1. The defendant's appeal is dismissed.

2. The costs of appeal shall be borne by the Defendant.

Purport of claim and appeal

1...

The reasons why the court should explain about this case are as stated in the part of the reasoning of the judgment of the first instance except for adding the arguments and judgments in the defendant's trial as set forth in the following Paragraph 2. Thus, it shall be cited in accordance with Article 8 (2) of the Administrative Litigation Act and the main sentence of Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act.

In addition, even where an obligor grants the same trust that does not invoke the benefit of extinctive prescription, the obligee may block the obligor’s defense of extinctive prescription only if he/she exercises his/her rights within a reasonable period from the time when such circumstances exist. Here, “a reasonable period of time for exercising the right” should be limited to a short-term period (six months from the time when the cause of suspension is extinguished) corresponding to the suspension of prescription under the Civil Act. However, when the relevant precedents were rendered (as of September 4, 2014), it should be deemed that the de facto disability in the event that the cause of suspension is extinguished and the exercise of the right is possible. However, the Plaintiff claimed disability benefits only after December 10, 2015 when one year and three months have passed since the date of the decision, and therefore, the Defendant’s assertion on extinctive prescription cannot

① However, there is no ground to view that the Plaintiff was aware of the fact of the pronouncement of the instant judgment at once the relevant judicial precedents were rendered, and there is no reason to view that the Plaintiff was aware that the cause of disability that could not exercise his/her right was eliminated. ② In the instant judicial precedents, the external binding force of the instant provision was finally denied upon the pronouncement of the instant judicial precedents, but the Defendant changed the time of recovery from the “date of leaving the workplace” from the “date of leaving the workplace” to the “date of leaving the workplace,” which was enacted and implemented on January 14, 2016, and the same year.

3. From January 14, 2016 or on March 28, 2016, the instant provision was deleted, and even around March 28, 2016.