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과실비율 70:30  
(영문) 서울고법 2015. 6. 4. 선고 2013나2023677 판결
[손해배상(기)] 상고[각공2015하,619]
Main Issues

In a case where Party A claimed damages against Party B by asserting that the art works produced and kept by Party A were previously discharged due to a fire in the greenhouse owned by Company B due to a defect in the cooling stack manufactured by Company B, and Company B asserted that there was no defect in the cooling conditioning, such as the occurrence of a fire, etc. before the expiration of about four years, the case holding that Party B was liable to compensate for the damages suffered by Party B, on the ground that the fire was caused by a defect in the cooling conditioning, even if the life of the cooling conditioning was in the expiration of a period of approximately four years, even if the life of the cooling conditioning was in the expiration of approximately four years

Summary of Judgment

In a case where Gap claimed for damages against Eul corporation by asserting that the art works produced and kept by Eul were discharged by fire in the greenhouse owned by Byung due to the defect in the cooling stack manufactured by Eul corporation, and Eul corporation claimed that there was no defect in the cooling conditioning, such as the occurrence of a fire, etc. after the expiration of about four years, the case holding that Eul corporation is liable to compensate for damages caused by a fire on the ground that the life of Eul corporation merely means the minimum period during which the product can function normally according to its original purpose, and the manufacturer of household appliances, such as the cooling conditioning, bears the duty of care to ensure safety in the design and manufacture process to prevent damage to consumers by the dangerous nature of the product, even if the life of the cooling conditioning was about four years after the expiration of its life, on the ground that the fire occurred in the normal use situation and the fire was not proven due to the defect in the cooling conditioning, and that the fire was caused by a defect in the cooling conditioning, and that the fire was caused by a fire.

[Reference Provisions]

Article 750 of the Civil Act

Plaintiff, Appellant and Appellant

Plaintiff (Attorney Choi Han-soo, Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Defendant, appellant and appellee

El Electronic Co., Ltd. (Attorney Lee Dong-soo, Counsel for the defendant-appellant)

The first instance judgment

Seoul Southern District Court Decision 2012Gahap15009 decided October 11, 2013

Conclusion of Pleadings

May 14, 2015

Text

1. Of the judgment of the court of first instance, the part against the defendant in excess of the amount ordered to pay is revoked, and the plaintiff's claim corresponding to the revoked part is dismissed

The defendant shall pay to the plaintiff 35,00,000 won with 5% interest per annum from December 14, 2009 to June 4, 2015, and 20% interest per annum from the next day to the day of full payment.

2. The plaintiff's appeal and the defendant's remaining appeal are all dismissed.

3. 4/5 of the total litigation costs is assessed against the Plaintiff, and the remainder is assessed against the Defendant, respectively.

Purport of claim and appeal

1. Purport of claim

The defendant shall pay to the plaintiff 197,550,000 won with 5% interest per annum from December 14, 2009 to the service date of a copy of complaint, and 20% interest per annum from the next day to the day of complete payment.

2. Purport of appeal

A. The plaintiff

The judgment of the first instance court is amended as stated in the purport of the claim.

B. Defendant

The part against the defendant in the judgment of the first instance is revoked, and the plaintiff's claim corresponding to the above revocation is dismissed.

Reasons

1. Basic facts

A. The Plaintiff graduated from ○○ University, a junior college, and a visual design department in 1995, and is working as a type artist, an artist, and a picture artist. The Defendant is a corporation with the purpose of manufacturing and selling electrical machinery appliances.

B. On December 14, 2009, around 12:07, a fire occurred in the Plaintiff’s vinyl owned by Nonparty 1 (hereinafter “the instant vinyl”) located in the Namyang-si, Namyang-si (hereinafter “instant vinyl”) and the agricultural instruments and cooling equipment located in the pipe tank 1, 65m2, and 65m2, and the agricultural instruments and cooling equipment located in the said greenhouse (the Defendant manufactured and sold, and the Defendant manufactured and sold, hereinafter “instant cooling equipment”), the household appliances, such as laundry machines, and electric straw, etc., the art works produced and kept by the Plaintiff, and the adjacent container 27m2 per annum were partially destroyed (hereinafter “instant fire”).

C. After the occurrence of the instant fire, the Defendant conducted an investigation into the scene of the fire along with the Southyang Fire Prevention Certificate, and on May 13, 2010, the Defendant paid KRW 10,000,000 as insurance money to Nonparty 1 for the damages incurred by the instant fire in accordance with the insurance contract with the Defendant.

[Reasons for Recognition] Facts without dispute, entry and video of Gap evidence Nos. 16 and 34 (if there are virtual numbers, including each number; hereinafter the same shall apply) and the purport of the whole pleadings

2. The parties' assertion

A. The plaintiff

The fire of this case occurred due to the defect in the protective device of the air conditioners of this case manufactured by the defendant. Since the plaintiff's work in the greenhouse of this case was entirely destroyed due to the fire, the defendant is liable to compensate the plaintiff for the damage caused by the fire, as the manufacturer and seller of the air conditioners of this case under the Product Liability Act or the legal principles of tort liability under the Civil Act.

Accordingly, the Plaintiff seek against the Defendant the payment of the amount of KRW 147,550,00, which is equivalent to the value of 144 points of the Plaintiff’s art works that were destroyed by the instant fire, as well as the amount of compensation for mental distress suffered by the Plaintiff due to the Plaintiff’s loss of the same work as his own decentralization, for more than 10 years after the Plaintiff started his work.

B. Defendant

1) The Fire Certification Board (Evidence A No. 2) merely stated “the presumption of a fall by electrical-talking” as the cause of fire, and there was no objective data as to whether the instant fire was either a fall by electric-talking due to defects in internal devices such as a cooling system, etc., or by negligence on the part of the Plaintiff.

2) The air conditioners of this case were produced in 1998, and the term of which was 7 years from the date of the purchase of the product was 11 years from the date of which the fire was used until December 2009. The fire of this case occurred after the expiration of the above life period. Thus, it is difficult to deem that the air conditioners of this case were safe and durable within the expected range in light of the technical level and economic feasibility at the time of the manufacture, and there were any defects in the product itself.

3) The Plaintiff and Nonparty 1 used the instant cooling in general housing under the prescribed installation conditions and usage methods, not using the air cooling, but using it in the instant greenhouse which is inevitable to be exposed to changes in electricity, damp and temperature, and in the instant greenhouse which is likely to damage products from wild animals, and caused the instant fire. Furthermore, the Plaintiff and Nonparty 1, without taking any specific measures against the instant greenhouse, have been placed on the top of the first soil floor of the instant greenhouse without using the air cooling. Furthermore, under the poor environment, the Plaintiff and Nonparty 1 did not undergo safety inspection or follow-up inspection services (A/S) once until the instant fire occurred under the poor environment, but did not undergo a long-term inspection or follow-up inspection services (A/S). Accordingly, the Plaintiff and Nonparty 1 did not 1’s use of the air cooling system for cleaning and management on the back of the air cooling and storing dust and foreign materials on the back of the air cooling. Accordingly, the Plaintiff and Nonparty 1’s use of the air cooling method was not caused by the Plaintiff and Nonparty 1.

4) There is no evidence to prove that the Plaintiff’s 144 points of work claimed within the instant vinyl at the time of the occurrence of the instant fire. Moreover, in light of the Plaintiff’s income level, the degree of property, the fact-finding results on the appraiser of the first instance court, etc., the economic value of the Plaintiff’s work ought to be deemed insignificant.

3. Determination

(a) Occurrence of liability for damages;

1) Whether to recognize liability under the Product Liability Act

A) Product liability as a strict liability not premised on the manufacturer’s intentional or negligent act with respect to damage caused by a defect of a product was newly introduced under the Product Liability Act (amended by Act No. 6109, Jan. 12, 2000 and enforced July 1, 2002) and is applicable to the product from the first supplied product after July 1, 2002 (see Supreme Court Decision 2002Da17333, Sept. 5, 2003). Thus, if the Plaintiff intends to assume the Defendant’s liability under the Product Liability Act, the Plaintiff must prove that the instant coolant was supplied after July 1, 2002.

B) The Plaintiff asserted that Nonparty 1 purchased the instant coolant as a new product at around 2003, but it is not sufficient to recognize only the descriptions and images of the evidence Nos. 25 and 26, and there is no other evidence to prove otherwise.

Rather, the following circumstances are acknowledged by adding the entire arguments to the statements in Eul evidence Nos. 5 through 9, namely, the plaintiff's remaining-born non-party 2 stated that he purchased and used the air conditioners of this case, and that he moved to the greenhouse of this case. The plaintiff's losses in the air conditioners of this case were in the shape of a type other than the manufacturing model of this case in 1998. The defendant's model of manufacturing in 1999 did not have a front part of the air conditioners of this case, even though there was a front part of the air conditioners of this case. The plaintiff was found to have no front part of the air conditioners of this case (the defendant started to manufacture the air conditioners of the electronic model that used the PCB from around 1999 to that of this case). The plaintiff's assertion that the air conditioners of this case was to be used for the air conditioners of this case and the plaintiff's second part of the air conditioners of this case before the implementation of the Product Liability Act without the plaintiff's second part of this case.

2) Liability for damages caused by a tort under the Civil Act

A) Relevant legal principles

In cases where damages are claimed against a manufacturer due to defects, such as lack of performance, etc. in mass products produced with high technology as a result of the concentration of technology, and as a result, it is extremely difficult for a consumer to prove the existence of specific defects in the product, and whether the damage was caused by such defects in scientific and technical aspects. Therefore, if a consumer proves the fact that the product was not equipped with quality or required performance or efficacy that the product was defective, and that the damage was caused by the use of the product in accordance with normal usage, the manufacturer’s failure to prove the fact that the product was caused by any other cause, other than the defect, the mitigation of the burden of proof to presume the existence of the defect and that the damage was caused by the defect is more than the damages compensation system that provides guidance on the fair and reasonable burden of damages (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 2003Da167181, Mar. 12, 2004; 208Da87168, Aug. 16, 2004).

B) Determination

(1) In full view of the following facts and circumstances as a result of the fact-finding on the evidence mentioned above, Gap evidence No. 2, Eul evidence No. 21, Eul evidence No. 5, and the fact-finding on the Namyang Fire Prevention Center of the court of first instance, the plaintiff and non-party No. 1 used the air conditioners of this case in accordance with normal usage, even though they used the air conditioners of this case in accordance with normal usage, the plaintiff and non-party No. 1 were liable to compensate the plaintiff for damages incurred to the air conditioners of this case due to the defects in the air conditioners of this case and the electric tring (if the electricity flow flows out for a long time).

(A) On December 14, 2009, from around 12:07, when the fire in this case occurred to around 16:10 the next day, the fire in the Namyang Fire Fighting Station stated that the fire in this case 1 did not have a sprinked in the roof of the instant plastic house. The fire in this case was observed by the sprinkravings at the early stage of the fire in the cooling engine, and the sprinking, melting, and melting, distinguishing the string from the string panel, and the wood plates on the upper bottom of the said string panel were relatively considerably destroyed and dried, and the strings of the steel plates at the lower bottom of the instant coolant were found to have been generated in the stringr and the stringr's opinions were comprehensively taken into account the fact that the fire in this case occurred in the stringr and the stringr's opinions were presented.

(B) Consumers recognize that home appliances, such as air conditioners, are products used for a long period of time in their daily lives, and there are no materials to deem that the case of fire caused by electric tring, etc. is widely known in the air conditioners, and thus, there is a concern for manufacturers to pay attention to the safety or defects of the products unless internal components are dangerous or safety is explained, and even based on the operating manual, etc., the explanation or risk does not appear specifically.

(C) The Plaintiff and Nonparty 1 used the instant vinyl as a warehouse mainly, but divided some of them into a residential space where people could live on the floor, and they seem to have been placed in the said residential space (Therefore, the instant vinyl cannot be deemed as an environment identical or similar to the general vinyl where crops grow).

(D) In light of the field circumstances after the fire of this case, the plaintiff and the non-party 1 appear to have used the cooling house of this case for general purposes, such as storing food in the cooling house of this case, and there is no circumstance to deem that they used the cooling house for other purposes.

(2) Judgment on the defendant's assertion

(A) As to the assertion about the expiration of the life period

According to the evidence evidence evidence Nos. 3 and 4 of the criteria for the settlement of consumer disputes, although it is acknowledged that the life of the cooling house is 7 years in the life table for each item, the criteria for the settlement of consumer disputes is merely an announcement to present the standards for agreement or recommendation so that disputes may be settled smoothly among consumers and business operators pursuant to the Framework Act on Consumers, and it cannot be said that the above period has elapsed. Furthermore, even if the above period has elapsed 7 years, as alleged by the defendant, the life of the cooling house of this case was 4 years after the expiration of the above life period, the product concerned merely means the minimum period during which the product can normally function according to its original purpose, and even after the expiration of the life period, the manufacturer's life was stated as 7 years in the evidence No. 1, which is a manual for using the cooling house, and thus, it cannot be seen that the manufacturer's safety inspection or safety inspection of the product of this case would not cause any harm to the consumer's body during the process of using the cooling house.

(B) As to the assertion that it cannot be viewed as an independent defect of the air conditioners of this case

As seen earlier, the fire in this case appears to have occurred due to the defect in the air conditioners of this case and the electrical trawing, and there is no evidence to acknowledge that the fire in this case occurred due to any other reason. Thus, the defendant's assertion on this part is without merit.

(C) As to the assertion that the use is not in accordance with normal usage

It is difficult to readily conclude that the Plaintiff and Nonparty 1 used the instant vinyl as a residential space or warehouse and installed air conditioners in the space as deviating from normal usage. Even if the Plaintiff and Nonparty 1 used the instant vinyl for more than 10 years without undergoing safety inspection or post-inspection services, it is difficult to conclude that the Plaintiff and Nonparty 1 used it as a residential space or warehouse, if the vinyl house rapidly changes temperature and habits compared to the ordinary house, and there is a high risk of fire if it is used for a long-term period of time in such an environment, there is a high risk that the electric shock would occur, and the Defendant, as the manufacturer, should explain or notify the risk to the consumers in advance. However, there is no other evidence to acknowledge it as otherwise. Meanwhile, even if the Plaintiff and Nonparty 1 did not periodically clean the instant greenhouse without undergoing safety inspection or post-inspection services, it is difficult to view it as the Defendant’s ground for negligence or liability limitation, as it goes beyond the Defendant’s normal use.

B. Scope of liability for damages

1) Plaintiff’s damages

A) Property losses

(1) The Plaintiff’s work kept in the instant plastic house due to the instant fire is as seen earlier. However, the Plaintiff’s work alleged to have been destroyed (the damaged work the Plaintiff claimed is ① six points of “finch est” in 2002, ② seven points of work used on the New Bank of Korea, 2004, ③ twenty points of work used on the offline sign of 2005, ④ one point of the exhibition work of 205, ⑤ 40 points of “Art. 5” history of 206, 6 points of “Finch 206,” 7 points of the Plaintiff’s plastic house of 40 points of work, 54 points of work, 50 points of work, 40 points of the Plaintiff’s plastic house of 206, 40 points of work, 54 points of work, 40 points of the Plaintiff’s plastic greenhouse of 200, 50 point of work, and 4 point of work of the Plaintiff’s plastic greenhouse of 200 points of the instant case.

Meanwhile, according to the result of the appraisal by the Seoul Art Appraisal Association of the first instance court, each fact-finding by the Seoul Art Appraisal Association of the first instance court on the Seoul Art Appraisal Association, the Seoul Art Appraisal Association may recognize the fact that the Plaintiff’s 144 points alleged to have been lost due to the fire of this case by means of a photograph submitted by the Plaintiff that the value would reach a total of 90,550,000 won, and that the Association evaluated the fact-finding by the first instance court on the basis of the nature of the work, the author’s history and career, the social awareness, the status of the storage of the work, the distribution price in the present art market, etc., on the basis of the fact-finding by the first instance court on the basis of the nature of the work, the author’s history and career, the history of the work, the status of the storage of the work, the distribution price in the present art market, etc., while the expert witness selected

However, according to the fact-finding conducted by the first instance court on the Korea Art Appraisal Association, an incorporated association, and the Korea Telecommunication Association, each association is found to have responded to the purport that the pictures alone are unable to conduct an appraisal of the works without regard to the actual objects of appraisal, and in light of the overall purport of each evidence and pleadings as seen earlier, the value of the works can be measured according to the size and scale of the works and the status of the storage of the works, etc. as a three-dimensional form by using Han and iron company, etc. The pictures submitted by the Plaintiff cannot be determined to the extent that each work falls under the size and scale of the Plaintiff’s assertion, and it is difficult to conclude that all the 144 points alleged by the Plaintiff had maintained the same status as the pictures at the time of the occurrence of the fire in this case, even if all the works claimed by the Plaintiff were destroyed by the fire in this case, it is difficult to recognize that the value reaches KRW 90,550,000, as the above appraisal results.

(2) The court may determine the amount of damages by taking into account all the relevant indirect facts, such as the relationship between the parties revealed by the result of examination of evidence and the purport of the entire pleading, the background leading up to the occurrence of property damage, the nature of damage, and various circumstances after the occurrence of damage, even though the existence of property damage was proved under the principle of free evaluation of evidence. This legal principle aims to realize the ideal and function of the damage compensation system that provides the guiding principle for fair and reasonable allocation of damage by reducing the degree of proof and conviction if it is difficult to prove the amount of damage due to the nature of the case, and it does not grant a judge a discretionary discretion to calculate the amount of damage. In determining the specific amount of damages by the above method, the court must make every effort to investigate the indirect facts that are the basis for calculating the amount of damage, and determine the amount of damages objectively acceptable by reasonably evaluating the indirect facts that were investigated (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 646Da627, Sept. 10, 2009).

In the instant case, according to the aforementioned evidence, it can be acknowledged that there were many remaining parts of the steel company, etc. seen as the bones of the Plaintiff’s work. In light of the fire site photographs of the instant case, even though the fire occurred, it is deemed that the damage was caused to the Plaintiff’s work that was destroyed by the fire, but it is practically impossible or difficult to prove the completion and storage of the work, and the amount of the damage. Thus, this court should determine the amount of damage by comprehensively taking into account all the following circumstances, which can be seen in light of the evidence as seen earlier and the entire purport of the arguments, and the amount of damage amount is equivalent to 50,000,000,00 won, the damage suffered by the Plaintiff is deemed to be equivalent to 50,000 won.

(A) After the graduation of the university, the Plaintiff had engaged in the work for about 14 years until the time of the occurrence of the instant fire, and held exhibitions multiple times with individuals or groups, and had accumulated considerable career and reputation as a mid-to-door artist in order to examine various books of rights. There is little case of the Plaintiff’s transaction of the work, and thus, the objective market price for the work is formed. However, according to the statement in the evidence No. 22 of the Plaintiff, it appears that according to the size of 50 x 50 x 50 x 15 cm produced in 208 and displayed in the “out of love milk” in the evidence No. 2007, 2000, 200 x 29195 x 200 x 700 cm x 30360 cm x 305 cm, each of which appears to have been traded with the work in 2005 cm.

(B) In around 2012, the Plaintiff held the exhibition at the art gallery located in the Net Library. The Plaintiff classified the Plaintiff’s work into seven groups for each theme (one group of works consisting of three to four works), and calculated the insurance premium of KRW 15,150,000 for each group of works, based on which the insurable value of KRW 1,50,000 for each group of works has been determined and the insurance premium of KRW 15,150,000 is calculated.

(C) The Plaintiff’s works are three-dimensional materials that mainly express people or things by using Korean and Korean ironworks, and are used for the purpose of displaying the works themselves. However, the works can be taken by photographing them in pictures and inserting them in publications or selling goods made in the shape of the works. However, all of the works caused by the fire of this case become unusable in the future.

(D) However, most of the works alleged by the Plaintiff that they were in custody of the instant vinyl are produced from around 2002 to around 2006 (No. 138 of the evidence No. 38 of the work produced in 2009). Since the production of the work, it is difficult to avoid the possibility that the said situation has deteriorated or has been damaged to a certain extent during the period of being kept until the fire of the instant case occurred. In particular, it is difficult to readily conclude that the remaining works, excluding six points of the display work of the “Finninland” in 2002 and four points of the personal electric power, “the wind, the day of wind,” in 204, are produced for a specific purpose, such as the production of a magazine, cartoon, etc., of the works produced for a particular company’s response, magazine, or cartoon, etc., and it is difficult to conclude that the said works can be ordinarily utilized for another purpose or for another purpose in transaction.

B) Mental damage

In general, in a case where a property right is infringed due to a tort committed by another person, mental suffering shall be deemed to have been recovered from the compensation for such property damage. Thus, if a property damage was caused by an irrecoverable mental suffering, this shall be a damage due to special circumstances, and if the perpetrator knew or could have known such circumstances, he/she may claim consolation money for such damage (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 2001Da82507, Mar. 18, 2004, etc.).

In order to claim consolation money for mental damage caused by the Plaintiff’s loss of his own work, other than property damages recognized prior to the instant fire, the Defendant should be proved to have known or could have known that the Defendant had known that the art work was kept in the vicinity of the instant cooling house and that the said work would have been damaged if the fire occurred in the cooling house of this case, and that there was no evidence to support this, the Plaintiff’s claim for this part of this case cannot be accepted.

2) Limitation on liability

In light of the following circumstances, it is reasonable to limit the Defendant’s liability to 70% in light of the overall circumstances and the principle of equity as to the share of damages, such as the following circumstances, which can be acknowledged by comprehensively taking account of the purport of the entire pleadings, i.e., the Plaintiff and Nonparty 1’s use of the cooling house in this case for a long period of more than 10 years, and the lower part of the cooling house in this case presumed to be the source of the fire in this case as the fire in this case was not completely obstructed, making it impossible to manage cleaning, etc., because the lower part of the cooling house in this case presumed to be the source of the fire in this case was not completely obstructed.

3) Sub-decisions

Therefore, the defendant is obligated to pay to the plaintiff 35,00,000 won (=50,000,000 won x 70%) and to pay damages for delay at each rate of 20% per annum as stipulated in the Civil Act until June 4, 2015, which is the date of the judgment of the court of the first instance, where it is deemed reasonable for the defendant to dispute as to the existence or scope of the obligation to perform the fire of this case from December 14, 2009 to the date of full payment.

4. Conclusion

Therefore, the plaintiff's claim of this case is accepted within the scope of the above recognition, and the remaining claims are dismissed as there is no ground. Since the judgment of the court of first instance is partially unfair, the defendant's appeal is partially accepted, and the part against the defendant ordering payment in excess of the above recognition amount among the judgment of the court of first instance is revoked, the plaintiff's claim corresponding to the cancellation portion is dismissed, and the plaintiff's appeal and the defendant'

Judges Han-young (Presiding Judge)

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