The prosecutor's appeal is dismissed.

1. Summary of prosecutor's appeal grounds;

A. The sentence sentenced by the court below to the defendant (two years of imprisonment, three years of suspended sentence, three years of community service, 300 hours of order to attend a lecture, 40 hours of order) is too unhued and unfair.

B. Inasmuch as the risk of recidivism is high, the lower court’s exemption from disclosure or notification order is unreasonable.

2. Determination

A. In a case where there is no change in the conditions of sentencing compared to the first instance court’s determination on the unfair argument of sentencing, and the first instance judgment does not deviate from the reasonable scope of discretion, it is reasonable to respect it.

It is desirable to refrain from imposing a sentence that does not vary from the first instance trial by destroying the first instance judgment solely on the ground that the sentence of the first instance judgment falls within the reasonable scope of discretion but differs from the view of the appellate court (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2015Do3260, Jul. 23, 2015). The lower court considered the fact that the Defendant’s indecent act by force against the victim under the age of 13 is heavy, and that the victim is deemed to have suffered a considerable sense of sexual humiliation and suffered emotional distress, and that the Defendant was punished.

On the other hand, the above punishment was determined by considering the favorable circumstances that the defendant recognized the crime of this case and reflects the wrongness of the defendant, and that there was no record of punishment for the defendant.

Unlike the circumstances considered by the court below, there is no special change in circumstances that this court newly considers.

In addition to the aforementioned circumstances, examining various circumstances, such as the Defendant’s age, sex, environment, motive, background, means and consequence of the crime, circumstances after the crime, family relationship, etc., and the sentencing conditions as shown in the pleadings, the lower court’s sentencing is too uneasible and unreasonable.

B. Article 49(1) and (2) of the Act on the Protection of Children and Juveniles against Sexual Abuse on determining whether to exempt disclosure or notification order.