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1. The instant lawsuit shall be dismissed.
2. The costs of lawsuit are assessed against the Plaintiff’s representative F.
Reasons
1. Defendant B asserts that the instant lawsuit was unlawful as it was filed by an unlawful representative without the resolution on authorization, while the Plaintiff asserted that, at the general meeting of September 11, 2010, the resolution on the election and the authorization for filing a lawsuit was adopted, and thereafter, the said resolution was ratified at the general meeting of September 7, 2013. Thus, the validity of the resolution made at each of the above general meetings should be examined.
The defendant B asserts the validity of the resolution of the clan General Meeting on September 11, 2010 (1) that since the clan General Meeting on September 11, 2010 held without legitimate convening procedures and there is a serious defect in the convening procedures, the resolution of the above General Meeting is invalid.
As to this, the plaintiff argued that there was no defect in the convocation procedure even if he did not go through a separate convocation procedure at the clan meeting on September 11, 2010, even though he did not go through a separate convocation procedure at the clan meeting on September 11, 2010.
(2) If members of a clan regularly gather at a certain place on a fixed day each year in accordance with the rules or practices of the clan and are to deal with the religious affairs of the clan, it is not necessary to separately convene a clan meeting.
(See Supreme Court Decisions 91Da43862 delivered on March 10, 1992, 93Da27703 delivered on September 30, 1994, etc.). In full view of the health class and evidence No. 1’s purport, the Plaintiff’s rules (established on August 31, 2010) that were applied at the time of the above clan general meeting, which only include the opening of the general meeting on the first day of each year, do not refer to the place where the general meeting was held, and there was no reference to the place where the provision on the convening of the general meeting was amended, as alleged by the Plaintiff, and thus, it is recognized that the provision on the convening of the general meeting was amended every year at the time of the above general meeting.