2015Nu13961 Revocation of a ruling

A

President of the Central Maritime Safety Tribunal

July 14, 2016

August 18, 2016

1. The plaintiff's claim is dismissed.

2. The costs of lawsuit shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

Of the Korean Maritime Safety Tribunal's ruling on December 18, 2015, the part of the Korean Maritime Safety Tribunal's ruling on the suspension of business against the plaintiff shall be revoked for two months.

1. Occurrence of marine accidents and details of adjudication;

(a) The occurrence of the marine accident;

1) On November 25, 2014, around 10:35, on a petroleum product transport vessel, C loaded fuel oil at the port of Ulsan Metropolitan City, Ulsan Metropolitan City, and thereafter started with nine seafarers, including the Plaintiff, who is the captain, on board, and toward the military mountain port.

2) On November 26, 2014, C confirmed D cargo ships sailing at the foreline of the foreline while sailing at a military mountain port E-2 wharf on November 27, 2014, following the following day while waiting at the A-2 anchorage.

3) On November 27, 2014, the Plaintiff, the captain of C, was trying to overtake D, at around 06:19, the speed of D’s pilot E, making it possible for D to overtake D on the right side. The defect that D’s above E is adequate to overtake, and that D is overtaking on its starboard side.

4) On November 27, 2014, around 06:33, a military air traffic control center rendered a radio broadcast to wait for each vessel as it is anticipated to control departure from a port where there are a large number of dogs inside a military air route.

5) A around November 27, 2014, around 06:46, 201, C passed through an EsO-day wharf, which is a destination, while carrying a tugboat of tugboat F.

6) A) On November 27, 2014, at around 06:52, the Plaintiff, the captain of C, stated that D’s pilot E would be a VHF, and that D’s pilot E would go through a string and immediately bypass, and that the above E would be going to the port side of E’s engine engine stoves during C, and that the Plaintiff would go to the port side of E’s stoves, and that the Plaintiff would go to Korea’s right bypass.

B) Around that time, C left the e-mail to enter the wharf, left approximately 170 meters from the e-mail, left the e-mail, and became the form of gradually blocking D’s path as follows.

A person shall be appointed.

7) At the time of the above communication, Eul was unaware of the fact that C was moving back to the central part of the sea route and obstructed the course at approximately 100 meters of D’s players, and it was later known that D had the main engine stopped immediately after the communication in order to find C into the ground and avoid the collision. However, at around 06:54, around November 27, 2014, the accident of collision between the two vessels at the 320°58°59 of north latitude and the 320°58°59 of East latitude and the 126°36°2 of East longitude and the 126°32 of East longitude, which are distanceed from the e-mail on November 27, 2014 (hereinafter “the marine accident”).

8) Meanwhile, at the time of the occurrence of the instant marine accident, the inside of the instant vessel was very limited to 100 meters in rectification, and C was destroyed by the vessel’s hull and the residential area of the U.S. vessel, and D was partly mined by the athletes.

(b) Details of adjudication;

With respect to the case B at the Central Sea on December 18, 2015, the Korean Tribunal of the Safety and Sea shall not take appropriate safety measures, such as reduction of speed, etc., against the plaintiff's third mate's work in the case of a marine accident, even though C was overtaken within a military mountain port with restricted visibility, and even though C was unable to discover the scheduled contact location for the neglect of boundary, it was behind the engine to enter the port of contact. In order to re-enter the port of contact, it is also necessary to prevent the opposite ship's course while leaving the engine. However, it is also necessary to suspend the plaintiff's work at the third mate's office for two months.

A person E who is involved in a marine accident shall be reprimanded (hereinafter referred to as "the ruling of this case").

[Grounds for recognition] Gap evidence 1 to 10, Eul evidence 4 (including each number), the purport of the whole pleadings

2. Whether the ruling of this case is lawful

A. The plaintiff's assertion

D’s pilot E knew of the fact that there was C in the front section on the route of an open port where it is difficult to secure the right to view the front section from the inside of the inside, thereby causing the instant marine accident in violation of this provision, even if the front section is secured and the front section is safe to overtake the vessel. Therefore, the instant marine accident was caused by the front negligence of the above E, and the Plaintiff did not have any responsibility to do so, the instant judgment that rendered a disposition of the suspension of business for a period of two months shall be revoked.

B. Determination

1) In light of the following circumstances, it is reasonable to deem that the instant marine accident was the principal cause of the Plaintiff’s negligence, which is the captain of C, who violated the duty of care to avoid the course of the vessel being overtaken until the vessel being overtaken is sufficiently far away from the vessel being overtaken.

① Article 13(1)4 of the former Public Order in Open Ports Act (amended by Act No. 12844, Nov. 19, 2014; repealed by the Act on the Arrival and Departure of Ships; hereinafter referred to as “former Public Order in Open Ports Act”) provides that no vessel shall overtake another vessel on a sea route: Provided, That if it is deemed that the vessel to be overtaken can be visually and safely overtaken, it may overtake another vessel by the method prescribed in Articles 67(5) and 71 of the Maritime Safety Act (amended by Act No. 1302, Nov. 6, 2015; hereinafter referred to as “former Maritime Safety Act”) and Article 71(1)4 of the former Maritime Safety Act provides that no vessel may overtake another vessel on a sea route until such time as the vessel is overtaken or is under the duty to exercise due care until such time as the vessel is out of way different from that of this Section, it appears that the vessel is out that the vessel is out of way of being overtaken or is out of way.

② At the time of the occurrence of the instant marine accident, C was about 30 minutes from the time of the occurrence of the instant marine accident, and C’s captain, around November 27, 2014, at around 06:52, the Plaintiff, the captain of the instant marine accident, referred to as “VHF” to D pilot E, and immediately right-hand. This appears to have been due to the Plaintiff’s adjacent distance and the fact that the Plaintiff was aware that the vessel is located in the same way. In light of the above, it is difficult to deem that the existing overtaking relationship was terminated at the time of the instant marine accident.

③ Even in a limited visibility with D, it may be deemed that there was negligence of overtaking C without taking speed measures, etc., but the occurrence of the instant marine accident is difficult to view that the occurrence of the instant marine accident was caused by the former negligence on the D side because it was not in the situation of termination of the existing overtaking relationship as seen earlier. Rather, inasmuch as C’s act of blocking the center of the sea route while moving on the sea route without any notification at any time while the visibility is restricted, it is difficult to predict it as D’s act of blocking the center of the sea route is not ordinary, and therefore, the main responsibility of the instant marine accident lies in C.

2) As seen above, in light of all the circumstances, such as the circumstance of the marine accident of this case, the details of the Plaintiff’s negligence, and the degree of damage to the ship involved in the accident, the adjudication of disciplinary action that suspends the Plaintiff’s work of class 3 mate for two months shall be deemed appropriate to take a disciplinary action. Therefore, the part of the adjudication of disciplinary action against the Plaintiff in this case is legitimate, and the Plaintiff’s assertion disputing this is not acceptable.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, the plaintiff's claim is dismissed as it is without merit. It is so decided as per Disposition.

Allowable judges of the presiding judge

Judges Kim Gin-han

Judge Park Jong-hoon