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(영문) 대법원 1995. 10. 13. 선고 95누3770 판결
[토지초과이득세부과처분취소][공1995.12.1.(1005),3825]
Main Issues

Scope of application of Article 8 (3) of the Land Excess Profits Tax Act

Summary of Judgment

According to the provisions of Article 8 (3) of the Land Excess Profit Tax Act, land which is already prohibited from being used as a provision of law before its acquisition is not excluded from idle land, and the Land Excess Profit Tax Act is first intended to recover non-income, such as development gains, as tax, but it is also an important purpose to restrain speculative demand for idle land, etc. by means of tax. Since the acquisition of land, the use of which has already been restricted by law, in itself, is recognized to have acquired the land for the purpose of speculation, it does not constitute an unreasonable discrimination by treating such person differently from land owners imposed by law after its acquisition, and it does not change by acquiring the land before its enforcement, unless there is a special transitional provision.

[Reference Provisions]

Article 8(3) of the Land Excess Profits Tax Act

Plaintiff-Appellee

Plaintiff

Defendant-Appellant

Head of Gwangju District Tax Office

Judgment of the lower court

Seoul High Court Decision 94Gu25836 delivered on February 7, 1995

Text

The judgment below is reversed and the case is remanded to Seoul High Court.

Reasons

We examine the grounds of appeal.

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, although Article 8 (3) of the Land Excess Profit Tax Act provides that land, the use of which is prohibited by law, after its acquisition, shall not be deemed idle land for a certain period. However, regardless of the time of its acquisition, it is reasonable to not regard the land, the use of which is restricted by law, and even if not, it is reasonable to apply the above provision to the person who acquired the land before the enforcement of the above Act, at least after the acquisition of the land, regardless of whether the restriction on the use under law was incurred after the acquisition of the land, and it is reasonable to apply the above provision to the person who acquired the land before the enforcement of the above Act, and is designated as the land rearrangement zone on December 30, 196 and prohibited from using the land as a site for construction.

However, Article 8 (3) of the Land Excess Profit Tax Act provides that "land falling under idle land, etc. due to the prohibition of use due to the statutory provisions after the acquisition of the land shall not be deemed idle land, etc." Thus, the land which is already prohibited from being used by the statutory provisions before its acquisition shall not be excluded from idle land, and the land excess profit tax law aims first to recover non-income, such as development gains, into tax, but it is an important purpose to restrain speculative demand for idle land, etc. by means of tax, and it is recognized that the acquisition of land, the use of which has already been restricted by the statutory provisions, by itself, has acquired the land for the purpose of speculation. Therefore, it does not constitute an unreasonable discrimination by treating such person differently from the land owner imposed by the statutory regulations after its acquisition, and it does not mean that the land has been acquired before its enforcement, unless there is any special provision.

Therefore, the judgment of the court below is erroneous in the misunderstanding of legal principles as to the above provision, which affected the conclusion of the judgment.

Therefore, the lower judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the lower court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Ahn Yong-sik (Presiding Justice)

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