The appeal is dismissed.

The costs of appeal are assessed against the Plaintiff.

The grounds of appeal are examined (to the extent of supplement in case of supplemental appellate briefs not timely filed).

1. The filing of a lawsuit against the deceased person is contrary to the basic principles of the Civil Procedure Act requiring the rescue of the plaintiff and the defendant, and thus, it is inappropriate to establish a substantial litigation relationship, and thus, the judgment of the court of first instance was rendered

Even if the ruling is valid, the ruling is void automatically.

(1) The Majority Opinion argues that the Defendant was alive at the time of filing a lawsuit but died before being served with a duplicate of the complaint (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 69Da929, Mar. 24, 1970).

(See Supreme Court Decision 2014Da34041 Decided January 29, 2015). Such a legal doctrine also applies to a payment order in which a deceased person is a debtor.

In cases where a debtor dies after a request for a payment order is made with a deceased person as a debtor, or after the original copy is served, such payment order shall not be effective.

Even if the payment order is formally the same as that which has been formally finalized due to the service of the heir, etc., it cannot be said that the payment order against the deceased will be valid for the heir.

In addition, when the decision to discontinue the rehabilitation procedures becomes final and conclusive, the trustee's authority is extinguished, so even if the decision to discontinue the rehabilitation procedures becomes final and conclusive after the payment order is issued to the debtor and the original is delivered before the original copy

2. Review of the reasoning of the lower judgment and the record reveals the following facts.

On April 22, 2013, the Plaintiff filed an application with the Seoul Northern District Court (hereinafter “C”) for a payment order seeking payment of KRW 674 million per share issued by C (hereinafter “C”) as the debtor on April 22, 2013, and damages for delay. The obligor is B from the above court.