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본 영문본은 리걸엔진의 AI 번역 엔진으로 번역되었습니다. 수정이 필요한 부분이 있는 경우 피드백 부탁드립니다.
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(영문) 춘천지방법원 2016.07.22 2015나5273
구상금
Text

1. The plaintiff's appeal is dismissed.

2. The costs of appeal shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

Purport of claim and appeal

The first instance court.

Reasons

1. The reasoning for the judgment of the court of first instance concerning this case is as follows, and the reasoning for the judgment of the court of first instance concerning this case is as stated in the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance, except in the following cases. Thus, it shall be cited in accordance with the main sentence of Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act.

2. The phrase “person who operates an automobile for his own sake” under Article 3 of the Guarantee of Automobile Accident Compensation Act (from No. 5 to No. 6 of the judgment of the court of the first instance) means a person who can be deemed to be in the position of a responsible subject to the control of the operation of the automobile in question and to enjoy the benefit therefrom by social norms. In this case, the control of the operation includes cases where it is deemed that there is a possibility of indirect control or control, rather than actual control. Thus, in cases where a motor vehicle is entrusted for the sale and purchase of a motor vehicle, the question of whether the truster is in charge of the operation control shall be determined by social norms by examining the substantial relationship between the parties concerned.

(See Supreme Court Decision 2002Da47181 delivered on November 26, 2002, etc.). In this case, the following facts can be acknowledged in full view of the following facts in light of the following facts: (a) Doctrine, Eul’s statement of evidence Nos. 1 through 6; (b) initial viewing at the court of the first instance; and (c) the purport of each fact inquiry to the Sung Military Administration.

① From March 1, 2012, Defendant B was unable to operate a motor vehicle any longer as it was administered due to brain disease, and Defendant B requested G operating a used motor vehicle on or around May 1, 2012, which was the shape of Defendant B, to sell the instant motor vehicle.

(2) G is requested for sale as above, but it is intended to scrap the vehicle of this case because the condition of the vehicle of this case is not good, but it is possible to scrap the vehicle without disposing of the seizure established on the vehicle of this case.

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