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(영문) 대법원 1978. 11. 28. 선고 78다1909,1910 판결
[손해배상][공1979.3.15.(604),11614]
Main Issues

Whether there is a duty of care to prevent deferred vehicles from being driven on an expressway until the subsequent vehicle's drilling accident.

Summary of Judgment

Prior vehicles that run low speed on the expressway have a duty of care to prevent the subsequent vehicle from being able to stop until the subsequent vehicle's drilling accident.

Plaintiff, Counterclaim Defendant, and Appellant

Attorney Kim Tae-dong, Counsel for the defendant-appellant

Defendant, Counterclaim Plaintiff, Appellee

[Defendant-Appellee] Attorney Yang Jong-soo, Counsel for defendant-appellee

original decision

Seoul High Court Decision 78Na1255,1256 decided August 24, 1978

Text

The appeal is dismissed. The costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiff.

Reasons

(1) As to the first ground for appeal:

In short, the author argues that, in short, the non-party 1, the driver of the vehicle involved in the accident of this case of the plaintiff company, operated the so-called "Spane" (the driver did not have the Spanish, exceeded the load, and therefore, he operated only one of the back wheels on the left-hand side, and therefore, as a result, he did not operate at a speed of 30 cc per hour as he stops because he did not operate at a speed of 30 cc as he did, thereby obstructing the course of the defendant company's vehicle during the follow-up operation) is a violation of administrative laws and regulations, but the duty of care to prevent the sudden accident and the breakdown of the vehicle after the end cannot be deemed to be against the above non-party who was the driver of the preceding vehicle.

However, the judgment of the court below is just and persuasive since the accident of this case occurred on the expressway and there is a duty of care to avoid excessive high speed driving on the expressway, while there is a duty of care to avoid excessive low speed driving.

(2) As to ground of appeal No. 2

In short, this paper argues that the reasoning of the original judgment is inconsistent with the reasoning of the judgment, because it is recognized that the Plaintiff’s vehicle on the part of the instant case was “stopping” at the point of accident in this case, and the latter part of the judgment states to the effect that “the vehicle was in a state of stopping.”

However, examining the circumstances of the accident of this case in accordance with the record, it shall not be deemed that there was "stopping", "a state of stopping", or "a state of stopping", or that there was an impact on the result of the judgment.

(3) As to the third ground for appeal:

In sum, the issue is that the damage of the vehicle loaded and damaged by the Defendant Company was caused by the collision with the Plaintiff Company’s vehicle and the collision with the vehicle of the Nonparty Youngnam Transportation Company, which Nonparty 2 driven by Nonparty 2, and therefore, the lower court should have deliberated on the negligence on the part of the said Nonparty Company’s vehicle, and held the Plaintiff liable entirely by the Plaintiff due to insufficient deliberation.

However, even if the harmful act against the defendant company's vehicle was conducted by the plaintiff's negligence and the negligence on the part of the above non-party company, the plaintiff company and the above non-party company shall be jointly and severally liable for the defendant's damages. For this reason, the plaintiff's separate claim against the above non-party company against the non-party company as a separate suit for the reason that the court below did not conduct an examination on this point, it cannot be said that the decision of this case that ordered the plaintiff to compensate for damages has any influence. Therefore, there is no argument.

(4) As to the fourth ground for appeal:

In sum, the court below's determination that the ratio of the plaintiff's negligence and the defendant's negligence was 4 to 6 is that the court below's determination that the defendant's negligence was under-assessment and that the court below erred by misapprehending the legal principles of comparative negligence or violated the rule of experience

However, considering the record, the above judgment of the court below is justified and it cannot be said that there is no legal theory.

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Kim Young-ju (Presiding Justice)

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