2011Do7925 A. homicide : Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Crimes

【Violation of the Rate (Vehicles)】

(b) Violation of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc.

(c) Violation of the Aggravated Punishment Act on Specific Crimes;

(d) Violation of the Road Traffic Act (the measures not taken after accidents);

(e) A violation of the Road Traffic Act;

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Residential ancient cities

Prosecutor

nan

Seoul High Court Decision 2011Do64 Decided June 10, 2011

November 29, 2011

The judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded to Seoul High Court.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

The criminal intent in the crime of murder does not necessarily require the intention of murder or planned murder. It is sufficient if it is possible or predicted to cause the death of another person due to one’s own act, and its recognition or prediction is not only conclusive but also conclusive, so-called dolusence. In addition, in a criminal trial, the conviction should be based on evidence with probative value sufficient to cause a judge to feel true and true to the extent that there is no reasonable doubt, and even if there is no evidence to establish such a degree of conviction, it is inevitable to determine the defendant’s interest. However, if there is no evidence to establish a conviction, such conviction should not be formed by direct evidence, and it is formed by indirect evidence as long as it does not violate the empirical and logical rules, and even if indirect evidence does not have complete probative value as to the crime, if comprehensive consideration of all evidence related to the crime cannot be conducted under mutual relation, it can be determined that the crime cannot be established by comprehensive examination of evidence (see Supreme Court Decision 2008Do5727, May 27, 2008).

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below determined that among the facts charged in this case, as to the primary facts of the victim's death that the defendant murdered with the victim Lee ○○ (hereinafter "victim"), the defendant's primary facts of the death are direct evidence to acknowledge that there was the defendant's intentional murder, and the statement is only made in the investigation agency and court of Kim Jong-chul, and there are no consistency and doubtful points, and there is no obvious motive for the defendant to kill the victim, and there is no obvious motive for the defendant to kill the victim, and it is difficult to keep the side fast at a narrow speed and rapid speed, and Kim U.S. is not easy to find that the defendant's active act after the crime is difficult to be seen as the behavior of the person who committed the crime of murder, and it cannot be recognized that there was the defendant's intentional murder, and even if all other evidence shown in the records are considered, it cannot be viewed that the above facts charged cannot be proven to the extent that there is a reasonable doubt.

On the other hand, with respect to the conjunctive charges on the death of the victim who escaped without taking any necessary measures to cause the death of the victim by neglecting the victim of the vehicle in this case while the defendant left behind the vehicle in this case, the court found the defendant guilty on the ground that the defendant was guilty on the ground that he did not take necessary measures, such as aiding and abetting the victim while driving the vehicle in this case, and taking into account the circumstances as stated in its reasoning, it is acknowledged that the defendant did not take any necessary measures, such as aiding and abetting the victim while driving the vehicle in this case, even though he did not recognize the shock of the victim.

However, it is difficult to accept the judgment of the court below that the primary charge on the death of the victim constitutes a case where there is no proof of the crime for the following reasons.

원심판결 이유와 원심 및 제1심이 적법하게 채택하여 조사한 증거들 ( 피고인에게 살인의 고의가 있었음을 인정하는 직접증거로서의 김□□ 진술의 신빙성을 배척한 원심의 판단을 수긍할 수 있다고 하더라도, 범행 이전의 상황에 관한 김□□의 진술을 전부 배척한 원심의 판단은 수긍하기 어렵다. 즉, 김□□는 아래에서 보는 바와 같이 피해자가 대리운전을 해서 일산으로 가게 된 경위, 피고인이 피해자를 때린 경위, 이 사건 승용차가 정차한 뒤 벌어진 상황, 자신과 피해자가 이 사건 승용차의 뒤쪽으로 걸어가고 있었던 상황, 갑자기 붉은 빛이 보이면서 정신을 잃었던 상황 등 범행 이전의 상황을 명확하게 진술하고 있는바, 이는 주요 부분에서 일관되고 피해자의 112 신고내역, 박 과의 전화통화 내역 등 여러 증거에 의하여 뒷받침되고 있으며 그 진술의 신빙성을 의심할 사정이 보이지 않는다. 그런데도 원심이 피고인의 범행으로 인하여 1시간 40분 가량 정신을 잃었다가 깨어난 김□□의 범행 이후의 상황에 관한 진술과 행적이 다소 의심스럽다는 이유로 범행 이전의 상황에 관한 김□□ 진술의 신빙성을 배척한 것은 합리성이 없는 증거의 취사선택으로 볼 것이다 ) 에 의하면, 피고인은 사건 당일인 2010. 6. 26. 18 : 00경부터 ②②시 # # 동에 있는 식당에서 직장 동료 등 약 15명과 함께 회식을 하면서 술을 마셨고, 21 : 14 일행이 대리운전기사를 불러서 피해자가 온 사실, 당시 피고인은 술에 만취한 상태여서 직장 동료들이 부축하여 피고인을 이 사건 승용차의 뒷좌석에 태웠고, 직장 동료인 김□□는 조수석에 탄 사실, 피해자가 이 사건 승용차를 운전하여 피고인의 집이 있는 일산으로 가기 위하여 서울외곽순환고 속도로의 사고지점 부근에 이르렀을 무렵 뒷좌석에서 자고 있던 피고인이 갑자기 깨어서 ' 사기를 친다 ' 고 말하며 손을 뻗어 운전을 하고 있던 피해자의 머리를 잡아당기는 등 피해자를 폭행하기 시작하였고, 이에 피해자가 이 사건 승용차를 위 도로의 갓길에 정차한 후 112에 폭행당하고 있음을 전화로 신고한 사실, 그와 같이 정차하고 있는 동안에도 피고인은 계속하여 피해자를 폭행하거나 폭행하려 하였고, 김□□는 피고인의 폭행을 말리는 한편 직장 동료인 박◁◁에게 전화하여 도움을 요청하기도 한 사실, 그러던 중 피해자가 피고인의 폭행을 피하여 이 사건 승용차에서 내려서 뒤쪽으로 걸어 갔고, 피고인은 피해자를 뒤따라가 폭행하려 하였으며, 김□□는 피고인의 폭행을 말리는 상황이 한동안 이어진 사실, 그 후 피고인은 한숨 자고 가라는 김□□의 말에 따라 이 사건 승용차의 운전석에 앉았고, 피해자는 피고인의 행동에 대하여 사과하면서 지나가는 차를 잡아타고 가려는 김□□와 함께 이 사건 승용차의 뒷쪽으로 갓길을 따라

On the other hand, at 02, Kim Jong-dong's 2: 02, the victim was able to walk up to the roadside, but around 50 meters from the side, the defendant left the automobile of this case to the right side and continued to stop the vehicle of this case to the front side of Seoul 6-day, and the defendant was able to stop the vehicle of this case to the front side of Seoul 6-day 6-day 6-day 6-day 6-day 6-day 6-day 7-day 7-day 7-day 6-day 7-day 7-day 7-day 7-day 7-day 7-day 7-day 7-day 7-day 7-day 7-day 7-day 7-day 7-day 7-day 7-day her head of this case to the front side of the 3-day 5-day-day 7-day 7-day-day 7-day her front side.

The following facts found in the crime: ① if the defendant started to commit the crime, not with the intention of shocking the victim, but with no obstacle to the front door, it would be possible to drive the vehicle at the time of the crime; ② it is hard to see that the defendant operated the vehicle at the time of the crime at the time of the crime at the time of the crime at the time of the death of the victim at the time of the accident at the time of the accident at the time of the accident at the time of the accident at the time of the accident at the time of the accident; ② it is hard to see that the defendant was using the front door of the vehicle at the time of the accident at the time of the death of the victim at the time of the accident at the time of the accident at the time of the accident at the time of the accident at the time of the accident at the time of the accident at the time of the accident at the time of the accident at the time of the accident at the time of the victim at the time of the accident at the time of the accident at the time of the accident at the time of the accident at the time of the victim at the time of the second.

Nevertheless, the court below concluded that there was no intentional murder on the part of the defendant at the time of shocking the victim on the grounds as stated in its reasoning. The court below erred in the misapprehension of legal principles as to willful negligence of murder and in violation of logical and empirical rules, thereby exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence, which affected the conclusion of the judgment.

On the other hand, the court below found the victim not guilty of the primary facts charged as to the death of the victim and rendered a single sentence in relation to concurrent crimes under the former part of Article 37 of the Criminal Act with the remaining facts charged that the defendant is guilty of the facts charged in the preliminary facts charged. Thus, the court below's judgment should be reversed in its entirety.

Therefore, the lower judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the lower court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Lee In-bok

Justices Min Il-young

Justices Park Poe-young

Justices Kim Shin-young