2014Na3108 Insurance proceeds

1.A

2.B

[Defendant-Appellant]

1. Mant life insurance companies;

Jongno-gu Seoul Jongnoro 1 1

D Representative Director D

2. Samsung life insurance company;

Jung-gu Seoul Central District 2 150

E Representative Director

[Defendant-Appellant]

Busan District Court Decision 2013Gahap10959 Decided May 1, 2014

April 13, 2015

April 30, 2015

1. Of the judgment of the court of first instance, the part against the plaintiffs who ordered payment below shall be revoked.

2. For the plaintiffs:

A. The amount of money calculated by each of the 52,500,000 won and each of the above amounts with 6% per annum from July 6, 2013 to April 30, 2015 and 20% per annum from the following day to the date of full payment:

B. The Defendant Samsung Life Insurance Co., Ltd. shall pay 30,000,000 won each and 20% per annum from September 16, 2013 to April 30, 2015; and

sub-payment.

3. The plaintiffs' remaining appeals are dismissed.

4. The total costs of the lawsuit shall be borne by the Defendants.

5. Paragraph 2 can be provisionally executed.

The judgment of the first instance shall be revoked.

For the plaintiffs, the defendant Samsung Life Insurance Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as "the defendant Samsung Life Insurance Co., Ltd.") pays 52,500,000 won each, the defendant Samsung Life Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as "the defendant Samsung Life Insurance Co., Ltd.") 30,000 won each, and each of the above money, 6% per annum from the day following the delivery of the copy of each complaint of this case to the day of the completion of payment, and 20% per annum from the next day to the day of the completion of payment (the plaintiffs reduced their claims as above).

1. Facts of recognition;

A. The relationship between the parties and the conclusion of an insurance contract

The Plaintiffs are the parents of the deceased deceased deceased G (hereinafter referred to as “the deceased”) while serving in the Navy, and are the successors of the deceased (the inheritance shares 1/2), and the Defendants are the insurers who concluded the following insurance contracts with the deceased as the insured:

On January 10, 1997, the Maritime Police Organization concluded an insurance contract between the defendant Daehan Lifelong, the deceased, the beneficiary's heir at the time of death, the insurance period from January 10, 1997 to January 10, 2017, the accident death insurance amount of KRW 70,000, and the insurance amount of KRW 150 of the insurance amount in case of death due to a disaster on Saturdays or a holiday with a special contract for the guarantee of holidays (hereinafter referred to as "comprehensive guarantee insurance").

On November 10, 1997, the deceased entered into a contract with Defendant Samsung Life Insurance Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as "spllers insurance contract of this case") with a workplace with the content that the deceased will pay 20 million won when he dies due to a disaster on a holiday specified in the terms and conditions of the insurance contract for death in a holiday (today constitutes a holiday) (hereinafter referred to as "each insurance contract of this case").

The main contents of each insurance contract of this case are as shown in the attached Form.

B. Death of the Deceased

On July 25, 1998, the deceased was discovered at the fourth structure warehouse of the 4th Manyang, a Saturday, with the stringing of a pipe of sea water, after the deceased died (hereinafter referred to as the “instant accident”).

On November 4, 1999, the Plaintiff, the father of the Deceased, claimed insurance money against the Defendant Samsung Life, but did not accept it on the ground of suicide. On July 3, 2000, the Plaintiff filed a damages suit with the Seoul District Court on the ground that “the deceased was killed by his superior, or the unit was negligent in protecting the status of the unit and taking appropriate emergency measures.” However, the Plaintiff appealed on the ground that there was no evidence to acknowledge it on December 4, 2002. However, on September 24, 2004, the Seoul High Court rendered a judgment dismissing the appeal, which became final and conclusive at that time (hereinafter “the judgment of this case”).

(c) Results of the investigation by the Committee for Finding the Truth of Military Literature;

On November 7, 2005, Plaintiff A filed a civil petition to clarify the meaning surrounding the death of the deceased in the investigation and investigation of the death of the Navy headquarters.

On October 21, 2009, as a result of the re-examination of the deceased's death on the basis of the facts such as the facts revealed in the past, "the deceased is recognized to have suffered physical and mental pain due to H's typology, abusiveism, noncommissioned Officer concentrated on the deceased, stress arising from H's business relations, and cruel acts, and the deceased's h's h's h' before death (hereinafter referred to as "the decision of this case").

From the two families of South and North Korea, the deceased was born into his/her own body, and his/her parents were born, and the living environment seems to have been difficult.The deceased's usual character of the deceased was active, and personal relations were achieved by positive evaluation in the life of the military unit.The deceased, after his/her graduation from a high school on 1996, was transferred to the Maritime Rescue Team (SU, Sipalvage Unit), which is a special unit of the Navy, supported by the deceased, and supported the Maritime Rescue Team (SU, Sipalv Unit) for six months after his/her diving education was conducted for six months.

At the time of the death of the deceased, as a special unit of the Navy No. 4, the foregoing units were able to grow together with H noncommissioned Officer, who was on the 5th day after the death of the deceased, and were able to do so by means of a deceptive scheme and a special military unit. For this reason, almost 3 p.m. a new wall was gathered by the noncommissioned Officer on the 4th day after the death of the deceased, but the 1st day after the death of the deceased, who was on the 4th day after the death of the deceased, and the 5th day after the death of the deceased, the 1st day after the death of the deceased and the 5th day after the death of the deceased, and the 2nd day after the death of the deceased, the 1st day after the death of the deceased, who was on the 4th day after the death of the deceased and the 5th day after the death of the deceased, and the 2nd day after the death of the deceased and the 5th day after the death of the deceased were 9th day.

(d) Progress thereafter; and

On the ground of the instant decision on December 2, 2009, Plaintiff A filed a petition for retrial against the instant judgment. However, on April 14, 201, the Seoul High Court rendered a ruling dismissing the petition for retrial to the effect that the instant decision was merely a fact-finding and does not constitute grounds for retrial. The said ruling became final and conclusive around that time.

Based on the instant decision, the Plaintiffs filed an application with the Navy Chief of Staff for confirmation of death on the ground of the instant decision, and on December 26, 2012, the president issued a certificate of death on the deceased’s duty and confirmed that he/she is a deceased’s death (the main contents of the former Ordinance on the Handling of Persons of Former Works, which was in force at the time of the verification of death, are as shown in the attached Form), and the Plaintiffs filed the instant lawsuit on June 19,

[Ground of recognition] Facts without dispute, Gap evidence Nos. 1, 4 through 8, Eul evidence Nos. 1 through 3, Eul evidence Nos. 5, 7, 10, 11 (including the number of each branches), records obvious fact, the purport of the whole pleadings

2. The parties' assertion

A. The plaintiffs

The accident of this case constitutes a disaster, and the Defendants are obliged to pay the insurance money and damages for delay based on each insurance contract of this case to the Plaintiffs.

B. The defendants

As the deceased’s death is caused by suicide, it does not constitute a disaster due to the lack of contingent and external nature. In addition, according to the terms and conditions of each insurance contract of this case, the deceased constitutes an intentional damage to himself/herself and thus constitutes an exemption

Even if the claim of this case falls under the cause for payment of household insurance money, the prescription period was terminated after the lapse of two years from October 21, 2009 when the decision to issue this case was made at the latest; and

A. Whether it constitutes a disaster or an exemption from liability

In light of the legislative intent of Articles 659(1) and 732-2 of the Commercial Act, where suicide is stipulated as the reason for exemption of the insurer in an insurance contract which covers death as an insured accident, the suicide refers to the act of causing death by intentionally cutting one's own life life for its purpose and intentionally cutting one's life for this purpose, and it cannot be deemed that the insured has caused death in a situation where it is impossible for the insured to make a decent decision such as mental illness. In addition, in such a case, if the direct act of causing death was caused by the ex officio factor, the insured accident constitutes an accident that is not intentional by the insured (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2005Da49713, Mar. 10, 206).

In light of the above legal principles and negative aspects of suicide, general awareness of society, opinion and statement of the professional examiner of this case, etc., suicide is not in principle a disaster, and it is not subject to insurance benefits due to the reason for insurance exemption. However, in exceptional cases, in a case where ex officio factors are directly causing death, it cannot be assessed as a general suicide just on the ground that it is directly causing suicide. The issue of whether it can be assessed as such in a specific fact-finding does not exist, and the facts and opinions of experts related to the court should be determined closely.

In full view of the following circumstances, the deceased’s return to the instant case and the facts acknowledged earlier, and the entire purport of the pleadings (including the opinions and statements of professional examiners), it is reasonable to deem that the accident occurred in a situation where he is unable or remarkably limited to make a friendly decision-making, and thus, the accident of this case is an accident that is not caused by the deceased’s intentional act, as it is an accident that directly caused the death by external factors, and constitutes an accident that is not caused by the deceased’s intentional act. ① Even though the deceased was of a critical nature, he was employed in the naval rescue team, which is a special military unit of the Navy, while working in the Navy, and was subject to harsh acts such as diving, the customary and continuous dynamic, military discipline, and ice, and in particular, it appears that the above senior chief executive leader and H of the internal affairs team were in a state of extreme conflict and stress.

② On the day of the deceased’s death, the deceased was saved with h’s desire to look at a female-child organ during the outing of the country, along with the h’s bath. On the day of her death, the deceased seems to have caused extreme fladation, shame, humiliation, suppression, and fladation due to the h’s sathy, cruel act committed before the Hadern unit members.

③ The special military unit of the Navy, in particular, the naval vessel of the Navy, when working in a special space at the time of the practice of cruel acts, be forced to make a extreme choice in order to resolve this by making it the Deceased, and ultimately, it may be presumed that the situation of extreme conflict with the above appointment would have led to a situation in which normal and free decision-making could not be made.

④ Based on the instant decision, the Navy Chief of Staff decided that the deceased’s death was killed in action on duty. At that time, the deceased’s death falls under 2-14, and 3 of attached Table 1 of the Directive on the Treatment of Persons of Distinguished Services, which was medically recognized to have been caused by self-injury in the state where free will was excluded from the free will.

Therefore, the instant accident constitutes a disaster, and the Defendants’ assertion of exemption cannot be accepted.

B. Determination as to the claim on the extinction of prescription

Unless special circumstances exist, the statute of limitations of the insurance claim should be interpreted to run from the time when the occurrence of the insurance accident occurred, in principle, barring any special circumstance, since the right to claim is only abstract right before the occurrence of the insurance accident, and it can be exercised from the time when the occurrence of the insurance accident occurs. However, even if the claimant was unable to know of the occurrence of the insurance accident without negligence, the interpretation that the statute of limitations of the insurance claim should run from the time when the insurance accident occurred is too harsh to the claimant, and it cannot be deemed that the principle of social justice and equity is too harsh to the claimant, and that the existence of the statute of limitations system is not consistent with the reason for the existence of the insurance accident. Thus, in a case where it is objectively difficult to confirm the occurrence of the insurance accident from the objective perspective, the statute of limitations of the insurance claim will run from the time when the claimant knew or could have known the occurrence of the insurance accident (see Supreme Court Decision 200Da31168, Apr. 27, 200

In light of the foregoing legal doctrine, in light of all the circumstances related to the instant case, the Plaintiffs came to know or could have known that the death of the deceased constitutes the death on duty. It is reasonable to interpret that the extinctive prescription of each of the instant insurance claims has run from December 26, 2012, which could be evaluated as follows.

1 ① The initial accident was concluded as a simple suicide, and all of the Plaintiff A filed a civil petition and lawsuit at the suspicion that there was no other cause for the death of the Deceased, but did not accept it on the ground that there was no evidence to acknowledge it.

② After that, through a reinvestigation of the Committee on Finding the Truth and Finding of the Truth of the Korean History, the facts revealed that the statements of the persons concerned were partially fabricated (e.g., the entry of evidence No. 2 and the records of trial No. 74,75 pages), and the new facts that were at the time of the death of the deceased and customary irregularities in the military unit were revealed, and there was the instant decision to the effect that the death of the deceased was related to harsh treatment, stress caused by business relations, etc., but the Plaintiff A was sentenced to the dismissal of the decision to the effect that the instant decision was merely an investigation of truth as a fact in the request for retrial based on the instant decision.

③ In a claim for damages against the State, there is room to regard the instant decision, which discovered the truth of the fact, such as betata and cruel acts, as the starting point of the extinctive prescription (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2013Da212646, Dec. 26, 2013). However, in the instant case, it is reasonable to view that the Plaintiffs knew or knew of the fact that the death of the deceased constitutes an examination accident, i.e., an accident requiring the death of the deceased, inasmuch as the act of direct cause of the death was caused by ex officio, and thus, becomes a key issue for whether the deceased died in a situation where free decision-making is impossible. Furthermore, in light of the factual specification as seen supra, it becomes objectively clear whether the instant accident constitutes the insurance company, and thus, the Plaintiffs knew or became aware of the fact that the death of the deceased constituted an accident requiring the death of the deceased.

④ This does not have any probative value that does not have the same effect as, or does not allow counter-certificates as, “the presumption of legal fact” (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2012Da202819, May 16, 2013). Moreover, it is difficult to readily conclude that suicide constitutes a disaster solely based on the fact that there was a harsh act or sacity in the military unit at the time of death in an insurance contract based on a disaster. Moreover, the content of the facts revealed in the instant decision is also insufficient to readily conclude that the deceased’s death constitutes a disaster of an insurance accident (i.e., the fact that it is additionally revealed in the instant decision alone is difficult to readily conclude whether the insurer is a disaster or not (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2012Da202819, May 16, 2013).

⑤ It is reasonable to view the starting point of determining the starting point of the statute of limitations in a case claiming insurance proceeds as the starting point when it is objectively possible to verify the occurrence of an insurance accident in light of the specific facts in an individual case. Unlike the case where it is evident that the death of the insured was caused by the death or the death from an accident, or that the occurrence of suicide was caused by external inevitable circumstances, such as mental disease, etc., it is merely a case where the premise of suicide is maintained as in the instant decision, and it is only a case where the life-holder can objectively confirm that the death of the insured constitutes an insurance accident, which is the insurance accident, and if it is interpreted that the life-holder could objectively verify that the death of the insured constitutes an insurance accident, which is the insurance accident, it is too harsh to the insurance claimant, thereby

(6) In the case of this case, the reason why it was difficult to confirm that the deceased's death was a disaster that constitutes an insurance accident is due to the authoritative interpretation and measures of the military authority that concluded the insurance accident due to simple suicide. It can be evaluated that the reason for the exercise of the right to claim the insurance was removed based on the factual basis that "the deceased died due to self-injury under the situation where free will is excluded because the deceased's death was a direct cause, i.e., the reason that the deceased's death was caused by self-injury in the situation where the deceased's death was excluded from the free will."

Therefore, it is reasonable to evaluate the occurrence of the instant insurance accident as around December 26, 2012, the business day at the time of the occurrence of the death on duty, and the filing of the instant lawsuit on June 19, 2013, which was before the lapse of the statute of limitations from the said time. As seen earlier, the Defendants’ claim for the extinction of the statute of limitations is groundless.

C. Sub-committee

Therefore, the defendant principal life insurance proceeds of KRW 52,50,00 (15 million (i.e., death insurance proceeds of KRW 70 million x 1.5 million under special agreement on holiday security) and each of the above amounts are 6% per annum under the Commercial Act (see Supreme Court Decisions 2009Da85342, Dec. 24, 2009; 200,000 won per annum from the day following the day of the delivery of the complaint of this case including the declaration of intention to claim insurance proceeds of this case to the day of the decision to April 30, 2015; 300,000 won per annum from the day after the day of the payment of the insurance proceeds to the day of the above amount; 300,000 won per annum from the day after the day of the above decision to the day of the expiration of the insurance proceeds of KRW 160,000,000 per annum, and 200,000 won per annum from the day of death (2.).

4. Conclusion

Therefore, the plaintiffs' claims shall be accepted within the scope of the above recognition and the remainder shall be dismissed as without merit. Since the part against the plaintiffs in the judgment of the court of first instance which has concluded a different conclusion is unfair, it shall be revoked and the defendant shall be ordered to pay the above-mentioned money to the defendants, and the remaining appeal by the plaintiffs shall be dismissed as without merit

Large enterprise (Presiding Judge)

Iseather

Park Ho-ho

Insurance Terms and Conditions

Grounds for Payment of Insurance Money (Article 7 of the General Guarantee Insurance Act, Article 8 of the Flus Insurance Act)

Insurance money for death of a disaster shall be paid when the insured is not a state of disability of class I in the disability classification table during the insurance period and dies due to a direct cause other than a traffic accident specified in the disaster classification table. Insurance proceeds may not be paid when the insured has intentionally impaired himself/herself (Article 9 and Article 11 of the General Guarantee Insurance Act) who does not pay insurance money. However, this shall not apply where the insured has damaged himself/herself under the state of mental illness and where he/she has caused a disability of class I in the disability classification table in the disability classification table by committing suicide after two years from the commencement date of insurance responsibility or by impairing himself/herself. The payment of insurance money, etc. (Article 18 of the General Guarantee Insurance Act, Article 21 of the Plus Insurance).

Upon receipt of the documents specified by the required documents at the time of filing a claim for insurance proceeds, the company shall issue a certificate of receipt and pay the insurance proceeds within three days from the date of receipt of the documents, and if necessary to investigate or confirm the grounds for payment, it may pay the insurance proceeds within ten days. If the insurance proceeds are not paid within the above payment date, the company shall pay the amount calculated by adding the amount calculated as the annual interest rate for the loan of the terms

Attached Table 2 Disaster Classification Table

24. Otherwise exposure to the unknown and detailed factors.

25 Gaz. 25

26 Cases of non-verification of intention

Instructions on Disposal of the Electrical Construction Boxes

Article 3 (Classification)

Death or injury (referring to a mental or physical disorder including a disease; hereinafter the same shall apply) shall be divided into the following sections, and the classification criteria shall be as specified in attached Table 1:

1. Death; (b) Death in action; (c) Death in action;

Article 4 (Examination Committee for Major Matters)

(1) In order to examine matters on death or wound, examiners of a construction network at each military headquarters shall be conducted to examine the matters.

The Council and the Deliberative Committee on the Performance of Duties shall be established.

Article 6 (Classification of Death)

(3) Decisions of the Armed Forces by other State agencies with the authority to conduct investigations prescribed in the attached Table 2 and recommendations or recommendations.

When a decision has been made, it may be reviewed.

[Attachment 1] Amendment to the Classification Criteria Table for Majors (Related to Article 3)

Line of Duty (Standard Number 2-14) 3

be directly causing verbal abuse or cruel acts related to the performance of duties or education and training.

The death and injury due to self-injury in a state in which free will is excluded; and

recognized

[Attachment 2] State agencies authorized to conduct investigations (related to Article 6(3))

Serial 5. Military Languages and Photographs Finding Committee ( dissiping on December 31, 2009)