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(영문) 수원지방법원 안산지원 2018.01.24 2017가단62511
소유권이전등기
Text

1. The plaintiffs' claims are dismissed.

2. The costs of lawsuit are assessed against the plaintiffs.

Reasons

1. Basic facts

A. On July 23, 1987, the area was changed to 12,256 square meters due to the division of H land in Ansan-gu G 13,884 square meters prior to the division (hereinafter “land prior to the division”). On December 28, 2016, each land listed in the separate sheet (hereinafter “instant land”) was divided into each land listed in the separate sheet (hereinafter “instant land”).

B. On September 17, 1974, the transfer registration procedure for ownership transfer was completed under the name of the deceased J, the spouse of the deceased I on September 12, 1974.

C. On August 12, 1981, the Defendant completed the registration of ownership transfer under the name of the Defendant, which was made on November 20, 1974 pursuant to the former Act on Special Measures for the Registration of Ownership of Real Estate (Act No. 3094, Dec. 31, 197) with respect to the land before subdivision.

The deceased on August 24, 1974, the deceased on August 24, 1974, the deceased on October 10, 2006, and the plaintiffs and the defendant are children of the deceased I and the deceased J.

[Ground of recognition] Unsatisfy, each entry of Gap evidence 1 to 6 (including virtual number), and the purport of the whole pleadings

2. The assertion and judgment

A. The alleged plaintiffs asserted that the registration of transfer of ownership in the name of the deceased J as to the land before division was filed based on the sale certificate prepared after the death of the person liable for registration, and that the registration of transfer of ownership in the name of the defendant was made by false guarantee and confirmation, and thus the cause invalidity is invalid. Thus, the defendant asserts that the deceased I and the deceased J are liable for the registration of transfer of ownership as to the land in this case due to the restoration of real name.

In regard to this, the Defendant intended exclusion period as it constitutes a claim for recovery of inheritance, and even if not, in light of the fact that the Plaintiffs did not raise any objection against the Defendant’s sole receipt of the compensation for expropriation of H land on 1987, the Plaintiffs have long been subject to the limitation period.

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