The constitutional interpretation of Article 44 (2) of the Game Industry Promotion Act that stipulates that a person who commits a violation of Article 32 (1) 7 of the same Act shall confiscate game products owned or occupied by him/her as necessary.

Articles 32(1)7 and 44(1) and (2) of the Game Industry Promotion Act

[Plaintiff-Appellant] Plaintiff 2006Do4075 delivered on September 14, 2006 (Gong2006Ha, 1774)

Defendant

Defendant

Attorney Kim Jong-ho

Gwangju District Court Decision 2008No2349 Decided December 12, 2008

The appeal is dismissed.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

According to Articles 32(1)7 and 44(1) and (2) of the Game Industry Promotion Act (hereinafter “Game Industry Promotion Act”), a person who conducts an act of exchanging or mediating exchange or re-purchase of tangible or intangible results (referring to score, premiums, virtual currency used in a game, which is prescribed by Presidential Decree, and things similar thereto prescribed by Presidential Decree) obtained through the use of a game product shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than five years or by a fine not exceeding 50 million won, and the game products owned or occupied by the person concerned shall be confiscated, and if they cannot be confiscated, the value thereof shall be additionally collected. In light of the contents of each of the above provisions, the eradication of speculative game products, and the legislative purport of the Game Industry Promotion Act, such as the creation of a healthy game culture, in violation of Article 32(1)7 of the Game Industry Promotion Act, a person who conducts an act of exchanging or mediating exchange or re-purchase of results obtained through the use of the game product, or who owns or occupies the game products by a person who actually contributes to such act.

After recognizing the facts in the judgment by the first instance court based on the evidence duly admitted, the lower court determined that the game of this case should be confiscated as necessary pursuant to Article 44(2) of the Game Industry Promotion Act, since the game of this case was owned by the Defendant, the violator.

In light of the above legal principles and records, since the game of this case is owned by the defendant and actually contributed to the repurchase business of tangible and intangible results acquired by the defendant through the use of game products, the judgment of the court below is somewhat insufficient but just in conclusion, and it is not erroneous in the misapprehension of legal principles as to necessary confiscation, which affected the conclusion of the judgment. Therefore, the defendant's ground of appeal is without merit.

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Ahn Dai-hee (Presiding Justice)