The appeal is dismissed.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. In order for a common principal to be established under Article 30 of the Criminal Act, it is necessary to implement a crime through functional control based on the common intent as a subjective requirement. Here, the common processing intent is insufficient to recognize another person’s criminal act and to allow it without restraint, and it should be one of the two with intent to commit a specific criminal act as a joint principal, and it should be one with intent to move one’s own intention to practice using another person’s act (see Supreme Court Decision 2002Do747, Mar. 28, 2003, etc.). Such common processing intention is insufficient solely with recognizing another person’s criminal act without restraint, and to accept it without any specific criminal act (see Supreme Court Decision 200Do576, Apr. 7, 200). In addition, it is sufficient to reasonably recognize an indirect fact that the criminal defendant has to bear a considerable relation with the criminal act of 200Do7166, Apr. 7, 200).

(c).