1. All appeals filed by the Defendant (Counterclaim Plaintiff) against the principal lawsuit and counterclaim are dismissed.

2. The costs of appeal shall be principal lawsuit and counterclaim.

A principal lawsuit and a counterclaim shall be deemed simultaneously.

1. The reasons why the court should explain this part of the facts of recognition are as stated in the corresponding part of the judgment of the court of first instance, and thus, this part is cited by the main text of Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act

2. Determination on the main claim

A. According to the above facts finding as to the claim for delivery of real estate of this case, since the loan contract of this case was terminated on or around January 6, 2014 due to the Defendant’s default of loan charges, etc., the Defendant should deliver the real estate of this case to the Plaintiff with its reinstatement.

On December 2012, the Defendant asserted to the effect that, although the boiler of the instant real estate was broken down and demanded repair thereof to the Plaintiff, the Plaintiff could no longer use and benefit from the instant real estate due to the Plaintiff’s implied approval, the Defendant could no longer use and benefit from the instant real estate.

First, as alleged by the Defendant, it is insufficient to recognize the boiler No. 7 solely on the statement of the Health Team and the No. 7, as to whether the boiler of the instant real estate was broken out to the extent that it could no longer use and benefit from the instant real estate as claimed by the Defendant, and there is no other evidence to acknowledge it. Thus, the Defendant’s above assertion without any need to further examine whether or not the Defendant’s boiler repair request or the Plaintiff’s rejection of the boiler

The Defendant asserts that: (a) around December 2012, the boiler of the instant real estate was out of order; (b) the instant real estate could no longer be used and profit-making therefrom; and (c) around March 2013, the Defendant used the instant real estate from June 2013 to September 2014.

Meanwhile, there is no evidence as to whether boilers of the instant real estate were accepted from March 2013 to September 2014 for about one year and six months.

If so, B used and made profits from the instant real estate that the Defendant became unable to use and make profits from the boiler failure for about one year and three months.