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(영문) 광주고등법원 (전주) 2017.01.10 2016노189
아동ㆍ청소년의성보호에관한법률위반(강제추행)
Text

The defendant's appeal is dismissed.

Reasons

1. The court below rendered a judgment dismissing the prosecutor's request regarding the part of the case against the defendant against whom the request for attachment order was made, and the part of the case against the defendant was appealed. As such, the part of the judgment of the court below regarding the claim for attachment order among the part of the case against the defendant is not profitable, and as such, this part is excluded from the scope of the judgment of this court, notwithstanding Article 9 (8) of the Act on the Protection and Observation of Specific Criminal Offenders and Electronic Monitoring,

Therefore, the scope of this court's adjudication is limited to the defendant's case.

2. Summary of reasons for appeal;

A. The sentence of the lower court’s unfair sentencing (two years of imprisonment, three years of suspended execution, 120 hours of community service order, and 80 hours of lecture for treatment of sexual assault, etc.) is too unreasonable.

B. In light of the fact that an order of disclosure disclosure notification to the illegal defendant is likely to impede social life and academic studies as well as the defendant's family members, etc., the order of disclosure disclosure notification by the court below is unfair.

3. Determination

A. In light of the fact that the sentencing of a judgment on an unfair assertion of sentencing is based on statutory penalty, taking into account the factors constituting the conditions for sentencing under Article 51 of the Criminal Act within a reasonable and appropriate scope, and the fact that the sentencing is conducted within an appellate court’s ex post facto nature, etc., it is reasonable to respect the first instance judgment in a case where there is no change in the conditions for sentencing compared with the first instance judgment, and the sentencing of the first instance judgment does not deviate from the reasonable scope of discretion. Although the sentencing of the first instance judgment falls within the reasonable scope of discretion, it is desirable to reverse the first instance judgment and to refrain from imposing a sentence that does not differ from the first instance judgment solely on the ground that the sentence differs from the appellate court’s view (see Supreme Court Decision 2015Do3260, Jul. 23, 2015).

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