The case holding that even if a title truster has completed a registration of transfer on the grounds of termination of the period of prescription, he is obligated to perform the registration of transfer to the prescriptive acquisitor.

Although the fact that the defendant church completed the registration of transfer of ownership after the completion date of the plaintiff's acquisition by prescription is identical to the above recognition, this real estate is owned by the defendant church in substance, even during the period from the plaintiff's possession to the completion date of the prescription. However, the defendant church merely held a title trust on the register to each registered titleholder in the above instruction, and thus, is a party at the time of the completion of the plaintiff's acquisition by prescription,

Article 245 of the Civil Act

Daegu City

The Republic of Korea may have two persons, except the Korean President Park Jong-ro Association ○○ Japan Association.

Daegu District Court of First Instance (66Ga320 decided)

Supreme Court Decision 70Da682 Delivered on September 29, 1970

The original judgment shall be modified as follows:

The plaintiff's main claim and the main claim are dismissed.

On March 30, 1966, the Korean Film Association (name omitted) shall implement the procedure for the registration of ownership transfer on the real estate recorded in the attached list to the Plaintiff on March 30, 1966.

Of the total costs of litigation, the part that was born between the plaintiff, defendant 2 and 3 shall be borne by the plaintiff, and the remainder shall be borne by the defendant's Association of Arts, Science and Technology (name omitted).

(Request for Main Enemy)

(1) The Korea Tymna Association (name omitted) Japanese Tymna Association against the Defendant;

A) As to the land indicated in the Attachment Nos. 1 and 2

1.The Daegu District Court No. 19126 of Jun. 9, 1966, the procedure for the cancellation of the registration of the transfer of equity interests on the ground of contribution of May 25, 1966 between Defendant 2:

2.The procedure for the cancellation of the registration of the transfer of equity rights between the defendant 3, as the registration receipt No. 19124 of June 9, 1966, on the ground of the contribution made by the defendant 3;

B) As to the land listed in Appendix 2:

1.The Daegu District Court No. 19128, Jun. 9, 1966; the procedure for the cancellation of the registration of the transfer of equity interests due to the contribution of the defendant 2;

2.The procedure for the cancellation of the registration of the transfer of equity rights between the defendant 3, as the registration receipt No. 19124 of June 9, 1966, on the ground of the contribution made by the defendant 3;

C) With respect to the land in the list No. 3, Daegu District Court No. 24464 of Jul. 20, 1966, the procedure for the cancellation of the ownership transfer registration due to the cancellation of the trust by Nonparty 18 of the 1966.3.15, 1966;

D) As to the land listed in the Schedule No. 4:

1.The Daegu District Court No. 24464, Jul. 20, 196; the procedure for the cancellation of the registration of the transfer of equity interest due to the cancellation of the trust of the non-party 1, 1966, as the registration No. 2464;

2.The procedure for the cancellation of the registration of the transfer of equity rights between the defendant 2, as the registration receipt No. 19129 of Jun. 9, 1966, which was made by the same court, for the reason of contribution. 15 May 25, 1966;

3.The procedure for the cancellation of the registration of the transfer of equity rights between the defendant 3 as the registry No. 19123, Jun. 9, 1969;

(e) As to the land listed in Appendix 5:

1. The Daegu District Court No. 24464 of Jul. 20, 196, and the procedure for the cancellation of the registration of transfer of equity interest arising from the cancellation of the trust as of Mar. 15, 1966 between the non-party 2, 3, 4, 5, 6

2.The procedure for the cancellation of the registration of the transfer of equity rights between the defendant 2, as the registration receipt No. 19127 of Jun. 9, 1966, which was made by the same court, due to the contribution of May 25, 1966;

(f) As to the land listed in Appendix 6:

1.The procedure for the cancellation of registration of the transfer of equity rights such as entry in the foregoing one entry;

2.The Daegu District Court No. 19125 of Jun. 9, 1966, the procedure for the cancellation of the registration of the transfer of equity interests for the reasons of contribution of May 25, 1966;

G) With respect to the land listed in the Schedule 7, Daegu District Court No. 19122 on June 9, 1966, when the procedure for the cancellation of the ownership transfer registration due to the sale and purchase as of May 25, 1966 between Defendant 3 as the registration receipt No. 19122,

(2) On March 31, 1946, Defendant 3 and Defendant 2 shall implement the procedure for the registration of ownership transfer due to the donation to the Plaintiff on the whole of the real estate recorded in the attached list.

(3) Judgment that the litigation costs shall be borne by the defendant, etc.

(Preliminary Claim)

1. On March 31, 1946, the Korea Telecommunication Association (name omitted) shall implement the procedure for the registration of ownership transfer due to the donation to the Plaintiff on the land specified in the attached Table 1 to 7.

2. On March 30, 1956, the Korean Film Association (name omitted) shall implement the procedure for the registration of ownership transfer due to the completion of prescription on the entire real estate stated in the attached Table to the Plaintiff.

3. On March 30, 1966, the Korean Film Association (name omitted) shall implement the procedure for the registration of ownership transfer due to the completion of prescription on the said real estate to the Plaintiff.

4. The Korean Film Association (name omitted) shall confirm that the said real estate was owned by the Plaintiff.

(1) First, we examine the Plaintiff’s principal claim and the first preliminary claim.

According to the above 1-8 register No. 1, 2, 3 (Protocol of Examination of Witnesses), 7-1, 13-8 (No. 17) and 18 (No. 17-100), which were recorded on the above 6th of the above 6th of the 6th of the 7th of the 196th of the 1st of the 196th of the 196th of the 196th of the 196th of the 196th of the 196th of the 196th of the 196th of the 196th of the 196th of the 196th of the 196th of the 196th of the 196th of the 196th of the 196th of the 196th of the 196th of the 196th of the 196th of the 196th of the 196th of the 196th of the 196th of the 1.

Therefore, the plaintiff's main claim on the premise that the real estate in this case is the ownership of the non-party 16 and 17, and the plaintiff's primary claim on the premise that the ownership of the defendant church was donated by a legitimate resolution shall be rejected as without merit.

(2) The plaintiff's second preliminary claims are examined.

From March 31, 1946, the day on which the Plaintiff acquired the above school, the Plaintiff asserted that the prescriptive prescription has been completed on March 30, 1956, on the premise that the Plaintiff occupied the real estate in a peaceful and public manner as a doctor to own it until the day and that there was no good faith and negligence at the beginning of possession. The Plaintiff’s possession as the intention to own it up to the day is as follows: Provided, however, there is no proof as to the fact that there was no negligence at the beginning of possession on the donation from Nonparty 16 and 17 of the property owned by the Defendant church by Nonparty 16 and 17, the above assertion should be rejected without merit.

(3) Next, the Plaintiff’s claim for the third preliminary claim is determined.

Comprehensively taking account of the entire purport of the party’s argument in the above evidence Nos. 7-1 and 23 (School History) without dispute over the establishment of the above evidence Nos. 7-1 and 23 (National School Regulations), the Plaintiff may be presumed to have occupied the real estate in peace and public performance for 20 years as the owner of the real estate during the period of possession of the Plaintiff, as acknowledged in the above Paragraph (1), and immediately taken over the entire real estate from the deceased non-party 16 and non-party 17, and received it from the deceased non-party 17, and then continued possession from March 28, 195 as the teacher and the site of the Plaintiff's public scardo National School, and continued possession from March 28, 195 after opening possession. The Plaintiff still did not have any influence on the Plaintiff’s possession from August 16, 195.

The defendant church alleged that the plaintiff's possession is not independent possession even if the plaintiff was delivered with the real estate, and therefore, the plaintiff's possession was alleged to be not independent possession, but the non-party 2, 3, 10, and 11's testimony and the result of the defendant's personal examination cannot be trusted, and the non-party 2 and the defendant's personal examination are not contrary to the other, and there is no evidence contrary to the other, as the plaintiff's official document is a document, it is obvious that the plaintiff was in arrears with the above 14-1, 13, 14-2, 3, and 17-2 of the above 15-2, 3, and 17-2 of the above 14-2, and the testimony portion of the 16, 21-2, and 17-1 of the above 14-2, and the above 16, 17-2, and 17-17 of the above Don National University.

Therefore, the plaintiff's possession was completed on March 30, 196, which was 20 years after the date of acquisition, and the right to claim for the transfer of ownership was completed on March 30, 196. As to this point, since the defendant church completed the registration of transfer of ownership on the real estate in the name of the defendant church after the date of completion of the plaintiff's acquisition, it cannot be asserted that the acquisition by prescription cannot be asserted against the defendant church. However, the fact that the defendant church completed the registration of transfer of ownership after the date of completion of the plaintiff's acquisition by prescription is the same as the above recognition, but the real estate is owned by the defendant church in fact from the time the plaintiff started possession to the expiration of the prescription period, and as such, the defendant church is the party at the time of the completion of the acquisition by prescription of the plaintiff and the defendant church is the person liable for the registration of transfer of ownership as at the time of completion of the plaintiff's acquisition by prescription and the defendant church cannot be exempted from the above registration obligation

If so, the plaintiff's main claim and the main claim of the first, second and second preliminary claims shall be dismissed without merit, but the third preliminary claims shall be accepted for that reason. The judgment of the court below is partly contrary to the above, and it is so modified and it is so decided as per Disposition in accordance with Articles 89, 92 and 96 of the Civil Procedure Act, which are related to the cost of lawsuit.

[Attachment List omitted]

Judges Lee Jae-ho (Presiding Judge)