(a) Punishment of a corporation and criminal intent in accordance with the joint penal provisions

(b) A criminal intent committed at cancer and a joint principal offender;

(c) Responsibility of a corporation to which an employee of the corporation who does not participate in the conduct;

(d) Examples that importing of the air control and drying apparatus as if they were damping constitutes a violation of the Trade Business Act;

A. In a case where a corporation is punished pursuant to the joint penal provisions of Article 34 of the Trading Business Act, the criminal intent as a subjective constituent element of a crime is sufficient if it is recognized that an employee of the same corporation, who is an actual offender, should import without undergoing due process.

B. In order to constitute a joint principal offender, there is no need to be a prior conspiracy among the accomplices, and it is sufficient that the intent to realize a joint principal offender is reached through mutual cooperation with implied doctrine.

C. In a case where a juristic person is punished by joint penal provisions, even if an employee of a juristic person is not directly involved in the act of the commission and only an employee of another juristic person who is the other contestant has been jointly engaged in the act of the commission, the juristic person shall not be exempted from the liability of joint principal offenders.

(d) The act of importing imported goods, which are air control and drying devices, as simple damping, through the procedures shall be limited to the case where it has not gone through the lawful procedures provided for in subparagraph 3 of Article 29 of the Trade Act.

(a) Article 34 of the Trading Business Act; Article 13 (c) of the Criminal Act; Article 30 (d) Article 29 subparagraph 3 of the Trading Business Act;

Supreme Court Decision 82Do1818 delivered on October 26, 1982, 71Do496 delivered on April 30, 1971

Defendant 1 and three others

Defendants

Attorney By Law, Attorney Park Jong-chul, Park Jong-chul, Park Tae-kak, and Shin Tae-kak

Seoul Criminal Court Decision 81No2138 delivered on August 20, 1981

All appeals are dismissed.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. As to the grounds of appeal Nos. 1 and 4 by each defense counsel of Defendant 1 Co., Ltd. (the followingly named company as Defendant 1), Defendant 2 Co., Ltd. (the abbreviationd name of Defendant 2), and Defendant 3 Co., Ltd. (the followingly named company as Defendant 3),

In light of the records, each evidence cited in the judgment of the first instance, which is the imported goods by the Defendants, can be recognized as a air control and drying device consisting of the main constituent parts of the damp and freezing apparatus, and it is not a simple one-proof machine. Thus, it cannot be said that there was an error of incomplete deliberation solely on the fact that the measures that the judgment was concluded to the same effect and the evidence preparation which was completed by the fact-finding did not go through an appraisal by a specialized institution, and there was no error of incomplete deliberation on the part of the imported goods as a single-proof machine, and as such, there was no evidence to deem the imported goods as a single-proof machine, as in the records, the judgment of the court below which maintained the judgment of the court below cannot be adopted with a different view, and it cannot be viewed as an appropriate precedent in this case as a different case.

2. As to Defendant 1’s defense counsel’s ground of appeal No. 2 and Defendant 2’s defense counsel’s ground of appeal No. 3

This case is a case where the defendants who are juristic persons are punished under the joint penal provisions of Article 34 of the Trade Act. The subjective elements of this case's crime are satisfied if they are aware that the defendants, who are the employees of the defendant 1 company, and the non-indicted 2, who are the employees of the defendant 1 company, are engaged in income without going through legitimate procedures. According to the evidence above, it is acceptable to accept that there was such awareness among the defendants. In addition, in the case of the establishment of joint principal offender, it is sufficient to agree with the accomplice in advance, as well as with the intent of realizing joint principal offender (refer to the evidence of this case 82Do1818, Oct. 26, 1982). Thus, according to the evidence above, it is acceptable to accept the aforementioned implied conspiracy among the above employees, so the judgment of the court of first instance that admitted the facts without any evidence.

3. On Defendant 1’s defense counsel’s ground of appeal No. 3

In the case of joint principal offender, even though he did not directly participate in the act of execution after he conspired to commit the act, he cannot be exempted from the liability of joint principal offender for the act of shared execution by other accomplices (see Supreme Court Decision 71Do496, Apr. 30, 1971). According to the records, the defendant's employee, non-indicted 1 and other employees or representatives of the defendant, it is acceptable to accept the fact that he conspired to import goods without undergoing due process. Thus, it is nothing more than issuance of the certificate of sale of goods by Non-indicted 1, and even if he did not participate in all import procedures thereafter, it cannot be exempted from the liability of joint principal offender for the act of importing goods without undergoing due process conducted by other competitors. Accordingly, the above decision is just and there is no error of law, such as theory of lawsuit.

4. As to each of the grounds of appeal No. 2 by Defendant 2 and Defendant 3’s defense counsel, it is acceptable that Defendant 2, Defendant 2’s employees, and Defendant 3’s employees were imported through the procedures set forth in the first instance court’s holding that the imported goods, which are the air conditioners and building devices, are merely portable, which can regulate temperature and habits, based on the records. Thus, this constitutes a case where the import of the imported goods, which are the building devices, is not subject to the legitimate procedures set forth in Article 29 subparag. 3 of the Trade Business Act. Therefore, the decision of the first instance court at this point is just and it cannot be said that there is a misapprehension of the legal principles of the Trade Act, such as the theory of lawsuit, which is without merit.

Therefore, all appeals are dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating judges.

Justices Jeon Soo-hee (Presiding Justice)