The appeal is dismissed.

The costs of appeal are assessed against the defendant.

For the reasons indicated in its holding, the lower court determined that: (a) it cannot be deemed that the Plaintiff did not lawfully apply for the adjustment of the contract amount; (b) the Plaintiff and the Defendant agreed not to claim additional expenses due to the extension of the contract term; or (c) even if there was an agreement between the Plaintiff and the Defendant that the additional payment of the contract amount should not be made even if the contract term of the secondary supply contract of this case was extended in excess of 12 months, such agreement was null and void as “a special agreement unreasonably restricting contractual interests of the contracting parties” prohibited by Article 4 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Act on Contracts to Which the State was a Party (amended by Presidential Decree No. 30597 of April 7, 2020; hereinafter “former Enforcement Decree of the State Contracts Act”); (d) the Defendant was liable to pay the Plaintiff the total financial expenses that the Plaintiff additionally paid due to the change of the contract term of each of the instant supply contracts to the Plaintiff 189,294 (25,927 supply contract related to the secondary supply contract, 16360,2967,29651,65656,654,65656,656,566,566,54,5661,54,54,664,5666,54,54,566666666,4, and254,5666666664,4,4, etc.

The judgment below

Examining the reasoning in light of the relevant legal principles and records, the lower court’s aforementioned determination is justifiable.

In so doing, contrary to what is alleged in the grounds of appeal, the court below did not err by misapprehending the legal principles regarding the interpretation of a special agreement or disposition document that unfairly limits the contractual interests of the other party, or by exceeding the bounds of free evaluation of evidence.