logobeta
본 영문본은 리걸엔진의 AI 번역 엔진으로 번역되었습니다. 수정이 필요한 부분이 있는 경우 피드백 부탁드립니다.
텍스트 조절
arrow
arrow
(영문) 서울고등법원 2018.02.22 2017누76939
장해급여부지급처분취소
Text

1. The defendant's appeal is dismissed.

2. The costs of appeal shall be borne by the Defendant.

Purport of claim and appeal

1..

Reasons

1. The reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance, such as admitting the judgment, is the same as the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance, except to supplement or add the judgment as follows 2. Thus, it shall be cited as it is in accordance with Article 8(2) of the Administrative Litigation Act and the main sentence of Article

2. The supplementary and additional defendant asserts as follows.

Even in cases where the obligor has granted the same trust that the benefit of extinctive prescription should not be invoked, the obligee may block the obligor’s defense of extinctive prescription, even if he/she exercises his/her rights within a reasonable period from the

Here, "reasonable period of exercise of rights" should be limited to the short-term (six months from the time the cause of suspension ceases to exist) in accordance with the suspension of prescription under the Civil Act.

However, when the relevant Supreme Court Decision (214Du7374) was rendered ( September 4, 2014), it should be deemed that the exercise of the right was possible due to the removal of de facto disability. However, the Plaintiff claimed disability benefits only on February 2, 2016, which was 17 months from the date of the decision.

Therefore, the defendant's assertion of extinctive prescription cannot be viewed as an abuse of rights against the principle of good faith.

However, there is no ground to view that the Plaintiff’s pronouncement of the relevant Supreme Court Decision was immediately known at the time of rendering that there was no reason to view that the Plaintiff’s failure to exercise his/her right was eliminated, and ② the external binding force of the previous provision was finally denied upon the issuance of the relevant Supreme Court Decision; however, the Defendant changed the time of recovery from noise distress “the date of leaving the place of work” from “the date of leaving the place of work,” which was enacted and implemented around January 14, 2016, to “the date of leaving the place of work,” and the previous provision was deleted until it reached March 28, 2016, and it appears that the previous provision was effective even around January 14, 2016 or around March 28, 2016.

arrow