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(영문) 대법원 1988. 6. 28. 선고 88누3215 판결
[재산세등부과처분취소][공1988.8.15.(830),1166]
Main Issues

The case holding that the land owner could not use the land due to a cause not attributable to the owner under the former Enforcement Rule of the Local Tax Act (amended by Ordinance of the Ministry of Home Affairs No. 452 of Dec. 31, 1986)

Summary of Judgment

Even if the land acquired by Gap by reclaiming public waters was designated as a third-class aesthetic district in which legal construction could be constructed, it is reasonable to view that the land is not used due to the reason that the land owner under Article 78-3 subparagraph 20 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Local Tax Act (amended by the Ordinance of the Ministry of Home Affairs No. 452 of Dec. 31, 1986) is not responsible for the land owner due to the reason that the land owner could not use the land, regardless of the owner’s will, in the future, if the land was reclaimed more higher than the previous sea of the land at the time of reclamation due to the alteration of urban planning and redevelopment, etc.

[Reference Provisions]

Article 78-3 subparagraph 20 of the former Enforcement Rule of the Local Tax Act (amended by Ordinance of the Ministry of Home Affairs No. 452 of December 31, 1986)

Plaintiff-Appellant

[Defendant-Appellant] Park Jae-sik, Counsel for defendant-appellant

Defendant-Appellee

Attorney Kim Jong-soo, Counsel for the defendant-appellant of Busan Metropolitan City Maritime Affairs

Judgment of the lower court

Daegu High Court Decision 87Gu189 delivered on February 5, 1988

Text

The judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Daegu High Court.

Reasons

We examine the grounds of appeal.

With respect to the third point:

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below confirmed that the land of this case which the plaintiff acquired ownership through reclamation of public waters on November 24, 1975 was a third-class aesthetic district under Article 112 of the public notice of May 24, 1980, and it was possible to construct the land of this case as a third-class aesthetic district under the property tax payment period under Article 142 (1) 1 (6) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Local Tax Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 12028 of Dec. 31, 1986) until September 16, 1984, the land of this case remains a vacant land under the main sentence of Article 142 (1) 1 (6) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Local Tax Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 12028 of Dec. 31, 1986) and rejected the land of this case on the ground that the land of this case was excluded from public land under Article 78-3 (452) of the former Enforcement Rule of the Local Tax Act.

However, according to the plaintiff's 1987.8.31 stated on the 6th day for pleading of the court below, if the plaintiff's 2nd day for pleading of the above 7th day for pleading No. 7th day for pleading No. 7th day for pleading No. 7th day for pleading No. 7th day, the plaintiff's construction permit cannot be granted under the Building Act because there were no roads leading to public use as seen earlier, and there were no low-proof and no drainage facilities. (1) Since the plaintiff's above land was designated as 86,8 Olympic Games and part of the surrounding land was filled up at 1.5m high than that of this case's 1.5m high-level 3m high-ranking land at the 6th day for pleading No. 8th day for pleading No. 1, the plaintiff's construction permit was to be changed to the 1st day before and after the construction of the above land, and it was not possible to use the above land at the time of the construction permit no longer than the plaintiff's construction permit.

Nevertheless, without examining and determining this point, the lower court’s rejection of the Plaintiff’s assertion solely on the grounds stated in its reasoning cannot be deemed to have affected the conclusion of the judgment by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the grounds that the parties’ assertion was erroneous and failing to exhaust all necessary deliberations, thereby failing to exhaust all necessary deliberations. The allegation contained in such purport is with merit.

Therefore, without examining other grounds of appeal, we reverse the judgment below and remand the case to the Daegu High Court. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Kim Jong-chul (Presiding Justice)

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