[1] The meaning of “original production,” which is the element of “work” under Article 2 subparag. 1 of the Copyright Act, and the case where so-called functional works such as architectural works or diagrams are recognized as creative and protected as a copyrighted work

[2] Where a certified architect Eul who produced and delivered design drawings and specifications concerning multi-family houses newly built by Gap corporation, and Gap corporation newly built another building with design drawings and specifications produced and delivered by Gap corporation Byung after the construction of the said house, and Gap corporation revised Eul's design drawings and specifications against Byung without Eul's consent, thereby manufacturing Eul's design drawings and specifications, and sought compensation for damages from copyright infringement, the case holding that Eul's design drawings and specifications constitute works indicating Eul's creative identity, and Eul's design drawings and specifications are substantially similar to Eul's design drawings and specifications, and Eul corporation and Byung are liable for damages from copyright infringement, and there were no errors by misapprehending legal principles, etc.

[1] Article 2 Subparag. 1 of the Copyright Act defines a work as “a creative production that expresses human thoughts or emotions” and requires creativity. Even if creativity does not require complete originality, to be recognized as creative, a certain work does not simply imitate another’s work, and must include the creator’s own expression of ideas or emotions.

In Article 4(1)5 of the Copyright Act, the term “architectural models and design drawings and other architectural works” includes “architectural, architectural architecture models and design drawings and other architectural works,” and in Article 4(1)8 of the same Act, the term “architectural, drawing, design drawings, design drawings, models and other diagrams works” are examples of works. However, as so-called functional works, the expression of architectural works or figure works is restricted by means of general expression methods in the relevant field, their use or functions, convenience of users of copyrighted works, etc. As such, it is often difficult to recognize creativity if the functional works indicate the function or practical idea according to such general expression methods, etc., but if the creative identity of the creator appears because they contain independent expressions of the creator of ideas or emotions, creativity may be recognized, thereby being protected as a copyrighted work.

[2] The case holding that the judgment below did not err by misapprehending legal principles in holding that Gap company and Byung are liable for damages arising from copyright infringement, in case where Gap company and Byung were liable for damages arising from copyright infringement, as Eul's design document contains the expression of Eul's own idea or appraisal, and Eul's design document constitutes a work that shows the creative identity, and Eul's design document is substantially similar to Eul's original original gyd (CAD) file, and Eul's original gyd (CAD) file is substantially similar to Eul's design document, since Eul company and Byung are liable for damages arising from copyright infringement, since Eul company and Byung are liable for damages due to copyright infringement, since Eul's design document contains only minor modifications in Eul's original gyd (CAD) file without Eul's consent

[1] Article 2 subparag. 1, Article 4(1)5, and 8 of the Copyright Act / [2] Article 2 subparag. 1, Article 4(1)5, and Article 4(1)8 of the Copyright Act

[1] Supreme Court Decision 2008Do29 Decided January 30, 2009 Supreme Court Decision 2019Do9601 Decided April 29, 2020 (Gong2020Sang, 1046)

Plaintiff (Attorney Kim Young-soo, Counsel for defendant-appellant)

Lee Snish Korea Co., Ltd and one other (Law Firm Hansung, Attorneys Kim In-style et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Seoul High Court Decision 2016Na2073109 decided August 24, 2017

All appeals are dismissed. The costs of appeal are assessed against the Defendants.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. Article 2 Subparag. 1 of the Copyright Act defines a work as “a creative production that expresses human thoughts or emotions” and requires creativity. Even if creativity does not require complete originality, to be recognized as creative, a certain work does not simply imitate another’s work, and must include his/her own independent expression of ideas or emotions (see Supreme Court Decision 2019Do9601, Apr. 29, 2020).

In Article 4(1)5 of the Copyright Act, the term “architectural models and design drawings and other architectural works” refers to works, etc. under Article 4(1)8 of the same Act, and “architectural works or figure work” refers to works, etc. However, as so-called functional works, their expressions are restricted by means of general expression methods, their use or functions, convenience in the use of works by users, etc. Therefore, even though it is difficult to recognize creativity if functional works include independent expressions of the creator of ideas or emotions and thus, creative identity of the creator appears, if creative identity of the creator is recognized (see Supreme Court Decisions 2008Do29, Jan. 30, 2009; 2008Do629, Apr. 29, 2009).

2. For reasons indicated in its reasoning, the lower court: (a) deemed that at least the roof form, the entrance door of the first floor and the painting form among the Plaintiff’s design documents contain the expression of the Plaintiff’s own ideas or emotions, and thus, the said design documents constitute a copyrighted work in which the Plaintiff’s creative identity is revealed; and (b) further, the Defendant design documents prepared by making only the minor transformation into the original file of the Plaintiff’s design documents was substantially similar to the Plaintiff’s design documents, and thus, recognized the Defendants’ liability for damages arising from copyright infringement and calculated the amount of damages in accordance with Article 126

3. Examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the relevant legal principles and records as seen earlier, the lower court did not exhaust all necessary deliberations to the lower court, but did not err by exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence against logical and empirical rules, or by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the determination of copyrighted works and the calculation

4. Therefore, all appeals are dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Min You-sook (Presiding Justice)