The prosecutor's appeal is dismissed.

1. Summary of grounds for appeal;

A. Part 1 of the case of Defendant 1) The sentence of the lower court’s unfair sentencing (two years and six months of imprisonment, three years of suspended execution, and 80 hours of an order to attend sexual assault treatment programs) is too uneasy and unreasonable.

2) Considering the attitude of the Defendant’s act to be exempted from disclosure disclosure notification order and the nature of the crime, etc., the disadvantage and side effect of the Defendant due to disclosure notification order cannot be less than the profit and preventive effect expected from disclosure notification order. Therefore, it is unreasonable for the lower court to exempt the Defendant from disclosure notification order.

B. The risk of recidivism can be acknowledged in light of the following facts: (a) each of the instant crimes with respect to which the instant case was filed for an attachment order order was committed on three occasions from April 2015 to December 2015 by an alternative method; (b) the Defendant’s sexual impulse is deemed difficult to coordinate; and (c) the Defendant’s risk of recidivism against the Defendant was assessed at an interim level; and (d) the lower court’s dismissal of the Defendant’s request for an attachment order with respect to an electronic device is unreasonable.

2. Determination on the part of the case of the defendant

A. In light of the fact that the sentencing of a judgment on an unfair assertion of sentencing is made within a reasonable and appropriate scope taking into account matters that are the conditions for sentencing under Article 51 of the Criminal Act, based on the statutory penalty, and the fact that the sentencing is made within the reasonable and appropriate scope, and the appellate court’s ex post facto nature, etc., it is reasonable to respect the sentencing in a case where there is no change in the conditions for sentencing compared with the first instance trial, and the sentencing of the first instance is not exceeded the reasonable scope of discretion. Although the sentencing of the first instance falls within the reasonable scope of discretion, it is desirable to reverse the first instance judgment on the sole ground that the sentence of the first instance falls within the reasonable scope of discretion, and to refrain from imposing a sentence that is not different from the first instance judgment solely on the ground that it is somewhat different from the appellate court’s view (see Supreme Court Decision 2015Do3260, Jul. 23, 2015).