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(영문) 대법원 1999. 1. 15. 선고 98도2550 판결
[경범죄처벌법위반·도로교통법위반][공1999.2.15.(76),320]
Main Issues

Whether the principle of prohibition of disadvantageous change applies to a case where only the defendant claims a formal trial against a summary judgment (affirmative)

Summary of Judgment

According to the provisions of Article 14(1) and (2) of the Procedure Act, in a case where a defendant or chief of a police station is dissatisfied with a summary judgment, he/she may request a formal trial in case where the defendant or the chief of a police station is dissatisfied with the summary judgment, and pursuant to the provisions of Article 19 of the same Act, unless otherwise provided in the above Act, the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act shall apply mutatis mutandis to the summary judgment. Meanwhile, pursuant to the provisions of Articles 453 and 457-2 of the Criminal Procedure Act, in a case where a public prosecutor or the defendant is dissatisfied with the summary order, he/she may request a formal trial in case where he/she or the defendant is dissatisfied with the summary order. However, in a case where the defendant requests a formal trial, he/she shall not be sentenced to a penalty heavier than that of the summary order where he/she has the character of a right recognized as the party to the lawsuit in case where he/she is dissatisfied with the summary judgment procedure, and the procedure and effect are similar.

[Reference Provisions]

Articles 14 and 19 of the Procedure for Summary Trials Act, Articles 453 and 457-2 of the Criminal Procedure Act

Defendant

Defendant

Appellant

Defendant

Judgment of the lower court

Seoul District Court Decision 98No3266 delivered on July 15, 1998

Text

The judgment of the court below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Seoul District Court Panel Division.

Reasons

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. In light of the records, the court below is just in finding the defendant guilty of the violation of the Punishment of Minor Offenses Act and the violation of the Road Traffic Act (traffic obstruction), and there is no error in the misapprehension of the rules of evidence as alleged in the grounds of appeal.

2. However, according to the records, although the defendant was sentenced to a fine of KRW 50,00 in a summary judgment, and filed a request for formal trial against him/her, he/she again appealed after being sentenced to a fine of KRW 100,000 in the first instance court of this case, but he/she was sentenced to

According to the provisions of Article 14(1) and (2) of the Procedure Act, where a defendant or chief of a police station is dissatisfied with a summary judgment, he/she may request a formal trial in cases where he/she is dissatisfied with the summary judgment, and pursuant to the provisions of Article 19 of the same Act, unless otherwise provided in the above Act, the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act shall apply mutatis mutandis to the case where he/she is dissatisfied with the summary judgment. Meanwhile, pursuant to the provisions of Articles 453 and 457-2 of the Criminal Procedure Act, in cases where a public prosecutor or a defendant is dissatisfied with the summary judgment, he/she may request a formal trial in cases where he/she or the defendant is dissatisfied with the summary order, but he/she shall not be sentenced to a penalty heavier than that of the summary order in cases where he/she has the nature of a right recognized as a party to the lawsuit in cases where he/she is dissatisfied with the summary judgment due to the punishment procedures for both the right to request a formal trial or the right to request a formal trial.

Nevertheless, it is clear that the court below's maintenance of the first instance court's measure which sentenced the defendant to a more severe punishment than the summary trial has committed an unlawful act of misunderstanding the legal principles as to the prohibition of disadvantageous alteration in the summary trial proceedings, and it has influenced the judgment. The argument pointing this out is with merit.

3. Therefore, the judgment of the court below is reversed and the case is remanded to the court below. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Lee Yong-hun (Presiding Justice)

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심급 사건
-서울지방법원 1998.7.15.선고 98노3266
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