[1] In a situation where the precedents, theories, precedents, etc. on the nature of the guidance and supervision of school life records have not been established, whether the act of performing affairs existing solely on the ground of such circumstance constitutes grounds for disciplinary action in the event that the office of education conducted such affairs after considering them as autonomous affairs and it is found to be a state delegated affairs (negative)

[2] In a case where a public educational official belonging to the Office of Education in charge of the Superintendent of the Provincial Office of Education requested the Office of Education to request a disciplinary decision against an act of unfairly dealing with the affairs related to the entry of school violence students' school records against the policies of the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology, and a request for objection to school violence records was made on the website of the Office of Education in charge, but the request for a disciplinary decision was not complied with, the case holding that no person subject to disciplinary decision is obligated to apply for a disciplinary decision to the Superintendent

[1] According to the interpretation of relevant statutes, such as the former Elementary and Secondary Education Act (amended by Act No. 11690, Mar. 23, 2013), the instruction and supervision of affairs concerning the preparation of school life records of the superintendent of education shall be deemed to fall under the delegated state affairs of the agency. However, considering the legislative intent of a lawsuit seeking objection against the disposition of revocation stipulated under Article 169 of the Local Autonomy Act, the Superintendent of an Office of Education, in the absence of precedents, theories, precedents, etc. as to the nature of guidance and supervision affairs as mentioned above, deemed to be autonomous affairs, and carried out affairs after the fact that the administrative affairs are the state affairs delegated by the agency, cannot be deemed to fall under the grounds for disciplinary action immediately on the ground that the specific execution of affairs immediately

[2] In a case where a public educational official belonging to the Office of Education in charge of the Superintendent of the Provincial Office of Education issued an order to perform duties to request a disciplinary resolution against an act of unfairly conducting affairs related to the entry of school violence students' school life records against the policies of the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology and a request for objection to the entry of school violence records on the website of the Office of Education to the request for a disciplinary resolution against the act of requesting a disciplinary resolution against the act of notifying the school violence student's school life records, the case holding that even if a person subject to disciplinary action is deemed to be a legal autonomous affairs while performing the duties of guiding and supervising the preparation of school life records in accordance with the policies of the Office of Education, which is a superior to his duties, but it is judged that the act of notifying the person subject to disciplinary action was in violation of the Acts and subordinate statutes, such circumstance alone does not constitute a ground for disciplinary action, and it cannot be deemed that the person subject to disciplinary action violates Article 3 (2) of the State Public Officials Service Regulations or Article 56 of the State Public Officials Act.

[1] Articles 9(4) and 17 of the Framework Act on Education, Article 6, 25, and 47(2) of the former Elementary and Secondary Education Act (Amended by Act No. 11690, Mar. 23, 2013); Article 82 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (Amended by Presidential Decree No. 24423, Mar. 23, 2013); Article 34(2) of the former Higher Education Act (Amended by Act No. 11690, Mar. 23, 2013); Article 35 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Higher Education Act (Amended by Act No. 11690, Mar. 23, 2013); Article 201 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Local Education Act (Amended by Presidential Decree No. 24135, Mar. 23, 2013); Article 169 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Local Education Act / [2] Articles 9(4) and 17(3) of the former Enforcement Decree

Gyeonggi-do Superintendent of an Office of Education (Law Firm Dalsan, Attorneys Kim Glll-hwan et al.)

(2) The Minister of Education (Attorney Choi Gyeong-hoon et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

January 23, 2014

The Defendant’s order of performance of duties against the Plaintiff on November 22, 2012 is revoked. The costs of lawsuit are assessed against the Defendant.

The same shall apply to the order.

1. Details of the instant order to perform duties

The following facts are either disputed between the parties, or acknowledged by comprehensively taking account of the entries in Gap evidence 1 to Gap evidence 23 (Additional Number omitted) and the whole purport of pleadings.

(a) Amendment of the defendant's guidelines for preparing and managing school records;

(1) On January 27, 2012, the Defendant: (a) recorded the measures to be taken against an aggressor student of school violence at the Autonomous Committee on Countermeasures against School Violence as stipulated in each subparagraph of Article 17(1) of the Act on the Prevention of and Countermeasures against Violence; and (b) revised the Guidelines for the Preparation and Management of School Records by Ordinance of the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology (hereinafter “instant Guidelines”) in order to make it available to students as life guidance and higher school admission data (hereinafter “instant Guidelines”); and (c) the main contents are as follows.

(A) Method of entering school life records

The term "a statement of special character in the school register" means a statement of transfer, expulsion from school, and the term "a statement of special character in the attendance situation" means social service, special education or psychological treatment, suspension of attendance for not more than ten days, suspension of attendance for not more than ten days, and a written apology, prohibition of contact, intimidation, and retaliation, service at school, and class replacement, respectively.

(b) the preservation period of school life records;

Measures to be taken against aggressor students recorded in school records shall be preserved for five years after graduation, and high schools shall be preserved for ten years.

(2) On June 29, 2012, the Defendant re-amended the instant guidelines by the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology Directive No. 257, and revised the preservation period of school life records from 10 years to 5 years after graduation from elementary schools and middle schools.

B. The Plaintiff’s reserved land in this case

On February 15, 2012, the Plaintiff requested the Defendant to reconsider the records of school violence disciplinary actions. In addition, on July 9, 2012, the National Human Rights Commission held the 14th electric power committee and decided “comprehensive policy recommendations for the creation of human rights-friendly school culture” on the following grounds: “The National Human Rights Commission shall revise school violence records to ensure that school violence records are not subject to any other human rights infringement, such as the introduction of the deletion review system or the interim deletion system prior to graduation.”

On the basis of this, the Plaintiff sent a public letter to the district office of education and each school in each level on August 9, 2012, stating that “Until the future policies of the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology and the Gyeonggi-do Office of Education have been established, it is necessary to withhold records of school violence in school life records (hereinafter “the time reserved land in this case”).

C. The instant corrective order and ex officio revocation disposition

On August 16, 2012, the Defendant notified the National Human Rights Commission of the policy recommendations on the “Recommendation on the Entry in School Violence” among the “Recommendation on Comprehensive Policy for the Creation of Human Rights-Friendly School Culture,” and issued a corrective order to the effect that, on August 23, 2012, the Defendant “(i) cancelled the direction to withhold the entry of school records informed to the school in the Office of Education, and (ii) issued a corrective order to the school and the Office of Education by August 24, 2012 to the effect that the measures against school violence students should be entered in school records by August 27, 2012 (hereinafter “instant corrective order”).

As the Plaintiff did not comply with the instant corrective order, on August 27, 2012, the Defendant revoked ex officio the Plaintiff’s reserved land in the instant case on the ground that the principal’s school principal did not arbitrarily determine the matters to be determined pursuant to Article 25 of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (hereinafter “instant revocation disposition”). As to this, the Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the Defendant on August 29, 2012 as Supreme Court Decision 201Do183 Decided August 29, 2012, pursuant to Article 169(2) of the Local Autonomy Act.

(d)request to conduct and take a specific audit;

(1) From August 28, 2012 to September 13, 2012, the Defendant conducted a specific audit of the Gyeonggi-do Office of Education and pointed out the following matters:

(A) Unfair conduct in dealing with the entry of school violence aggressor students in school records

(1) Details of disposition: Institutional warning and heavy disciplinary action.

(2) Objects subject to heavy disciplinary action: Nonparty 1 inspector, Nonparty 2, former school inspector, former school inspector, Nonparty 3 (former Gyeonggi-do Education and Training Institute), former school inspector, Nonparty 4 (former Hong High School), school inspector Nonparty 5, school inspector Nonparty 5, and school inspector Nonparty 6 in contractual service, who is the representative Nonparty 6.

(B) Refusal to record school violence aggressor students' school records

(1) Details of disposition: Heavy disciplinary measure, minor disciplinary measure, and warning.

(2) Objects of heavy disciplinary action: Eight persons, including the head of Suwon Agriculture Bioscience Science School and the non-party 7.

③ Object of the minor disciplinary action: Multisan High School Deputy Principal, Non-party 8 and Vice-Party 9.

(4) Subject matter of warning: 33 persons, including the assistant principal, non-party 10, etc.

(C) Unfair public official service practices

(1) Details of disposition: Minor disciplinary action.

(2) Objects of minor disciplinary action: 25 persons, including Nonparty 11, etc. of the head of the Suwon District Education Office of Education.

(D) Defamation by the Audit Board of Education, Science and Technology

(1) Details of disposition: Heavy disciplinary action.

(2) Those subject to heavy disciplinary action: Non-party 4 to non-party 6 in the representative contract position.

(2) On October 16, 2012, the Defendant issued an individual warning disposition to the Gyeonggi-do Office of Education according to the result of a specific audit, and submitted the result of other dispositions to the Gyeonggi-do Office of Education after taking measures under the responsibility of the superintendent of education. On the other hand, the Defendant requested the principal, etc., who is a person subject to general disciplinary action among the persons subject to the Gyeonggi-do Office of Education, to take disciplinary measures within one month from the general disciplinary committee established in the Gyeonggi-do Office of Education.

E. Details of the instant order to perform duties

(1) On November 15, 2012, the Plaintiff filed an application for reexamination with the Defendant pursuant to Article 21 of the Audit Regulations of the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology, but the Defendant dismissed the Plaintiff’s application for reexamination on November 20, 2012. In addition, on November 22, 2012, the Defendant requested the Plaintiff to apply for a resolution on disciplinary action against “the head of the district office of education, the head of the City/Do office of education, the head of the City/Do office of education, and its subordinate officers” who are subject to the jurisdiction of the Special Disciplinary Committee of Public Educational Officials without delay pursuant to Article 51(1) of the Public Educational Officials Act, but on the ground that the Plaintiff would not comply with it, issued an order to perform the instant duties by November 27, 2012 under Article 170 of the Local Autonomy Act.

(2) Specific grounds for disciplinary action against “the head of the district office of education, the head of the City/Do office of education, and its subordinate” are as follows.

(A) Unfair conduct in dealing with the entry of school violence aggressor students in school records

(1) Objects of heavy disciplinary action: The director general of the Gyeonggi-do Office of Education and its subordinate officers.

② Specific grounds for disciplinary action: (a) the instant persons subject to disciplinary action violated Article 56 of the State Public Officials Act, Article 2-2 and Article 3 of the State Public Officials Service Regulations, and Article 8(3) of the Local Autonomy Act, by accepting public documents containing school violence measures in the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology, the instant corrective order, and the instant ex officio revocation disposition, without notifying the competent school thereof; and (b) implementing a public document pertaining to the instant postponement disposition against the policies of the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology four times.

(B) Unfair public official service practices;

(1) Objects of minor disciplinary action: 25 persons, including Nonparty 11, etc. of the head of the Suwon District Education Office of Education.

② Specific disciplinary grounds: (a) On August 27, 2012, this part of the disciplinary grounds: (b) attended the meeting of the head of a district office of education related to the records of the school violence student's measures held by the Gyeonggi-do Office of Education on August 27, 2012, and (c) under the title of "written appeal to the head of a district office of education of Gyeonggi-do Office of Education", Nonparty 11 of the Suwon District Office of Education and the head of a district office of education of Gyeonggi-do, which requested the withdrawal of school records and the withdrawal of audit, and (c)

2. Determination

(a) Affairs subject to an order to perform duties;

(1) According to Article 3 of the former Local Education Autonomy Act (amended by Act No. 11690, Mar. 23, 2013; hereinafter the same), and Article 170(1) of the Local Autonomy Act, affairs subject to an order of performance of duties that the Minister of Education may issue to the Superintendent of an Office of Education are “management and execution of national delegated duties.” In addition to the language and text of the provision, considering the purpose of the system of the order of performance of duties delegated to the Superintendent of an Office of Education or the head of a local government, it is reasonable to deem that state delegated duties refer to state affairs delegated to the Superintendent of an Office of Education, etc., i.e., State affairs delegated to the Superintendent of an Office of Education, etc., State affairs entrusted to the Superintendent of an Office of Education, etc.

(2) On the premise of such interpretation, the Plaintiff’s assertion that “the request for a request for a disciplinary decision against the head of the district office of education, the head of the City/Do office of education, and its subordinate officers is only autonomous affairs concerning the education and arts of local governments, and do not constitute the affairs subject to the order of performance of duties, and thus does not constitute the affairs subject to the order of performance of duties

The purpose of the former Public Educational Officials Act (amended by Act No. 11527, Dec. 11, 2012; hereinafter the same) is to provide for special cases concerning qualifications, appointment, remuneration, and guarantee of status, etc. of public educational officials who serve the whole nation through education (Article 1). In light of the legislative purpose and specific provisions of the former Public Educational Officials Act, the disciplinary affairs of public educational officials regulated by the Act on Public Educational Officials should be handled uniformly for the benefit of the whole nation along with those of qualifications, methods and procedures for appointment, remuneration, retraining, training, guarantee of status, etc. of public educational officials.

In addition, according to Article 33(1) of the former Public Educational Officials Act, the Minister of Education may delegate part of his/her right to appoint to the head of an educational administrative agency, etc., as prescribed by Presidential Decree, and Article 3(5)5 of the former Public Educational Officials Appointment Decree (amended by Presidential Decree No. 24215, Dec. 4, 2012) of the former Public Educational Officials Appointment Decree (amended by Presidential Decree No. 24215, Dec. 4, 2012) stipulates that the Minister of Education delegates a person who has the authority to appoint a school inspector, school inspector, and educational researcher belonging to the Superintendent of an Office of Education to the Superintendent of an Office of Education, and Article 3(5)7 of the former Public Educational Officials Act shall delegate the authority to appoint a school inspector, school inspector, and educational researcher, respectively.

In light of the nature of disciplinary affairs of public educational officials, and the form and content of the regulations of the Public Educational Officials Act concerning the delegation of authority, it is reasonable to deem that disciplinary action against the head of the district office of education, the head of the City/Do office of education, the director of the education bureau of the relevant subordinate agency, school inspector, and school inspector is state affairs, and the application for a request for disciplinary decision, which is a part thereof, also constitutes state affairs. Therefore, it is reasonable to deem that the application for a request for disciplinary decision made against the head of the district office of education

Meanwhile, Articles 20 subparag. 16 and 27 of the former Local Education Autonomy Act provide that the Superintendent of an Office of Education shall take charge of matters concerning the personnel management of state public officials under his/her jurisdiction concerning education and arts, and deal with matters concerning the appointment, disciplinary action, etc. of public officials under his/her jurisdiction. However, as seen earlier, it is nothing more than the purport of verifying state affairs delegated by the Superintendent of an Office of Education pursuant to the Public Educational Officials Act and subordinate statutes as his/her head. Thus, the relevant affairs cannot

(3) If so, the instant order for performance of duties is related to the state delegated affairs, and constitutes affairs subject to the duty performance order under Article 170(1) of the Local Autonomy Act. The Plaintiff’s assertion on this part cannot be accepted.

(b) Whether the duty has been fulfilled;

(1) Order of performance of duties and purport of the objection lawsuit system against such order

The purpose of Article 170 of the Local Autonomy Act, which applies mutatis mutandis to the operation, etc. of “an agency in charge of the affairs concerning education, education, and arts of local governments” under Article 3 of the former Local Education Autonomy Act, is to ensure the legitimacy and effectiveness of the execution of the affairs by rationally resolving disputes between the two agencies in relation to the management and execution of the affairs entrusted to the local government through the judgment of the Supreme Court, and to ensure the legitimacy of the execution of the affairs by ensuring the legitimacy and effectiveness thereof. Accordingly, in the management and execution of the affairs delegated to the local government, whether the head of the local government has the obligation to manage and execute specific affairs to the head of the local government in accordance with the provisions of statutes, considering the status, authority, mutual relations, etc. among the heads of the relevant local governments, does not change the opinion of the competent Minister in terms of recognition of facts concerning the affairs delegated to the relevant local government, or in interpreting and applying statutes, the competent Minister grants the authority to take follow-up measures to ensure the effectiveness of the administration and execution of the affairs (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2000

(2) Whether the applicant’s obligation to request a disciplinary decision on “unfair conduct in dealing with affairs related to the entry of school violence students’ school records” exists

(A) The instant grounds for disciplinary action are unfair. According to the foregoing legal doctrine, the instant grounds for disciplinary action are as follows: “The act of a person to be partially disciplined performed his/her duties in accordance with the Plaintiff’s direction that is the superintendent of education, constitutes grounds for disciplinary action; and whether the Plaintiff is obligated to request a disciplinary decision against the person to be partially disciplined.”

(B) First, we examine the legal nature of the superintendent of the Office of Education’s guidance and supervision over the preparation of school life records, which are the contents of the grounds for disciplinary action.

In order to determine whether affairs are autonomous affairs or delegated affairs, the head of a local government shall first consider the form and purport of the provisions of the relevant Act and subordinate statutes in order to determine whether such affairs are autonomous affairs or delegated affairs of an agency. However, other factors such as whether the nature of affairs is required to be handled nationwide, the burden of expenses related thereto, and who is the subject of final responsibility (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 2002Du10483, Apr. 22, 2003; 201Du566, May 23, 2013).

Article 17 of the Framework Act on Education provides that “The State and local governments shall guide and supervise schools and social educational institutions,” but does not provide clear criteria for distinguishing the affairs of the State and the affairs of local governments from the affairs of guidance and supervision of schools. In addition, Article 6 of the former Elementary and Secondary Education Act (amended by Act No. 11690, Mar. 23, 2013; hereinafter the same shall apply) enacted for the purpose of prescribing matters concerning elementary and secondary education pursuant to Article 9(4) of the Framework Act on Education, which was enacted for the purpose of providing for matters concerning elementary and secondary education, shall be subject to guidance and supervision by the Minister of Education, Science and Technology, while public and private schools shall be subject to guidance and supervision by the superintendent of education.”

However, according to Article 25 of the former Elementary and Secondary Education Act, the head of a school shall comprehensively observe and evaluate the academic achievement degree and personality (personality) of a student, and shall prepare and manage data, such as personal information, school records, attendance status, status of obtaining qualification certificate and certification, status of learning development, behavior characteristics and comprehensive opinion, and other matters prescribed by Ordinance of the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology to the extent necessary for educational purpose, in accordance with the standards prescribed by Ordinance of the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology (Article 1). The head of the school shall prepare and manage such data in the educational information system (Article 25 (2). The head of the school shall transfer such data to the head of the school to which the student transferred (Article 3).

In addition, according to Article 47(2) of the former Elementary and Secondary Education Act, Article 82 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 24423, Mar. 23, 2013), the records of the school life of the middle school are reflected in the entrance screening of high school electricity and the second group of schools, and Article 34(2) of the former Higher Education Act (amended by Act No. 11690, Mar. 23, 2013; hereinafter the same) and Article 35 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Higher Education Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 24423, Mar. 23, 2013), the head of a university may utilize the records of the school life of the high school as admission screening data to select new students.

According to the provisions of the former Elementary and Secondary Education Act, the former Higher Education Act, and the Enforcement Decree of each Act, where a student transfers his/her school life records between Cities/Dos or between national schools and public and private schools, it is necessary to manage the school life records systematically and uniformly. Where a middle student enters a high school located in another City/Do, the school life records shall be reflected in the admission process of high schools, and the school life records of a high school student shall be used as admission screening data of universities under the defendant's instruction and supervision. Thus, the affairs related to the preparation of school life records conducted by the principal of a school are deemed to be affairs to be conducted uniformly for the overall interest of the people.

Therefore, it is reasonable to interpret that the supervisory office's guidance and supervision of the affairs related to the preparation of school life records that require uniform handling on a national scale is the affairs of the nature that need to be processed uniformly for the benefit of the whole people. Therefore, it is reasonable to interpret that the guidance and supervision affairs of the superintendent of education concerning the preparation of school life records conducted by the head of a public and private school is the affairs delegated to the superintendent of education as the state affairs, like the guidance and supervision affairs conducted by the head of a national school.

(C) According to Article 169 of the Local Autonomy Act, the Minister of Education may file a lawsuit with the Supreme Court against an order or disposition concerning autonomous affairs of the Superintendent of an Office of Education only in violation of statutes (Paragraph (1)), and the Superintendent of an Office of Education may file a lawsuit with the Supreme Court against an objection against a disposition of revocation (Paragraph (2). The purport of limiting the scope of control by the Minister of Education to a violation of statutes, and granting the Superintendent of an Office of Education the authority to file a lawsuit against the Superintendent of an Office of Education regarding autonomous affairs is to recognize the legality control of the State over autonomous affairs and realize the principle of legal administration, while protecting the authority of the Superintendent of an Office of Education to execute a lawsuit against the autonomous affairs of the Superintendent of an Office of Education. Considering the legislative intent of a lawsuit against the disposition of revocation as stipulated under Article 169 of the Local Autonomy Act, the execution of affairs concerning autonomous affairs of the Superintendent of an Office of Education cannot be readily concluded that specific

In this case, the Plaintiff, the superintendent of the Office of Education, deemed the guidance and supervision of the affairs concerning the preparation of school life records to be autonomous affairs, and managed the affairs. The instant order for performance of duties is premised on the establishment of grounds for disciplinary action by the instant persons subject to the partial disciplinary action who assisted the management of affairs by such superintendent

However, the determination of whether affairs are autonomous affairs or delegated affairs by the head of a local government under the relevant Act and subordinate statutes shall take into consideration the form and purport of the relevant Act and subordinate statutes, but it shall also be made by taking into consideration whether the nature of affairs requires uniform and uniform processing on a national scale, the burden of expenses related thereto, and who is the subject of final responsibility. As such, the distinction between affairs related to autonomous affairs and delegated affairs by the head of a local government is not always clear solely with the content of

According to the interpretation of related Acts and subordinate statutes, the guidance and supervision of the superintendent of education on the preparation of school life records falls under the affairs of the delegated state. However, considering the legislative purport, etc. of an objection against the disposition of revocation as stipulated in Article 169 of the Local Autonomy Act, the Superintendent of an Office of Education, in the absence of precedents, theories, precedents, etc. as to the nature of the guidance and supervision affairs, deemed them autonomous affairs and carried out affairs after the fact that the affairs were found to be the affairs of the delegated state in the ex post facto judicial proceedings, cannot be deemed to constitute grounds for disciplinary action, solely on the ground that the specific execution of the affairs immediately

(D) The interpretation of the law itself is not clear in itself, so many opinions can be given. However, in a case where a significance is raised due to lack of precedents, theories, precedents, etc., the relevant public official's duty to pay attention to finding a reasonable ground, which led to an erroneous interpretation of the Supreme Court after the interpretation of the Supreme Court's interpretation based on one opinion. As a result, even if the treatment is deemed unlawful, it is difficult to expect that the public official will take the same treatment method as or above the average public official, and therefore, it is difficult to recognize the establishment of the grounds for the disciplinary action against the relevant public official.

Article 56 of the State Public Officials Act provides that "All public officials shall observe Acts and subordinate statutes, and faithfully perform their duties," and Article 57 provides that "public officials shall obey an official order of their superior officers when performing their duties, and imposes a duty to obey such orders along with the duty to comply with such Acts and subordinate statutes." In addition, Article 18 of the former Local Education Autonomy Act provides that "The Superintendent of an Office of Education shall have the Superintendent of an Office of Education in the City/Do as an institution in charge of the affairs concerning education, education, and arts of a City/Do", and Article 27 provides that "the Superintendent of an Office of Education shall direct and supervise public officials under his/her jurisdiction and handle matters concerning the appointment, education, training, service, disciplinary action, etc., as prescribed by Acts and subordinate statutes, municipal ordinances, and educational rules, and grants the authority to direct and supervise public officials under his/her jurisdiction to the Superintendent of an Office of Education. Therefore, the person subject to disciplinary action shall perform his/her duties in accordance with the direction and supervision of a superior officer in the course of duties,

In light of the above legal principles, in situations where it is unclear whether the guidelines of this case by the defendant are invalid due to the legal nature of the affairs concerning the preparation of school life records of the superintendent of education, whether the guidelines of this case are legally effective, or the violation of the principle of excessive prohibition under the Constitution, etc., even if the persons subject to partial sanctions were to perform their duties with the content of suspending the implementation of the guidelines in accordance with the direction and supervision of the school life records according to the direction and supervision of the superintendent of education, which is a superior official, and even if they were deemed to have violated the law, it is difficult to view that the act of the persons subject to partial sanctions constitutes grounds for disciplinary action.

(E) Therefore, since the grounds for disciplinary action against the person to be disciplined are not recognized, it cannot be said that the Plaintiff is obligated to request a disciplinary decision. Ultimately, this part of the order of performance of duties is unlawful.

(3) Whether a request for disciplinary decision on “unfair service conditions for public officials” exists

(A) Article 66 of the State Public Officials Act restricts public officials to “labor movement or other collective action for activities other than public duties.” In light of their position and nature of duties, a public official need to restrict the freedom of speech, publication, assembly, and association guaranteed by Article 21(1) of the Constitution rather than the general public, but even in such a case, it shall not be limited to a uniform or full-scale area on the grounds of the public nature or necessity. Even if there are grounds for such restriction, the restriction should be compared and balanced with the freedom of expression limited by establishing the restriction and the public interest to be guaranteed by such restriction, and even if it is deemed inevitable to restrict it, the restriction should be limited to the minimum possible extent and shall not infringe on the essential substance of the right. Therefore, “collective action for activities other than public service” under the State Public Officials Act refers to any collective action conducted by public officials for any work other than public service, and the purport of the State Public Officials Act, the duty of good faith under the State Public Officials Act, and the duty of care and duty of care under the State Public Officials Act, etc.

(B) The main contents of the appeal made by the person to be disciplined on the website of the Provincial Office of Education are as follows: “In light of the educational point of view, it is necessary to improve the structure or system of school violence to prevent and eradicate school violence since the side adaptation behavior of children is a matter of social system rather than an individual quality problem. The way to enter school violence measures in school life records is not just a definition, it goes against the legal common sense, and it does not go against the educational guidance, and at least a system for deliberation prior to graduation or interim deletion should be established as recommended by the National Human Rights Commission. Therefore, the Ministry of Education appeals to revoke a specific audit by the Gyeonggi-do Office of Education and a strict measure policy for teachers who did not comply with the direction of the Ministry of Education and the employees in charge of the Office of Education.”

Such an appeal shall not be deemed to fall under a specific political activity prohibited by the State Public Officials Act or any other Act against a public official, or an act of directly exposing an intention to support or oppose a specific political party or political force, which may infringe on the public educational official’s political neutrality, such as an act of directly revealing a specific political letter or a political sect. Rather, in light of the content and the method of expression of the appeal in this case, the appeal in this case appeals to the reconsideration of the school violence measures taken in the Ministry of Education based on the educational’s own conscience, and thus, the appeal in this case is merely an act of expression within the scope that an educator is ordinarily able under the sound social norms of our society in the area of educational policy, and thus, it cannot be said that such act goes beyond the original part of the public educational official’s educational policy and is contrary to the public interest, and thus, it may not be said that the education official neglected his duty of care and good faith.

Therefore, the publication of the instant appeal does not constitute a “collective act for purposes other than public service” prohibited under Article 66(1) of the State Public Officials Act, and it does not constitute a violation of Article 3(2) of the State Public Officials Service Regulations. Furthermore, it cannot be deemed that the said act violates Article 56 of the State Public Officials Act, which provides for the duty of good faith of public officials, on the ground that “All public officials shall observe the statutes and faithfully perform their duties.”

(C) If so, the grounds for disciplinary action against this part of the person to be disciplined are not established, and thus, the Plaintiff cannot be deemed to have a duty to request a disciplinary decision. This part of the order of performance of

3. Conclusion

Therefore, the plaintiff's claim of this case is justified, and the costs of lawsuit are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Kim So-young (Presiding Justice)