logobeta
본 영문본은 리걸엔진의 AI 번역 엔진으로 번역되었습니다. 수정이 필요한 부분이 있는 경우 피드백 부탁드립니다.
텍스트 조절
arrow
arrow
(영문) 수원지방법원 평택지원 2018.01.25 2017가합8731
석재대금
Text

1. The plaintiff's claim is dismissed.

2. The costs of lawsuit shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

Reasons

1. The Plaintiff, as to the cause of the claim, supplied building stones to the Defendant from July 201 to July 2012, 201, and the fact that the unpaid building stones amounted to 200,743,214 did not conflict between the parties. Thus, barring any special circumstance, the Defendant is obligated to pay to the Plaintiff KRW 200,743,214 and delay damages.

2. Judgment on the defendant's defense, etc.

A. As to this, the defendant, around October 2012, supplied a boundary stone in lieu of the payment of the unpaid stone price, and paid the above price. However, there is no evidence to acknowledge it.

B. In addition, the defendant asserts that the plaintiff's claim for the stone price has become complete by the extinctive prescription around July 2015.

Unless there are special circumstances, the extinctive prescription of credit payment claims arising from a continuous contract for the supply of goods shall individually run three years (the price for the goods sold by the merchant under Article 163 subparagraph 6 of the Civil Act) from the time each credit payment claims arising from an individual transaction have occurred, unless there are other special circumstances.

(see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 77Da2463, Mar. 28, 1978). The fact that the Plaintiff sold stone to the Defendant by July 2012 is as seen earlier, and it is evident that the Plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit on March 31, 2017, which was three years after the Plaintiff’s death.

Therefore, barring any other circumstances, the Plaintiff’s outstanding claim against the Defendant was extinguished by the completion of prescription.

As to this, the Plaintiff’s starting point of the statute of limitations should be the date after October 2012. The Defendant, on July 3, 2015, has approved the obligation, and the Plaintiff, on October 15, 2015, has renounced the benefit of prescription by expressing his/her intent to repay the obligation to the Plaintiff even around October 15, 2015.

However, as seen earlier, since the extinctive prescription of credit payment claims arising from a continuous goods supply contract individually proceeds from the occurrence of each credit payment claim arising from each individual transaction, it is difficult to view that the starting point of the extinctive prescription is after October 2012.

arrow