1. The judgment below is reversed.

2. The defendant shall be punished by a fine of twelve thousand won.

3. The above fine shall be imposed on the defendant.

1. The Prosecutor’s summary of the grounds for appeal (hereinafter “the Prosecutor’s Appeal”), which was pronounced by the lower court, is too unhued and unreasonable.

2. Ex officio determination of “a crime for which judgment to face with imprisonment without prison labor or heavier punishment has become final and a crime committed before such judgment has become final and conclusive” falls under concurrent crimes provided for in the latter part of Article 37 of the Criminal Act. In such cases, punishment shall be imposed in consideration of equity in cases where a crime among concurrent crimes provided for in Article 39(1) of the Criminal Act and a crime for which judgment has

Meanwhile, in light of the language, legislative intent, etc. of the latter part of Article 37 and Article 39(1) of the Criminal Act, in cases where a crime for which judgment has not yet become final and conclusive cannot be adjudicated concurrently with the crime for which judgment has already become final and conclusive, it is reasonable to interpret that the sentence shall not be imposed concurrently in consideration of equity and equity, or the sentence shall not be mitigated or exempted

(2) According to the evidence duly adopted and examined by the lower court, the Defendant was sentenced to one year to imprisonment for a violation of the Automobile Management Act, etc. at the Busan District Court on May 28, 2010 (hereinafter “final judgment”), and the said judgment became final and conclusive on September 9, 2010 (hereinafter “final judgment”), and on December 13, 2013, the former District Court sentenced two years of suspension of execution to eight months for fraud (hereinafter “second final judgment”) and became final and conclusive on April 11, 2014 (hereinafter “second final and conclusive judgment”), and criminal facts recognized in the second final and conclusive judgment on June 25, 2008, which were prior to the date the first final and conclusive judgment became final and conclusive. Thus, the crime of the second final judgment cannot be sentenced to the crime of the first final and conclusive judgment and the crime of the second final judgment after the date the final and conclusive judgment became final and conclusive.

Nevertheless, the court below erred by misapprehending the legal principles of Article 39(1) of the Criminal Act that sentenced punishment for each of the crimes of this case after the date when the first final judgment became final and conclusive, concurrently with the crime of final and conclusive judgment under Article 39(1) of the Criminal Act.