2014 Ghana 83060 Damages

A

1. B

2. C

3. Korea;

June 12, 2015

August 21, 2015

1. Defendant Republic of Korea shall pay to the Plaintiff 4,020,400 won with 5% interest per annum from June 25, 2013 to August 21, 2015, and 20% interest per annum from the next day to the day of full payment.

2. The plaintiff's respective claims against the defendant B and C and the remaining claims against the defendant Republic of Korea are dismissed, respectively.

3. Of the costs of lawsuit, the part arising between the Plaintiff, Defendant B and Defendant C shall be borne by the Plaintiff, and the part arising between the Plaintiff and the Defendant Republic of Korea shall be borne by the Plaintiff, and the remainder by the Defendant

4. Paragraph 1 can be provisionally executed.

The Defendants jointly and severally pay to the Plaintiff 30,020,400 won with 5% interest per annum from June 25, 2013 to the date of this judgment, and 20% interest per annum from the next day to the date of full payment.

1. Basic facts

A. Case history

1) On June 2013, 2013, 23:56, the Plaintiff refused to comply with the request from Defendant B and C, a police officer who belongs to the Kim Jong-si Police Station F patrol box, to voluntarily conduct an investigation into the suspicion of drunk driving, and attempted not to leave the patrol room. Nevertheless, Defendant B and C forced the Plaintiff into force, and Defendant B and C arrested the Plaintiff as a flagrant offender in the crime of obstruction of performance of official duties and carried the Plaintiff into the F patrol box. In this process, the Plaintiff sustained the Plaintiff as a flagrant offender in the crime of obstruction of performance of official duties for 14 days.

2) As a result of the measurement of drinking water by the pulmonary measuring device to the Plaintiff at the later police box, the blood alcohol concentration was 0.214%.

(b) Progress of judgment

1) From June 25, 2013 to June 23:56, 2013, the Changwon District Court: (a) denied the Plaintiff’s voluntary movement to investigate the suspicion of drunk driving by police officers, etc.; (b) continuously arrested B as an offender in the crime of obstruction of performance of official duties; and (c) interfered with B’s performance of official duties for police officers, and at the same time, inflicted an injury on B for about two weeks. On June 25, 2013, the Plaintiff brought a prosecution of interference with alcohol from the 1st century to the Eel parking lot located in the Road Traffic Act (hereinafter “MM”) to the 1stm of the Eel parking lot located in the same road. In addition, the Plaintiff brought a prosecution of interference with the performance of official duties for police officers on the second time, and 2th of the 1st of the 20th of the 20th of the 20th of the 2nd of the 2013.

2) As to the crime of obstruction of performance of official duties on March 21, 2014, the above court deemed that the police officer tried to force the plaintiff in the form of voluntary performance, such as where the plaintiff clearly expressed that he had no intention to do so, and thus, such police officer's act constitutes an unlawful performance of official duties. Even if the plaintiff assaulted the police officer against such unlawful forced performance, the crime of obstruction of official duties which requires legitimate performance of official duties cannot be established. Thus, insofar as the crime of obstruction of official duties is not established against the plaintiff, arresting the plaintiff as an illegal act of obstruction of official duties is also illegal performance of official duties. Thus, even if the plaintiff assaulted the police officer against such series of illegal arrest processes, the crime of obstruction of official duties cannot be seen as legitimate performance of official duties at the time of "the crime of obstruction of official duties", and thus, it cannot be seen that the police officer's act of unlawful performance of official duties against the plaintiff's request for voluntary self-defense, which cannot be seen as unlawful performance of official duties at the time of the plaintiff's request for arrest and measurement of the plaintiff's violation of evidence.

3) The Prosecutor appealed to the Changwon District Court 2014677, but the appellate court rendered a judgment dismissing the appeal on August 14, 2014, and on August 22, 2014, the judgment of the first instance court became final and conclusive on August 22, 2014. [Grounds for recognition] The fact that there is no dispute, each entry in Gap evidence 1 through 4 (including the number of branch numbers), and the purport of the entire pleadings.

2. Determination on the claim against Defendant Republic of Korea

(a) Occurrence of liability for damages;

1) According to the above facts, Defendant B and C, a police officer affiliated with the Defendant Republic of Korea, attempted to force the Plaintiff in the form of voluntary behavior, and even if the requirements for the arrest of a flagrant offender under the Criminal Procedure Act were not met, it can be recognized that the Plaintiff was arrested as a flagrant offender. As such, the Defendant and the Republic of Korea are liable to compensate the Plaintiff for the damages incurred by the Plaintiff due to such illegal arrest by police officers, i.e., illegal performance of official duties, pursuant to the main sentence of Article

2) The Plaintiff also asserts to the effect that it is unlawful for Defendant B and C to transfer the Plaintiff to the prosecutor’s office with the opinion of prosecution. As such, the Defendant Republic of Korea has a duty to compensate the Plaintiff for damages. The judgment of innocence in a criminal trial means that there is no proof that a judge has a conviction to the extent that the existence of a reasonable doubt is excluded from a reasonable doubt based on evidentiary evidence. It does not mean that a judgment of innocence in a criminal trial is not proven, but it is obvious that a judicial police officer or a prosecutor, as an investigative agency, investigated the case in question as an investigation agency, clarify the truth, and comprehensively taking into account the evidence collected and investigated, if it is deemed that there is reasonable reason for the suspect to be convicted, it may transfer the case to the prosecutor’s office with the opinion of prosecution or institute a public prosecution. Accordingly, in an objective view, a judicial police officer or a prosecutor has a duty to compensate for the Plaintiff for damages caused by such act. Even if there is no evidence to prove the existence of the crime through the first trial process, it is reasonable to affirm the judgment of innocence in light of empirical rule or rule 20.

In light of the following circumstances, the evidence No. 6-6, No. 6-7, No. 12, No. 12, and No. 4, which can be acknowledged by comprehensively considering the purport of the entire pleadings, it is insufficient to deem that the judgment of the investigative agency reached the extent that it was considerably unreasonable in light of the empirical and logical rules, and there is no other evidence to acknowledge this, and therefore, this part of the Plaintiff’s assertion is without merit.

① Defendant B and C discovered the body-man vehicle entering the EM parking lot in the direction of regulating drunk driving at a 80-meter range, and suspected as a drinking-driving vehicle, and followed the vehicle to the EM parking lot.

② Defendant B observed the Plaintiff’s opening and coming from the driver’s seat of the vehicle in his body, and Defendant C confirmed that the Plaintiff was drinking through the driver’s seat of the vehicle in his body and drinking.

③ At first, the Plaintiff, who was demanded by Defendant B and C to voluntarily conduct an investigation into the suspicion of drunk driving, was on his own seat at the back seat of the patrol vehicle. The Plaintiff asserted that he was on his behalf and was on his behalf at the patrol vehicle.

(④ 이후 순찰차 탑승 및 현행범 체포와 관련하여 원고와 피고 B, C 사이에 실랑이가 벌어졌고, 이러한 과정에서 원고는 피고 B의 뺨을 때리고 가슴을 발로 찼다.

⑤ The Plaintiff’s blood alcohol level measured by pulmonary measuring devices was 0.214% of the blood alcohol level.

6) The Plaintiff asserted that he was acting on behalf of the latter, and the Ha of a substitute driver present at a police box that he did not drive the vehicle on behalf of the latter, and stated that the Ha of a substitute driver present at a police box was a false assertion upon request from the other party to the telephone call which was caused by the Plaintiff’s mobile phone.

(b) Scope of damages;

(a) Medical expenses: 20,400 won (each entry in evidence A (1 to 3);

2) Consolation money

The Plaintiff was suffering from mental suffering by the aforementioned unlawful forced conduct by police officers. As such, Defendant Republic of Korea is obligated to pay consolation money to the Plaintiff’s mental suffering. Furthermore, considering the amount of consolation money, the amount of consolation money is determined as KRW 4,00,000, in full view of the following circumstances: (a) the police officer’s illegal act; (b) the details and developments leading up to the police officer’s unlawful act; (c) the part and degree of injury; and (d) other circumstances revealed in the pleading. The amount of consolation money that Defendant Republic of

Therefore, Defendant Republic of Korea has a duty to claim against the Plaintiff as to whether or not the Defendant’s obligation exists or not and the scope thereof (=20,400 + KRW 4,00,000) and damages for delay calculated by each of the annual rates of 20% as prescribed by the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Promotion, etc. of Legal Proceedings from the following day to the date of full payment, which is the date of this decision, from June 25, 2013, which is the date of this decision.

3. Determination as to claims against Defendant B and C

In cases where a public official inflicts damage on another person as a result of a tort in the course of performing his/her duties, in addition to the State’s liability for damages, if a public official’s individual is either intentionally or by gross negligence, the public official is not liable for damages due to the tort (see, e.g., Supreme Court en banc Decision 95Da38677, Feb. 15, 1996). In this context, a public official’s gross negligence refers to a situation in which a public official could have easily caused damage by unlawful or gross negligence if he/she did not pay considerable attention to the extent that the public official is ordinarily required, even if he/she could have easily predicted the result of causing damage by failing to do so (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2003Da1307, Dec. 26, 2003).

As determined earlier, Defendant B and C’s attempt to enforce the Plaintiff in the form of voluntary performance constitutes an unlawful performance of duties. Even if the Plaintiff committed an assault against such unlawful forced performance, the crime of obstruction of performance of duties is not established, and thus, Defendant B and C’s arrest of the Plaintiff as a flagrant offender in the crime of obstruction of performance of official duties also constitutes an unlawful performance of duties. However, considering the circumstances described in the above 2-A-2-1 through 2-1 of the above-mentioned 2-3-2-3, Defendant B and C at the time, it is highly probable that the requirements for arrest in the crime of voluntary performance and obstruction of performance of official duties were all satisfied. Accordingly, even if Defendant B and C do not pay considerable attention to the extent ordinarily required for police officers, it is difficult to readily conclude that such act is unlawful and harmful, and it is difficult to view that it is an unlawful progress due to gross negligence that is close to the intent, and thus, Defendant C is not liable for damages arising from the unlawful performance of duties due to Defendant B and C’s unlawful act.

4. Conclusion

Therefore, the plaintiff's respective claims against the defendant B and C are dismissed as it is without merit. The claims against the defendant Republic of Korea shall be accepted within the scope of the above recognition, and the remaining claims shall be dismissed as they are without merit. It is so decided as per Disposition.

Judges and Tax Judges