1. All appeals filed by the plaintiffs are dismissed.

2. The costs of appeal are assessed against the Plaintiffs.

The purport of the claim and appeal is the purport of the appeal.

The reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance is as stated in the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance except for the parts added by the following Paragraph 2. Thus, it is accepted by Article 8(2) of the Administrative Litigation Act and the main text of Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act.

(1) The plaintiffs asserts that the defects are null and void because they were subject to the amended Enforcement Decree of the Road Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 22947, Sept. 17, 2010) even though the imposition disposition in 2011 and 2012 should be based on the Road Act and the Seongdong-gu Ordinance on the Occupancy and Use Permission and the Occupancy Fees, etc. of Seongdong-gu.

Article 41(2) of the Road Act and Article 42(2) of the Enforcement Decree of the Road Act have not been amended in line with the amendment of the Enforcement Decree of the Road Act, so even if the provisions of the Ordinance prescribing the standards for calculating occupation and use fees of roads other than national highways have not been inconsistent with the Enforcement Decree of the Road Act, the provisions of the above Ordinance are effective within the scope of the upper limit of occupation and use fees according to the standards for calculation prescribed by the Enforcement Decree

(2) According to the reasoning of the lower court’s judgment, the lower court erred by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the occupancy and use of each road under the former Ordinance on the Occupancy and Use of Seongdong-gu and the Collection of Occupancy and Use Fees, etc., which were enforced during the period of occupation and use of each road subject to imposition for the imposition of the tax year 2011 and 2012, is 0.02 or more. In so doing, the lower court did not err by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the occupancy and use of each road subject to the imposition of the foregoing charges, as it did not err by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the occupancy and use of each road under the Enforcement Decree of the Road Act.

The above assertion by the plaintiffs is without merit.

② The Plaintiff A asserts that the amended Enforcement Decree of the Road Act cannot be applied because the disposition of imposition in 2010 was made before the enforcement of the amended Enforcement Decree of the Road Act, and that the defect is significant and apparent.

However, as stated by the court below, 208 and 208.