The appeal is dismissed.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. Article 307 of the Criminal Act provides that “a person who defames a person by openly pointing out a fact,” and Article 307(2) provides that “a person who defames a person by openly pointing out a false fact,” respectively, shall be punished.

Therefore, in order to establish the crime of defamation, there should be “a statement of fact” or “a statement of fact,” regardless of the defamation of paragraph (1) or paragraph (2).

Here, “statement of fact” refers to a report or statement of a specific past or present fact, which is substituted by “an expression of opinion,” the content of which is a value judgment or evaluation, and refers to a report or statement of a specific past or present fact, which can be proven by evidence (see Supreme Court Decision 96Do1741, Nov. 22, 1996, etc.). However, Article 310 of the Criminal Act does not punish where “the act under Article 307(1) is true and solely for public interest.”

In addition, Article 307(2) excludes defamation by “a statement of false facts” from its coverage, and provides that the illegality may be avoided only when the defamation by “a statement of fact” under Article 307(1) and, among them, the time when the false facts are “a true fact”.

According to the structure, language, and content of the foregoing provision, the term “fact” under Article 307(1) is not the term “justifiable fact” under Article 307(2), but the term “material fact” that is opposed to the “justifiable fact” under Article 307(2), but rather the term “written opinion” that contains value judgment or evaluation.

Therefore, the offense of defamation under Article 307(1) may be established regardless of whether the alleged facts are true or false. In particular, even if the alleged facts are false, if there is no awareness of falsity to the actor, not the offense of defamation under Article 307(2) but the offense of defamation under Article 307(1) may be established.