The case holding that registration of transfer of ownership is null and void on the grounds of anti-social juristic act.

The Plaintiff is obligated to sell the site to the Defendant and implement the procedure for ownership transfer registration, and it is invalid because it is an anti-social legal act in violation of the concept of social justice to ensure only his own claim against the Nonparty on the ground that the Nonparty did not have completed ownership transfer registration under the name of the Defendant, even though he was well aware of the circumstances, etc. being used as the site for the facilities such as the said office and police box, etc.

Article 103 of the Civil Act

Supreme Court Decision 71Da1271, 1272 delivered on July 11, 1972

Plaintiff

Seoul Metropolitan Government

Seoul Central District Court (71 Gohap330, 72 Gohap1086) in the first instance trial

(1) Revocation of the original judgment shall be revoked.

(2) The plaintiff (Counterclaim defendant)'s claim is dismissed.

(3) The plaintiff (Counterclaim defendant) will implement the procedure for cancellation registration of ownership transfer registration that was passed through the sale on April 3, 1971 with the Yongsan-gu Seoul Special Metropolitan City Yongsan-gu District Court No. 154-2, 38, and 157-2 and 23 with respect to the defendant (Counterclaim plaintiff) as to the 154-2, 38, and 157-2 and 157-2 of the same Yongsan-gu Seoul Special Metropolitan City Yongsan-gu.

(4) The costs of lawsuit shall be borne by the Plaintiff (Counterclaim Defendant) through the principal lawsuit and counterclaim.

The Plaintiff (Counterclaim Defendant, Counterclaim Plaintiff, Defendant Counterclaim Plaintiff, Defendant Counterclaim Plaintiff, and Defendant simply referred to as Defendant Appellant) removed the Plaintiff from 154-2, 154-2 and 157-2 of Yongsan-gu, Seoul, Yongsan-gu, Seoul, and 1, 28-1, 28-2, and 1, 57-2, and 1, 57-2, and 4, 57-2, 157-2, 157-2, 154-2, 3, 21, 27-1, 27, 28-1, 27, 27-1, 27, 27-1, 27, 27-1, 36-2, 15-2, 15-2, and 15-2, 15-3, and 15-3, 15-2, 27, 297, and 15-1, 27.2, 1,27

The judgment that the costs of lawsuit should be borne by the defendant and the declaration of provisional execution were sought, and the defendant's attorney requested the judgment that the costs of lawsuit should be borne by the plaintiff as a counterclaim, and that the counterclaim should be borne by the plaintiff.

The defendant's attorney sought a judgment to the same effect as the disposition.

(1) The facts that it was originally owned by Nonparty 1, 154-2, 38, and 157-2, 23 of Yongsan-gu Seoul, Yongsan-gu, Seoul, and 157-2 and 157-2, and 23 of the same, and each of the above sites was received on April 8, 1971 by Yongsan-gu, Seoul, Yongsan District Court No. 10790, which was received on April 8, 1971 between the above Nonparty and the Plaintiff, and there is no dispute between the parties. According to the result of the verification of subparagraph 1 of the judgment of the court below and the appraisal by Nonparty 2, according to the result of the appraisal by Nonparty 1, from June 1960, the defendant owned the building as stated in the purport of the claim on each of the above site and used it as a ice building in possession of the building site, and there is no evidence and evidence as stated in the attached Form No. 1, No. 298 (No. 96) and No. 98) of the above building on the ground.

(2) The plaintiff asserts that the above site is owned by the plaintiff, and without any title, the defendant owned the building indicated in the annexed drawing(a), (b), (c), and (b) section 28-5 Hobbebbeon as stated in the purport of the claim in each of the above site, and illegally occupied the part of the site, and thus, the defendant claims removal of the above building and delivery of the part of the site, and the defendant claims the payment of damages equivalent to the rent of the part of the site that the plaintiff suffered while illegally occupied the part from April 8, 1971, and the defendant purchased each of the above sites from 1960. The defendant purchased the above site from Nonparty 1 to 1960. Since the above transfer registration of ownership as to each of the above sites in the name of the plaintiff was null and void due to a juristic act contrary to social order, the plaintiff claims the execution of the procedure for the registration of transfer of ownership by subrogation of the above non-party.

(3) Accordingly, considering the above facts as follows: (a) No. 1-5 of the above evidence No. 1-2 (Evidence No. 2); (b) No. 3-2 (Evidence No. 1-2); and (c) No. 1-3 and No. 4 of the evidence No. 1-2; and (d) the above witness No. 9-3 and No. 6 of the lower court’s testimony that the above facts were established by Non-Party No. 1-6’s testimony, the non-party No. 1-6’s transfer registration of the above building No. 1-2 and the above facts that the non-party No. 1-6’s above facts were not known to the non-party No. 1-6’s above facts; and (b) the non-party No. 9-1 and the non-party No. 9-6’s new statement on the above facts that the non-party No. 1-party No. 1 and the non-party No. 1-6’s new statement No. 97.

In view of the above-mentioned facts, the registration of transfer of ownership on each of the above sites in the Plaintiff’s name shall not be deemed null and void on the ground of an anti-social act violating the concept of social justice.

(4) Thus, since the above transfer registration of ownership in the name of the plaintiff is effective, it is clear that there is no reason to judge the plaintiff's claim of the principal lawsuit and other points on the premise that the above land is owned by the plaintiff, and thus, it is dismissed. Meanwhile, since the defendant's counterclaim by the non-party 1, who purchased the above land from the above non-party 1, on behalf of the plaintiff in lieu of the above non-party as the purchaser of the above land, has a reason to accept the defendant's claim for the cancellation registration procedure of the above transfer registration in the name of the plaintiff, which is invalid, in lieu of the above non-party in lieu of the above non-party as the purchaser of the above land, it shall be accepted. Thus, since the original judgment is unfair in conclusion, the court below shall revoke the original judgment in accordance with Article 386 of the

Judges Kim Hong-chul (Presiding Judge)