions contracts (Article 3). ② The plaintiffs have to enter into an agreement with Pom and enter into consultation with Pom after explaining the contractual relationship with Pom with the outside, and then pay proceeds to the plaintiffs (Article 5) through ex post settlement (Article 7). The contents of the exclusive agreement, namely, whether Patom is entitled to exercise its authority to conclude or terminate the above exclusive agreement, or whether Patom is entitled to exercise its authority not to act on behalf of Patom or to act on behalf of Patom, or if it is not appropriate for Patom to enter into an exclusive agreement with Patom to receive some of the contributions from Patom in accordance with the agreement with Patom and the content of the exclusive agreement to receive the contributions from Patom.

3) The receiving entity of the broadcast contribution fee

Each broadcasting company has paid not only the program of this case but also the contribution fee for other programs to Som who is not the plaintiffs, and the plaintiffs seems to have been paid the amount settled by Som as prescribed in the exclusive agreement (the same shall apply in cases where the plaintiffs submitted the evidence No. 45 and No. 46 submitted at the trial). Furthermore, the plaintiffs requested each broadcasting company to pay the contribution fee only after the termination of each exclusive agreement with Som.

As to this, the plaintiffs asserted to the effect that it is nothing more than a delegation of the right of representation with respect to the collection of the contribution fee to Som, but in light of the above fact that the exclusive agreement is not limited to the right of the Som to receive the contribution fee but separately plans the payment procedure following the ex post facto settlement, it is difficult to accept the above argument.

4) Whether the right to claim remuneration as a merchant is recognized

Meanwhile, the Plaintiffs asserts to the effect that, if the Plaintiffs contributed to broadcasting in the absence of the agreement between the planning company and the broadcasting company, they constitute a merchant under the Commercial Act, the Plaintiffs are entitled to claim remuneration for each broadcasting company pursuant to Article 61 of the Commercial Act. However, as seen so far, there is sufficient room to deem the Plaintiffs’ broadcast contribution for each of the instant programs as a result of the agreement between Patom and each broadcasting company. Furthermore, the evidence submitted by the Plaintiffs alone is insufficient to recognize that the Plaintiffs actually belonged to the rights and obligations arising from the broadcast contribution. Furthermore, insofar as the Plaintiffs did not contribute to broadcasting by means of stores or other similar facilities, the Plaintiffs do not constitute “a person who performs commercial activities in their own name” as provided by Article 4 of the Commercial Act or “a person who operates business by means of merchants through stores or other similar facilities” as provided by Article 5 of the Commercial Act.

(v) Other circumstances;

① Each decision or recommendation for reconciliation, such as evidence Nos. 7, 8, and 12, is based on the Plaintiffs’ assertion that the Patom did not dispute with each other, and thus, it cannot be said that there was res judicata effect on the instant case. Moreover, it cannot be said that there is probative value to reverse the fact-finding or the aforementioned decision.

② The Plaintiffs asserted that the payment of each of the instant contribution contracts is a kind that can not be performed instead of a third party on behalf of the Plaintiffs, and thus, the Plaintiffs, not Som, are parties to each of the instant contribution contracts. However, as long as the agreement was concluded between the Plaintiffs and Somom separately, the Plaintiffs are not necessarily deemed to be parties to each of the instant contribution contracts even for the purpose of human benefits that can not be replaced by each of the instant contribution contracts.

③ The Plaintiffs also asserted that the broadcast contribution agreement between Patom and each broadcasting company was concluded by exercising exclusive authority pursuant to the aforesaid exclusive agreement, as the so-called “exclusive agreement”. However, even if the aforesaid exclusive agreement is a type of “pattain agreement” between Patom and Patom’s respective broadcasting companies, it cannot be immediately ratified that the Plaintiffs are the parties themselves and Patom’s representative under the broadcast contribution agreement between Patom and Patom’s respective broadcasting companies.

④ Meanwhile, among the contributions under a broadcast contribution agreement, the obligation of the planning company to pay 80% of the contributions to the Plaintiffs, an artist, is specified in Article 7 of the exclusive agreement. This is merely an internal settlement issue between Patom and the Plaintiffs pursuant to an exclusive agreement. There is no particular relationship with each of the parties to each of the instant contributions agreements that are concluded with each of the broadcasting companies.

⑤ Plaintiff 1 is also cited as the basis for the decision made on September 2, 2013 by the Tax Tribunal (Evidence A 30). However, insofar as the time when Plaintiff 1’s business income is attributed under the Income Tax Act and is based on the so-called “the principle of confirmation of rights”, it cannot be deemed that it affects any legal relationship, such as the confirmation of parties to a broadcast contribution agreement.

5. Determination on the first preliminary claim

The definition of “subcontract transactions” as stipulated in Article 2(1) of the Subcontract Act is as stated in the relevant laws and regulations. However, the obligation of the Plaintiffs to “contribution to a broadcast program” pursuant to the exclusive contract with Patom is a duty of act that is not substituted by another person. Therefore, the payment such as the contribution to a broadcast program cannot be deemed as constituting “services” or “services” as defined in Article 2(11) and (13) of the Subcontract Act.

Accordingly, the Plaintiffs asserts that the requirements of subcontract transactions subject to the same Act such as the Subcontract Act do not require substitution. However, the definition of “subcontract transactions” under Article 2(1) of the Subcontract Act is reasonable to deem that the principal contractor is a person who entrusts a subcontractor to a subcontractor or re-entrusted a subcontractor with the fact that a principal contractor was entrusted to a subcontractor by another business entity. As such, it is reasonable to deem that the “subsidized contribution” under the Fair Trade Commission Notice (Notice No. 2009-50) among the relevant laws and regulations invoked by the Plaintiffs may be replaced by another person. As such, it is reasonable to deem that the “subsidized contribution” under the Fair Trade Commission Notice (Notice No. 2009-50) of the relevant laws and regulations invoked by the Plaintiffs can be replaced by another person.

Therefore, the legal relationship between the plaintiffs and Patom pursuant to the exclusive contract does not constitute a "subcontract" under the Subcontract Act in the form of re-entrustment of the services entrusted by Patom from the broadcasting company to the plaintiffs. Therefore, this part of the plaintiffs' assertion is without merit.

6. Determination on the claim Nos. 2 and 3

Ex officio, a suit for confirmation requires the benefit of confirmation as a requirement for the protection of rights. The benefit of confirmation is recognized if there is a dispute between the parties regarding the legal relationship subject thereto and if the plaintiff’s rights or legal status is unstable or dangerous, it is the most effective and appropriate means to remove such apprehension or risk (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2014Da218511, Dec. 11, 2014). Meanwhile, in cases where a ground for execution under Article 248(1) of the Civil Execution Act arises due to a ruling of provisional seizure or seizure of claims on the ground of the deposit for repayment based on the latter part of Article 487 of the Civil Act and Article 248(1) of the Civil Execution Act, the obligor may submit to the obligor a copy of the judgment of execution for the same reason as the obligee’s right to receive the deposit for payment, for example, for the sake of the same reason as the obligee’s right to receive the deposit of execution as a final and conclusive one of the above judgment.

In addition, the plaintiffs asserted to the effect that the plaintiffs have a right to claim wages as an employee or employee of the Som, or that there is a claim for damages arising from the failure to perform the contract with the plaintiffs and Som. In other words, the plaintiffs claim that the Defendants, the creditors of Som or Som, under each contribution contract of this case, have a right to claim wages as an employee or employee of the Som, or that there is a claim for damages arising from the failure to perform the contract. Unlike the primary and preliminary claims that the Defendants, the creditors of Som or Som, who are creditors of Som, do not have the right to claim for payment of deposit money, on the premise that they do not have the right to claim for payment of deposit. In this part 2 and 3 preliminary claims, the plaintiffs claim that the Plaintiffs are the creditors of Som with the right to claim for payment of deposit money on the premise that

Examining the facts found in light of the above legal principles, each broadcasting company's deposit constitutes a mixed deposit based on the repayment deposit based on the creditor's probability and the execution deposit based on the debtor's seizure or provisional seizure. Therefore, unlike the primary or preliminary claim based on the premise that the plaintiffs himself/herself is the creditor of the contribution fee which was the cause of his/her deposit. Unlike the primary or preliminary claim based on the premise that the plaintiffs himself/herself is the creditor of the contribution fee, in the case of this part 2 and 3 preliminary claims, the purport of securing the plaintiffs' satisfaction of the claim against Som through the execution of the claim for the contribution fee against each broadcasting company of Som's responsible property, the plaintiffs must submit to the court of execution the document proving that the plaintiffs' claim for the payment of the deposit of this case belongs to Som who is the execution debtor. However, this part 2 and 3 preliminary claims are merely seeking confirmation of the plaintiffs' claim for payment of part of the deposit of this case. Therefore, the execution court's claim for payment of this case cannot be seen as the most effective way to confirm the plaintiffs's claim for payment of this case.

On the other hand, the plaintiffs asserted that the transfer of funds from the Patom was not effective against the defendant SM. The above broadcasting companies' deposit in this case includes the intent of the deposit made by Patom or the defendant SM because it is not possible to know the validity of the transfer of funds from the Satom's defendant SM, so there is room for the plaintiffs to seek confirmation of the claim for payment of funds by asserting that the transfer of funds is not effective against the defendant SM. However, in this case, since the creditor of the contribution claim subject to deposit is not the plaintiffs but the debtor, it is necessary to confirm that the claim for payment of funds is against Patom, the execution debtor, and otherwise, to seek confirmation that the claim for payment of funds belongs to the plaintiffs' right for payment of funds cannot be a solution for dispute.

In addition, the Plaintiffs asserts to the effect that, as an employee with wage claim against Som, the full amount of deposit can be paid in preference to the Defendants, or that the Defendants do not have any underlying claim for the seizure of the above claim (the equivalent claim) against Som. However, in the lawsuit for confirmation of confirmation, the principle that the said claim is permissible only when it is not possible to receive remedy through other procedures (the principle of supplement). However, since such claim is asserted as to whether dividends are distributed in the distribution procedure or its priority in the distribution procedure, it can be asserted first through a lawsuit by the executing court’s decision in the distribution procedure and in the case of an objection to the said judgment, seeking confirmation of the right to claim the withdrawal of deposit can not be a means of dispute resolution, and thus, it cannot be a valid and appropriate means of dispute resolution. In other words, the Plaintiffs have no benefit to bring

Ultimately, the plaintiffs' action corresponding to the claim Nos. 2 and 3 of this part cannot be deemed lawful.

7. Conclusion

Therefore, the lawsuit against the plaintiffs' defendant Ik Capital and the lawsuit against the remaining defendants added in the trial of the trial of the court shall be dismissed, respectively, by being unlawful. The plaintiff's primary claim against the remaining defendants except the defendant Ik Capital and the first preliminary claim against the others shall be dismissed, respectively. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the first instance judgment reflecting each conjunctive claim added in the trial of the court below.

[Attachment]

Judges Han Chang-hun (Presiding Judge)

1) On January 19, 2010, the instant order of seizure and collection was based on the money loan agreement No. 4, 2010 prepared by the notary public to the Defendant Sungdo Industries, which was signed by the law firm, as the notary public on January 19, 2010. Thereafter, the judgment of the Seoul Central District Court 201Ga65827 decided on December 9, 2011 (Seoul Central District Court 201Gahap65827 decided on December 9, 201) on the lawsuit for grant of succession execution clause brought by the Intervenor against the Defendant Sungdodosan (Seoul Central District Court 201Gahap65827 decided on December 9, 201). On the other hand, as the instant notarial deed, the Seoul Central District Court 201Da518588 decided on March 19, 201, which was declared as the notarial deed as the notarial deed as the notarial deed’s notarial deed as the notarial deed’s claim against the Defendant.

Note 2) The provisional seizure of this claim does not specify the amount of claims by broadcasting company.

(3) Article 31 (Restriction on Acceptance of Case) (1) of the Attorney-at-Law Act shall not perform the duties of attorney-at-law with respect to cases falling under any of the following subparagraphs: Provided, That this shall not apply where the mandator of a case accepted by one of the parties in the case of subparagraph 2 has consented. 1. Other cases delegated by the other party in the case of which the other party in which the other party in the case accepted by the other party in which the other party in the case accepted by the other party in which the other party in the case accepted by the other party in the case of subparagraph 2.

4) The written evidence Nos. 41 through 44 alone is insufficient to recognize that Plaintiff 1 entered into a contribution contract for the “(title 4 omitted) program” subject to the instant deposit in the same manner as the written evidence No. 24-3 on the “(Program name 8 omitted) program.”