Whether the purpose of seeking alteration of the part concerning the payment of child support under Article 837(2) of the Civil Act may be deemed to have been included in the claim for child support brought after an agreement was reached to vest the claim for the return of the deposit in the child support for the minor child upon divorce (affirmative)

In a case where one spouse seeks a trial on the bearing of child support on the premise that the liability for the bearing of child support was not agreed upon after an agreement was concluded to the effect that one spouse would vest part of the claim for return of the deposit for lease as the payment of child support for minor children in the form of child support, while the marriage is broken down, the claim for adjudication on the bearing of child support should be deemed to be the purport of seeking a change in the bearing of child support among the matters concerning the bringing-up of the person designated by the agreement between the parties. The court may change the said claim at any time, where it is recognized as being unfairly determined in light of all the circumstances, such as the age of the person designated by the agreement between the parties, the financial status, and other circumstances of the parents

Article 837 of the Civil Act

Supreme Court Order 90Meu699 delivered on June 25, 1991 (Gong1991, 2036) Supreme Court Order 92Switzerland17, 92Switzerland18 delivered on December 30, 1992 (Gong1993Sang, 610) dated May 13, 1994 (Gong1994Sang, 1693)

Re-appellant

Other Party

Principal 1 et al.

Gwangju High Court Order 97BB2, 3 dated February 25, 1998

The part of the judgment of the court below regarding the claim for child support is reversed and remanded to Gwangju High Court. The reappeal against the claim for division of property is dismissed.

The grounds for reappeal are examined.

1. As to the claim for division of property

According to the reasoning of the order of the court below, the court below acknowledged the purport that the claimant and the other party agreed to divorce on June 5, 1995, when the claimant and the other party agree to the divorce on December 21, 1995, and the other party have to waive all the claims, such as consolation money and division of property, and the above agreement concluded that the other party would file a complaint at the time, and that the other party's claim was made by threatening the petitioner to die without the above agreement without the above agreement, along with the window knife and knife incidental knife knife knife knife knife knife knife knife knife knife knife knife knife knife knife knife.

2. As to the claim for child support

According to the reasoning of the order of the court below, the court below acknowledged the fact that the claimant and the other party agreed on June 5, 1995 to raise the minor principal when they enter into the above agreement, but they maintained the decision of the court of first instance that dismissed the claimant's claim for child support by recognizing that the claimant's claim for child support for the other party's child support claim was extinguished. The court below affirmed the decision of the court of first instance, which recognized that the plaintiff's claim for child support claim against the other party was extinguished.

However, according to the records, the claimant appears to have sought a judgment on the burden of the child support of this case against the court on the premise that there was no agreement on the burden of the child support of this case between the other party and the other party among the matters concerning the child support of the principal of this case. According to the court below's recognition, an agreement has already been concluded between the claimant and the other party to the effect that the other party will belong to the claimant for the payment of the child support. In such a case, the claim for a judgment on the burden of the child support of this case should be viewed to the purport of seeking a change in the part of the child support of the matters concerning the child support of the person designated by the agreement between the parties. The court of the court of the original judgment can change it at any time if it is recognized as being unfairly determined in light of all the circumstances, such as the child's age under Article 837 (2) of the Civil Code, the financial status of the parents, and other circumstances (see Supreme Court Order 90Meu699, Jun. 25, 1991).

However, parents are jointly responsible for raising the child of the child of the child and, in principle, the expenses for raising the child should be jointly borne by the parents. This is the duty arising from the nature of the parent-child relationship without examining whether the child of the child is a person with custody and actually raising the child (see, e.g., Supreme Court en banc Order 92S21, May 13, 1994). According to the court below acknowledged in this case, since both the claimant and the other party are high school teachers, there is no big difference in the amount of income. On the other hand, some of the above lease deposit recognized as attributable to the claimant for the child support of the principal in this case can only be deemed as having been raised funds necessary for maintaining the residence necessary for raising the child of the principal in this case, and it is difficult to view that the court below erred by misapprehending the legal principles as to the child support agreement between the claimant and the other party in this case, and thus, it is unreasonable to deem the claimant to have been subject to division of property only on the ground of the above change of the land and property of the claimant.

3. Therefore, the part of the judgment of the court below regarding the claim for child support is reversed, and that part of the case is remanded to the court below. The reappeal against the claim for division of property is dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent

Justices Final Young-young (Presiding Justice)