Main Issues
Whether the application of the interest rate on delay damages as stipulated in Article 3(1) of the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Promotion, etc. of Legal Proceedings is excluded until the appellate judgment is rendered, where the debtor has accepted the argument in the first instance because he/she contests the existence and scope of the performance obligation (affirmative)
[Reference Provisions]
Article 3 of the Act on Special Cases concerning Litigation Facilitation, etc.
Reference Cases
Supreme Court Decision 97Da50725 Delivered on May 8, 1998
Plaintiff-Appellee
Plaintiff (Law Firm Yul, Attorney Park Gyeong-young, Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)
Defendant-Appellant
Design Sea Holdings Co., Ltd.
Judgment of the lower court
Seoul Western District Court Decision 2015Na30842 decided November 19, 2015
Text
Of the lower judgment, the part of the lower judgment against the Defendant ordering payment of KRW 16,50,000 as well as 6% per annum from June 28, 2014 to November 19, 2015, and 20% per annum from the next day to the day of full payment, is reversed, and the Plaintiff’s appeal corresponding to that part is dismissed. The remainder of the appeal is dismissed. The costs of the lawsuit are assessed against the Defendant.
Reasons
1. Judgment on the grounds of appeal
Article 3 subparag. 2 of the Trial of Small Claims Act provides that "when a decision contrary to the Supreme Court's precedents has been made" refers to an interpretation contrary to the Supreme Court's decisions concerning the interpretation of statutes applicable to a specific case, which is applicable to the relevant case, and simple violation of the rules of evidence or misapprehension of the legal principles, etc. do not constitute such violation of the rules of evidence or misapprehension of the legal principles (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 96Da51714, Dec
The allegation in the grounds of appeal in this case is nothing more than that of the error in applying the law to specific facts on the premise of the interpretation of the law expressed in the Supreme Court precedents. This cannot be a legitimate ground of appeal, and the assertion that the judgment of the court below erred in the determination of the settlement of construction price, etc. does not constitute any ground of appeal as stipulated in Article 3(a) of the Trial of Small Claims Act
2. Ex officio determination on damages for delay
Article 3(2) of the Act on Special Cases Concerning Promotion, etc. of Legal Proceedings (hereinafter “Litigation Promotion Act”) provides that “Where it is deemed reasonable for an obligor to resist the existence or scope of the obligation, prior to the adjudication of a fact-finding court that declares that the obligation has been obligation to perform the obligation to the obligor, paragraph (1) shall not apply to the reasonable extent.” However, if the obligor contests the existence or scope of the obligation to perform the obligation and such assertion is accepted in the first instance trial, even if the assertion is rejected in the appellate trial, the assertion is reasonable. Therefore, in such a case, the interest rate for delay damages under paragraph (1) of the same Article shall not apply until the judgment of the appellate court is rendered (see Supreme Court Decision 97Da50725, May 8, 1998, etc.)
In this case, the first instance court accepted the Defendant’s assertion and dismissed the Plaintiff’s claim in entirety, and the lower court subsequently accepted the Plaintiff’s claim after concluding the first instance court and accepted the Defendant’s claim in the first instance court. As long as the Defendant’s claim was accepted in the first instance court, the assertion should be deemed to have a reasonable ground. Therefore, even if the Plaintiff’s claim is fully accepted, the lower court should not apply the interest rate for delay damages until the date the lower court sentenced to Article
Nevertheless, the court below applied the interest rate for delay damages under Article 3 (1) of the Litigation Promotion Act from June 28, 2014 to the date of full payment after the delivery of the copy of the complaint of this case. This is erroneous in the misunderstanding of legal principles as to Article 3 (2) of the Litigation Promotion Act, thereby applying the interest rate for delay damages.
3. Conclusion
Therefore, the part of the judgment of the court below on the damages for delay is reversed, but this case is sufficient for the court to directly render a judgment, and thus, the final judgment shall be rendered in accordance with Article 437
According to the facts duly admitted by the lower court, the Defendant is obligated to pay to the Plaintiff 16,50,000 won and damages for delay calculated at the rate of 6% per annum under the Commercial Act from June 28, 2014 to November 19, 2015, which is the date of the lower judgment’s decision, and 20% per annum under the Litigation Promotion Act from the following day to the date of full payment.
Therefore, the part of the judgment of the court below against the defendant ordering payment in excess of the above amount is reversed, and the plaintiff's remaining appeal corresponding to that part is dismissed. The defendant's remaining grounds of appeal are dismissed as it is without merit. All costs of the lawsuit are to be borne by the defendant pursuant to Articles 105, 98, and 101 of the Civil Procedure Act. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent
Justices Kim Shin (Presiding Justice)