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(영문) 대법원 2010. 11. 25. 선고 2010도12529 판결
[공유수면관리법위반][미간행]
Main Issues

[1] The meaning of occupation and use of public waters under the former Public Waters Management Act and the standard for determining whether it constitutes occupation and use of public waters

[2] The case holding that in a case where the defendant, while running a four-wheeled scoo lease business, leased ten 4 wheeled 10 cooscoos to unspecified tourists without obtaining permission from the competent authorities, it cannot be deemed that the defendant occupied and used the 10 cooscoos for a specific purpose separately from the general use of the cooscoos for a specific purpose

[Reference Provisions]

[1] Article 5 of the former Public Waters Management Act (repealed by Act No. 10272, Apr. 15, 2010) (see current Article 8 of the Public Waters Management and Reclamation Act) / [2] Article 5 (see current Article 8 of the Public Waters Management and Reclamation Act) and Article 21 subparagraph 1 (see current Article 62 subparagraph 2 of the Public Waters Management and Reclamation Act) of the former Public Waters Management Act (repealed by Act No. 10272, Apr. 15, 2010)

Reference Cases

[1] Supreme Court Decision 2002Da68485 decided Oct. 15, 2004 (Gong2004Ha, 1807)

Escopics

Defendant

upper and high-ranking persons

Defendant

Judgment of the lower court

Changwon District Court Decision 2010No793 decided September 9, 2010

Text

The judgment of the court below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Changwon District Court Panel Division.

Reasons

We examine the grounds of appeal.

The former Public Waters Management Act (amended by Act No. 10272 of Apr. 15, 2010) refers to the so-called special use of public waters used for a specific purpose in a tangible and solid manner, apart from the general use of public waters (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2002Da68485, Oct. 15, 2004). Such special use of public waters is not necessarily exclusive or exclusive, but it is possible to coexist with the general use of public waters according to its intended use, so it cannot be said that the part of public waters is not public waters, and it is not public waters. Whether it is such special use or general use should be determined depending on the main use and function of such public waters.

The summary of the facts charged of this case is that the Defendant occupied and used public waters by way of getting operated at the head of △△ Beach, which is located in the South Sea (hereinafter referred to as “the head of the instant white site”) of the public waters by leasing four wheeled 10 with the name of “○○○○,” from April 2007 to May 24, 2009, when the Defendant engaged in the business of leasing four wheeled 10 with the name of “○○○,” in the South-west Sea Zone (hereinafter omitted) and without obtaining permission from the competent authorities, from April 2007 to May 24, 2009. Even according to the reasoning of the lower judgment, the Defendant said that the Defendant leased four wheeled scoo to tourists and operated the four scood scoo from the head of the instant white site. The tourists merely operated the four scood scoo in the vicinity.

Examining this in light of the above legal principles, the Defendant’s lease of four wheeled scoos to tourists, and the Defendant cannot be deemed as occupying and using the white president of this case, which is a specific part of public waters, for a specific purpose separate from the general use.

Nevertheless, the court below maintained the judgment of the court of first instance which found the defendant guilty of the above charges on the ground that the defendant occupied the sandy president of this case solely based on its stated reasoning. In so doing, the court below erred by misapprehending the legal principles on occupation and use of public waters, thereby affecting the conclusion of the judgment. The ground of

Therefore, the lower judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the lower court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Lee In-bok (Presiding Justice)

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