Plaintiff (Law Firm Young-soo, Attorneys Choi Byung-mo et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Head of Seo-gu District Tax Office (Attorney Park Jae-hwan et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

July 8, 2004

Gwangju District Court Decision 99Gu225 delivered on January 16, 2003

The plaintiff's appeal is dismissed.

Expenses for appeal shall be borne by the plaintiff.

The judgment of the first instance shall be revoked. The defendant shall revoke the disposition of imposition of KRW 1,152,820,000 against the plaintiff on February 8, 200.

1. Determination as to the legitimacy of the Plaintiff’s request for designating the date of this case

On February 7, 2003, the plaintiff received a petition of appeal from the court of first instance, stating the plaintiff's address as "No. 303 E. 2 E. 300 E. 2 E. 300 E. 30 E. 30 E. 10 E. 30 E. 200 E. 10 E. 200 E. 10 E. 30 E. 200 E. 10 E. 30 E. 206 E. 10 E. 30 E. 10 E. 30 E. 10 E. E. E., the plaintiff's address as the plaintiff's agent and the plaintiff filed a petition for adjudication on constitutional complaint from the court of first instance to the 30 E. 10 E. 106 E. 10 E. 203 E. 205 . 30 E. 14. 2005).

Article 171-2 (1) of the Civil Procedure Act, which applies mutatis mutandis to the administrative litigation pursuant to Article 8 (2) of the Administrative Litigation Act, provides that "if a party, legal representative or attorney changes the place to be served, a report shall be made without delay to the court." Paragraph (2) of the same Article provides that "a service of documents to a person who fails to make a report as prescribed in paragraph (1) may be made by registered mail at the place where service is previously made only when the place to be served is unknown," and as mentioned above, "if the place to be served on a delivery date is unknown" means that a service by registered mail can be made only when the other party issues an order to correct his address or ex officio does not need to investigate resident registration cards, etc., but at least the place to be served is unknown (see Supreme Court Decision 201Na31592, Aug. 24, 2001).

However, as seen earlier, the address of the plaintiff stated in the petition for adjudication on constitutional complaint, which was bound by the records of this case at the time when the notice on the date of pleading for the first and second time is served, is different from the address stated in the petition for adjudication on constitutional complaint, and thus, a junior administrative officer of the court below should have served the notice of the date of pleading to the address of the plaintiff stated in the petition for adjudication on constitutional complaint, and have served it to the address indicated in the petition for adjudication only when it was not served to the address of the plaintiff stated in the petition for adjudication on constitutional complaint. However, if it was impossible to serve the notice of the date of pleading once after being served to the address of the plaintiff stated in the petition for adjudication on constitutional complaint, the delivery of the notice without taking the above measures immediately after being served to the address stated in the petition

2. Quotation of judgment of the first instance;

The reasoning of the judgment of this court concerning this case is as follows. "(The plaintiff alleged that the above 700 million won was donated to the non-party 1, and it can be recognized that the non-party 1 received 70 million won in total as part of the purchase price of the land of this case. However, according to the records of the court of first instance, it is difficult to view that the non-party 1 received the above 70 million won as donation to the non-party 1, and there is no other evidence to acknowledge this differently, and the non-party 1 received the above 70 million won as donation to the non-party 1 under the main sentence of Article 8(2) of the Civil Procedure Act and Article 8(2) of the same Act, since the non-party 1's receipt of the above 70 million won as the donation to the non-party 1, and the non-party 1 appears to have received the above money on behalf of the deceased under the above evidence."

(a) 2. (a) part of the claim under paragraph (1)(b);

The Plaintiff knew that there was no inherited property at the time of the deceased’s death. Around February 26, 1997, the Plaintiff was aware of the existence of the pertinent land with the inherited property only after receiving a notice prior to the determination of the inheritance tax from the Defendant, and was unable to file a voluntary report or pay the inheritance tax within the six-month period prescribed by the Act. In other words, Article 26(1) main text and Article 26(2) of the Act, which is the basis for the imposition of the above additional tax, commenced inheritance as an inheritor. In other words, even though the decedent was aware of the death of the deceased, if the Plaintiff did not know at all about the type, quantity, value, value, value, etc. of the inherited property, and if interpreted to the effect that the above provision violates the property right and equal rights guaranteed under the Constitution, and thus, it is invalid. Even if not, the above reason constitutes a case where the Plaintiff could not have any justifiable reason attributable to the Plaintiff’s failure to report the inheritance tax of this case and to pay the additional tax.

B.2. (c) part of the determination of paragraph (1)(b).

Next, we examine the argument regarding the instant report and additional payment for arrears.

The Supreme Court has already held that "No penalty tax under tax-related Acts may be imposed on a taxpayer for the purpose of facilitating the exercise of the right to impose taxes and the realization of a tax claim where the taxpayer violates various duties, such as a return and tax payment, as prescribed by tax-related Acts without any justifiable reason, and the taxpayer's intent or negligence is not considered in the case of administrative sanctions imposed as prescribed by tax-related Acts. On the other hand, it is unreasonable for the taxpayer to be unaware of his/her duty, and there is a circumstance where it is unreasonable for the taxpayer to expect the performance of his/her duty or where there is any justifiable reason that it is unreasonable for him/her to expect the fulfillment of his/her duty, etc. (see Supreme Court Decision 96Nu15404 delivered on August 22, 197, etc.)" (see Supreme Court Decision 96Nu15404 delivered on August 22, 1997, etc.). Thus, the main sentence of Article 26 (1) of the Act to the effect that penalty tax may be imposed on a taxpayer fails to fulfill his/her duty to fulfill his/her duty.

In addition, as to the existence of the above justifiable reasons, it shall be proved on the part of the plaintiff's assertion. According to the plaintiff's personal examination result, although the plaintiff could not know the fact that the land of this case exists as inherited property at the time of the death of the deceased, it is insufficient to recognize that the plaintiff could not have any justifiable reason to believe that the plaintiff could not cause any violation to the plaintiff's performance of his duties, and there is no other evidence to prove otherwise. Rather, when examining the whole purport of the plaintiff's personal examination, the plaintiff was urged from the non-party 2 to waive his inheritance because he did not know that the plaintiff would bear the debt if he did not waive his inheritance because he had a large amount of the deceased's ordinary property and has a large amount of debt, the plaintiff did not think that the plaintiff did not waive his inheritance pursuant to the above solicitation, and therefore, it is not reasonable for the plaintiff's assertion that the plaintiff had been an inherited property at the time of the death of the deceased.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, the judgment of the court of first instance is legitimate, and the plaintiff's appeal is dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition.

Judges Park Jong-chul (Presiding Judge)