1. The judgment of the first instance is revoked, and the plaintiff's claim is dismissed.

2. All costs of the lawsuit shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

1. Basic facts

A. The Land Survey Board prepared in the Japanese Occupation Period is indicated as C’s assessment by stating the Gyeonggi-gun B B, 1,839 square meters (hereinafter “instant land before subdivision”).

B. The land prior to the instant partition had been real estate indicated in the separate sheet (hereinafter “instant land”) following the following division, land category change, administrative district change, etc., and the Defendant completed the registration of ownership preservation (hereinafter “registration of ownership preservation”) in the name of the Defendant under the title of the Suwon District Court as the registration office of the branch branch of Sungwon District Court for the Sungnam Branch Branch of the Sungnam Branch of the District Court on January 21, 1993.

C. On August 25, 194, the Plaintiff’s fleet C died and succeeded to the property of Australia and the Republic of Korea, and upon D’s death on July 24, 1983, E and F jointly succeeded to the property, and E died on January 8, 1998, and jointly succeeded to the property of the Plaintiff, etc.

[Ground for Recognition: Facts without dispute, Gap 1 through 5 (including each number, if any); hereinafter the same shall apply

(2) Each entry, each fact inquiry result against the branch office of the court of first instance, the purport of the entire pleadings

2. Determination:

A. The presumption of registration of ownership preservation on the land to be determined as to the cause of the claim shall be broken if it is proved that there is another person in charge of the assessment of the land, and the registration is invalid unless the registered titleholder specifically asserts and proves that he/she acquired by succession (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2007Da46138, Oct. 25, 2007), Gap 1 and 4, and the court of first instance's fact inquiry into the branch office of the party branch office of the court of first instance. In full view of the purport of the oral argument as a whole, Eul who was in charge of the land before the division of this case was in the Gyeonggi-do G major 92, the plaintiff's permanent domicile is G G in Gwangju-gun, the plaintiff's prior representative, and C, other than the plaintiff's prior representative C, did not have a permanent domicile in H. In full view of the above facts, it can be recognized that the plaintiff's prior to the division of this case.