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(영문) 대법원 2013. 5. 9. 선고 2012두28940 판결
[등록세등부과처분취소][공2013상,1052]
Main Issues

Whether registration following the transfer of an educational foundation, etc. under the Private School Act into a large city into the main office constitutes an object of heavy registration tax under Article 138 (1) 2 of the former Local Tax Act (affirmative)

Summary of Judgment

Article 127 (1) 3 of the former Local Tax Act (wholly amended by Act No. 10221, Mar. 31, 2010; hereinafter the same) provides that Article 127 (1) 3 of the former Local Tax Act shall grant benefits of non-taxation of registration tax only for "registration of establishment and merger" of an educational foundation, etc. under the Private School Act shall be considered to reflect a policy decision that there is no need to grant such benefits for other registrations. The latter part of Article 138 (1) 2 of the former Local Tax Act only provides that the transfer of the head office or principal office shall be deemed an establishment of a juristic person only for the registration of a juristic person subject to heavy registration tax so that it conforms to the purpose of the heavy taxation system, not for the provisions that prescribe the subject of non-taxation of registration tax, registration following the transfer of a educational foundation, etc. under the Private School Act into a large city into the main office outside of a large city constitutes the subject of taxation of registration tax under

[Reference Provisions]

Articles 127(1)3 (see current Article 41(5) and 138(1)2 (see current Article 28(2)2) of the former Local Tax Act (wholly amended by Act No. 1021, Mar. 31, 2010)

Plaintiff-Appellant

Seoul Digital University (Law Firm Jinjin, Attorneys Kim Yong-ho et al., Counsel for the defendant-appellant)

Defendant-Appellee

The head of Mapo-gu Seoul Metropolitan Government

Judgment of the lower court

Seoul High Court Decision 2012Nu9132 decided December 5, 2012

Text

The appeal is dismissed. The costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiff.

Reasons

The grounds of appeal are examined (to the extent of supplement in case of supplemental appellate briefs not timely filed).

1. Regarding ground of appeal No. 1

Article 137(1) of the former Local Tax Act (wholly amended by Act No. 10221, Mar. 31, 2010; hereinafter the same) provides that "where a corporation is registered, registration tax shall be paid according to the following classification." Subparagraph 2(i) provides that "2/1,000 of the paid-in total amount of investment or value of property in cases of registration due to the establishment or merger of a non-profit corporation," and subparagraph 4 provides that "75,000 won in cases of registration due to the relocation of its head office or principal office," respectively. The main sentence of Article 138(1) of the former Local Tax Act provides that "in cases of registration falling under any of the following subparagraphs, the tax rate shall be 30/100 of the relevant tax rate provided for in Articles 131 and 137, and subparagraph 2 provides that "in cases of registration by a corporation other than a large city as its head office or principal office within a large city, the amount of investment by the former Private School Act shall apply to "7 years".

Article 127 (1) 3 of the former Local Tax Act provides that a school juristic person, etc. under the Private School Act grants benefits of non-taxation of registration tax only for "registration of establishment and merger" shall be deemed to reflect a policy decision that there is no need to grant such benefits for other registrations. In light of the latter part of Article 138 (1) 2 of the former Local Tax Act, the latter part of Article 138 (1) of the former Local Tax Act only stipulates that the transfer of its head office or principal office shall be deemed as the establishment of a juristic person in compliance with the purpose of the heavy taxation system with respect to the registration of the juristic person subject to taxation of registration tax, and it does not provide for the non-taxation of registration tax, registration following the transfer of the principal office by a school juristic person, etc. under the Private School Act into a large city shall be deemed as subject to heavy

The judgment below to the same purport is just, and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the subject matter of heavy registration tax under Article 138 (1) 2 of the former Local Tax Act as alleged in the grounds of appeal.

2. As to the grounds of appeal Nos. 2, 3, and 4

In general, in order to apply the principle of trust protection to the tax authority's acts in tax law relations, the tax authority should name the public opinion list that is the subject of taxpayer's trust, and the taxpayer should not be responsible for the taxpayer's reliance on the tax authority's reliance on the tax authority's reliance on the tax authority's reliance on the tax authority's reliance on the tax authority's reliance on the tax authority's reliance on the tax authority's reliance on the taxpayer's reliance on the tax authority's reliance, and the tax authority's disposition against the reliance on the tax authority's reliance on the taxpayer's reliance on the tax authority'

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below acknowledged the facts as stated in its reasoning, and determined that the disposition of this case cannot be deemed to be contrary to the principle of trust protection, on the ground that the plaintiff's speech and behavior trust as above cannot be seen as transferring the principal office of this case or completing the registration of this case, in light of the fact that the plaintiff had already transferred the principal office of this case before the application for the registration of this case was already made and there seems to be no circumstance to deem that the registration of this case was non-taxable.

In light of relevant regulations, legal principles, and records, the fact-finding and judgment of the court below are justified, and there is no violation of the rules of evidence and misapprehension of legal principles as to the principle of protection of trust, as otherwise alleged in the grounds of appeal.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Kim So-young (Presiding Justice)

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