The prosecutor's appeal is dismissed.

1. Summary of grounds for appeal;

A. The lower court’s sentence against an unfair defendant in sentencing (the suspended sentence of KRW 3 million) is too unfortunate and unfair.

B. The Defendant, who was unreasonably exempted from disclosure disclosure notification order, committed an indecent act against the victim at an open place, and reported the victim at the initial stage of the investigation to the public.

Since the nature of the crime such as intimidation is very poor and the risk of recidivism is high, it is unfair for the court below to exempt the defendant from issuing an order to disclose personal information, even though the court below should disclose and notify personal information.

2. Determination

A. In a case where there is no change in the conditions of sentencing compared to the first instance court’s determination on the unfair argument of sentencing, and the sentencing of the first instance court does not deviate from the reasonable scope of discretion, it is reasonable to respect such a case (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2015Do3260, Jul. 23, 2015). The lower court determined the above punishment by taking account of favorable circumstances, such as the fact that the Defendant was the primary offender, the recognition of the instant crime, and the fact that the Defendant’s mistake is seriously against himself/herself, and the victim expressed his/her intention not to punish by agreement with the victim.

In addition to the above circumstances taken into account in sentencing, there is no special change in circumstances to change the sentence of the court below.

In addition, examining various circumstances, such as the defendant's age, sex, environment, motive and background of the crime, means and consequence, circumstances after the crime, family relationship, etc., as well as the conditions for the sentencing as shown in the arguments, the sentencing of the court below is too unfasible to the extent that it exceeds the reasonable scope of discretion, and it does not seem unfair.

This part of the prosecutor's argument is without merit.

B. According to Articles 49(1) and 50(1) of the Act on the Protection of Children and Juveniles against Sexual Abuse, the disclosure and notification of personal information of a person who committed a sexual crime against a child or juvenile should, in principle, be given to the public, be given to the person who committed an offense against a child or juvenile, and the special circumstances that may not be given exceptional.