1. The plaintiff's appeal is dismissed.

2. The costs of appeal shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

The purport of the claim and appeal is the purport of the appeal.

1. The reasoning of this court’s judgment citing the judgment of the court of first instance is identical to the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance, except for a dismissal or an additional determination as follows, and thus, it is acceptable in accordance with the main sentence of Article 420

Part 4 of the judgment of the court of first instance, “i.e., at the Plaintiff’s temporary general meeting of shareholders held on March 12, 1997,” set forth in Part 6 as “i.e., at the time of the conclusion of the instant lease agreement.”

In the first instance judgment, each of the 7th and 8th of the 5th of the 5th of the 195th of the 5th of the 5th of the 5th of the 5th of the 5th of the 5th of the 5th of the 5th of the 19

The second part of the fifth part of the judgment of the court of first instance, " March 12, 1997" at the bottom of the fifth part of the judgment of the court of first instance, shall be construed as "after the conclusion of the instant lease contract."

2. The Plaintiff asserts that even after the conclusion of the instant lease contract, the Defendant approved the obligation to return the deposit.

The evidence submitted by the Plaintiff alone is insufficient to recognize that the Defendant agreed to bear the obligation to return the lease deposit of this case, and if E did not actually pay the deposit amount of KRW 100 million to the Defendant instead of the Plaintiff, it was treated that E fulfilled the obligation to pay the deposit amount to the Defendant instead of paying the deposit amount of KRW 100 million to the Plaintiff, as alleged by the Plaintiff.

If it was agreed that the Plaintiff would not pay the security deposit that was not received from the Plaintiff, it constitutes an act of breach of trust of the Defendant’s representative director, E, and the Plaintiff’s representative director who participated in the process of determining the acquisition price of E and concluding the lease contract of this case, shall be deemed to have known or could have known such an act of abuse of the Plaintiff’s power of representation. Accordingly, the agreement on debt acceptance

The plaintiff's above assertion is without merit.

3. The plaintiff's claim for conclusion shall be dismissed for lack of reasonable grounds.

The judgment of the first instance is just in conclusion, and the plaintiff's appeal is groundless.